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 1 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Relevance and Background 
 
“While technology is important, it is what we do with it that matters.” 
Mohammed Yunus (founder of Grameen Bank, India) 
 
The internet has led to the rapid emergence of new organizational forms such as the sharing 
economy, crowdfunding and crowdlending and those based on the blockchain (particularly, 
cryptocurrency trading). These new forms struggle for survival and need to gain the acceptance 
of a significant public user base and state bodies upon which they depend for their continued 
existence. At the same time, such novel online-intermediated markets present challenges to 
society. Particularly in early phases of adoption and diffusion, proponents of these 
organizational forms must overcome strong distrust from all sides – the public, the private 
sector and potential regulating bodies are all understandably skeptical of such developments as 
these bring with them not only promises but are often accompanied by Schumpeterian processes 
of creative destruction (e.g. Schumpeter, 1942) which threaten incumbent firms and related 
employment. Consider how taxi companies and their drivers worldwide have been affected by 
the ride-sharing firm Uber, or how local and even global hotel business owners and managers 
struggle to cope with the apartment-sharing venture AirBnB, both classical examples of the 
sharing economy. At the same time, both business models promise to lower the costs of local 
transportation and accommodation for consumers by breaking up hitherto state-sanctioned 
oligopolies (e.g. the famously expensive taxi medallions in New York City or the typically 
coordinated pricing strategies of hotel chains1). In early adoption phases of a new industry, 
                                               
1 See Baum & Mudamby, 1995; Kalnins, 2006; 
 2 
typically both cognitive legitimation and socio-political legitimation are lacking (e.g. Aldrich 
& Fiol, 1994). Thus, the recurring question in management science (and economics) as to which 
new industries will ultimately be accepted by society (and the market) depends on a large 
number of conditions. A central phenomenon underlying the legitimacy of such new 
organizational forms is trust, which implies important roles not only for entrepreneurs and early 
adopters in these emerging markets but also for legislators, who must ultimately decide to which 
degree which types of regulation make sense at which time given economic and socio-political 
goals. 
Therefore, in this work, I examine a number of these new organizational forms - crowdfunding, 
crowdlending and cryptocurrency (Bitcoin) trading in four empirical studies, that highlight 
particular facets of trust and how trust (or the lack thereof) can hamper or facilitate the diffusion 
of such models. While the first two empirical studies examine trust in two forms of 
crowdfunding - crowdlending and equity crowdfunding through a decision-making lens, the 
third presents an experiment on the role of trust in groups in cross-cultural comparison and the 
final empirical study explores the role of trust, corruption and institutional context in the global 
diffusion of Bitcoins.  
Trust requires both exchange partners and interaction between them (i.e. some form of 
communication). Further trust requires at least one exchange partner to make him or herself 
vulnerable to the counterpart and thus expose himself to risk, e.g. of deception or betrayal (e.g. 
Venkataraman, 1997)2. Thus the agent’s decision to expose himself to the risk of opportunistic 
action by another implies the presence of trust (Coleman, 1990; Furlong, 1996). Trust between 
team members can lead to commitment to the organization, improved perceived task 
performance and team satisfaction (Costa, 2003). Trust has also been found to promote 
cooperation and truth-telling propensity (Porta, Lopez-De-Silane, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). 
                                               
2 The economics literature defines trust as “making yourself vulnerable to another agent, whose [potentially 
opportunistic] behavior is not under your control” (Furlong, 1996, p. 7). 
 3 
Similarly, it is well known that communication can promote trust as individuals get to know 
each other and discover commonalities, e.g. aligned incentives, common intentions, interests 
or goals, or on the flipside common dislikes or outcomes that both parties aim to avoid (Ben-
Ner & Putterman, 2009). In part, communication can reduce knowledge asymmetries between 
two or more parties. Also, trust-building is critical in the fight for legitimacy of a new venture 
or the establishment of a new market (e.g. Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
 
This work begins with an examination of crowdfunding and crowdlending, particularly 
regarding the roles of trust-based legitimation and communication– a recurring theme of all 
four empirical studies presented. To explore the role of trustworthy communication in 
crowdlending3, the first study examines deception on a leading German P2P-lending platform 
and analyzes whether and how deception cues in textual loan applications of borrowers are 
related to the risk of loan default. The second study aims to open the black box of investor 
decision-making in equity crowdfunding by qualitatively exploring the role of the 
entrepreneur’s communication with the crowd in the investor’s decision process of whether or 
not to (co-)fund a startup, particularly in terms of perceived signals of trustworthiness of the 
entrepreneur and perceived risks of the venture. The study also aims to answer a critical 
question for entrepreneurs in the crowd – how they can achieve a critical mass of supporters 
for their venture. The third study focuses on a specific setting within which trusting behavior 
occurs: interactions between representatives of groups. More specifically, the study 
experimentally explores the role of group representatives, particularly the willingness to trust a 
(in)group representative to invest in a public good on one’s behalf as well as the degree to which 
this contribution behavior is replicated cross-nationally (comparing pre-play communication 
and resulting public good investment behavior over time in Germany and Japan). The fourth 
                                               
3 “Trustworthy” here typically means that lenders can trust borrowers to pay back loans on time (Duarte, Siegel, 
and Young 2009). 
 4 
and final study examines the emergence of cryptocurrency trading in diverse market settings 
and in particular, the roles that institutional voids and perceived levels of trust and corruption 
play in determining trading volume in a particular country. To understand how these precise 
research topics emerged, in the following, research questions are developed in light of recent 
literature, after which the further structure of the thesis is described. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Next, we briefly summarize the most relevant publications that both motivate our chosen 
approach and our research questions in each empirical study.  
While research on communication and trust in IT-intermediated settings has begun to 
explore crowdfunding and crowdlending (e.g. Ahlers, Cumming, Günther and Schweizer, 
2015; Sonenschein, Herzenstein and Dholakia, 2011; Lukkarinen, Teich, Wallenius, & 
Wallenius, 2016), to date, only a small number of published papers analyze the relationship 
between narratives and P2P lending, two of which are briefly described here. First, Sonenshein, 
Herzenstein, and Dholakia (2011a) note that many borrowers in the crowd offer similar 
explanations (“social accounts”)4 for why they need a loan; explanations that are followed by 
an acknowledgement (of mistakes in the past) or a denial (when borrowers refute something 
about their past credit history) significantly predicts funding success, e.g. that the loan threshold 
was reached and therefore paid out5. The authors interpret this finding by arguing that these two 
types of constructed narratives evoke trustworthiness among lenders. In a follow-up article, 
Sonenshein, Herzenstein, and Dholakia (2011b) investigate the impact of identities (e.g., “hard-
working”) that borrowers create or attempt to portray for themselves in self-description texts, 
                                               
4 Accounts allow social actors to explain situations and events that are deviant or unanticipated (Scott & Lyman, 
1968). 
5 Recall that in crowdlending, loans are usually only paid out, when the funding threshold is reached. This is also 
the case in rewards-based crowdfunding, but can differ by platform, however. Some platforms consider a project 
successfully funded if 90% of the desired amount is reached. 
 5 
drawing on qualitative methodology. Looking for six identity claims in prospective borrower 
narratives (hardship, trustworthiness, hardworking, successful, moral and religious), the authors 
find a significant effect of identities on funding success, and in a follow-up analysis, on 
repayment success. Also, 84% of borrowers constructed one or more identities in their loan 
descriptions (Sonenshein, Herzenstein, and Dholakia, 2011b). 
Both studies focus on the perspective of borrowers. Therefore, in the first study of this 
work, we take the point of view of lenders and evaluate whether or not cues in the language of 
borrowers can yield important insights on the successful payback of their loan (i.e., whether 
they default or repay successfully). Further, we take an interdisciplinary approach, borrowing 
insights and methods from criminalistics (e.g. Buller and Burgoon, 1996) and linguistics (e.g. 
Pennebaker, Booth and Francis, 2007). Based on a sample of over 3000 crowdfunded loans on 
a well-known German crowdlending platform, the first empirical study therefore aims to answer 
the following research question using the method of survival analysis (e.g. Allison, 2014)6:  
RQ1: Can the occurrence of deceptive cues in soft information of IT-mediated P2P lending 
project descriptions help explain (or even better predict) loan default? 
While answering this question sheds light on the role of deception in P2P lending, it 
only gives us limited insight into success criteria, especially of newer forms of crowdfunding. 
To our knowledge, only two studies research success factors of equity crowdfunding in 
particular (Ahlers, Cumming, Günther, & Schweizer, 2015; Lukkarinen, Teich, Wallenius, & 
Wallenius, 2016). First, Lukkarinen et al (2016) find that in Europe, pre-selection of startups 
by crowdfunding platforms as well as the utilization of public and private networks help 
determine success or failure (Lukkarinen et al., 2016). The research paper by Ahlers et al. 
(2015) finds that providing more detailed information about risks and retaining equity both act 
                                               
6 Paul Allison, Ph.D., one of the foremost experts on survival analysis, kindly provided several helpful hints for 
this study based on a survival analysis workshop conducted in Stockholm in 2016. 
 6 
as signals that strongly impact the probability of successful equity crowdfunding. Social capital, 
on the other hand, is found to have no significant effect on the probability of success, partly 
contradicting the first study. The authors call for research that further explores investment 
reasons in equity crowdfunding, pointing to limitations of their quantitative dataset (Ahlers et 
al., 2015). Neither of these studies focus on the decision-making processes underlying funding 
success criteria in an in-depth qualitative manner. Yet we seek to understand precisely how 
entrepreneurs can seek to build investor trust and legitimate their early-stage venture in the 
crowd. 
To obtain a deeper understanding of what leads crowdfunding projects to a successful 
outcome, insights into the process of how individuals within the crowd reach their investment 
decisions are required. Based on this premise and three in-depth qualitative (interpretative) case 
studies of successful equity crowdfunding ventures, the second empirical study investigates the 
following research questions using theory-building from case studies methodology (e.g. 
(Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989):  
RQ2a: What roles do trust and perceived risk play in the decision-making process of crowd 
investors on CrowdEquity?  
RQ2b: Further, how can these be influenced by founders and the platform? 
Up to this point, the research questions presented seek to explore the role of trust and 
communication in crowdlending and equity crowdfunding in Germany. However, this still 
leaves three central questions unaddressed – first, what do cultural differences suggest about 
the degree that trusting investment behavior should be replicated in other, very different 
national settings? Second, participation in donation and reward-based types of crowdfunding 
projects is often motivated not only by profit maximization but also by social goals; therefore, 
it seems sensible to explore how ex-ante communication effects the willingness to trust others 
in the public good investment setting. Finally, due to the IT-mediated context of the platforms, 
 7 
investments in crowdfunding are relatively anonymous; this makes it particularly interesting to 
know whether people from or in certain cultures are more willing to trust strangers to act on 
their behalf. Also, under which conditions are group representatives perceived as legitimate to 
invest on behalf of members of the group?   
Yuki´s (2003) framework for understanding group behavior in collectivist countries and 
Yamagishi´s structural trust model (Kuwabara et al., 2007; Yamagishi, Cook, & Watabe, 1998), 
lead us to expect differences in trust between individualistic and collectivistic countries towards 
strangers in general, but also in the effect of communication between representative and 
constituency on the cooperative behavior of representatives. Therefore, using a sample of 231 
subjects we use experimental methods to compare public good contribution behavior of group 
representatives in Germany, a rather individualistic, European country, with that in Japan, the 
classical example of a collectivistic country (e.g. Hofstede and Hofstede, 2010) in treatments 
with and without (pre-play) communication. This leads us to posit the research questions:  
 
RQ3a: What are intercultural differences in negotiation behavior of (group) representatives 
who do not know each other and also do not know their constituency very well?  
RQ3b: Specifically, do more individualistic (collectivistic) cultures facilitate placing trust in a 
stranger´s cooperativeness (e.g. willingness to contribute to a public good) and if so, how? 
 
  Answering these questions promises to shed light on investment behavior in two very 
different countries with contrasting levels of generalized trust. Yet, we have so far largely 
disregarded the role of the country’s level of development (e.g. developing countries). 
Institutional theory assumes that the emergence and development of new markets is strongly 
linked to the emergence and development of specific institutions and rules that shape this 
market (Padgett & Powell 2012). Institutions interact with organizations to play a key role in 
 8 
economic development (e.g. Peng & Heath, 1996) and in shaping the legitimacy7 of markets 
(Bowen & Cleckq 2008; Doh et al, 2010). Spaces where such institutions are lacking are known 
as institutional voids8 (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Institutional voids can inspire entrepreneurs 
to create or enter new markets (Mair & Marti 2009). Crowdfunding and cryptocurrency trading 
are good examples of such markets. But at the same time, a lack of financial (and technological) 
infrastructure can hamper entrepreneurs from entering such markets. This type of setting 
famously motivated Google executives to bring the internet to Sub-Saharan Africa with a 
network of hot air balloons and Facebook executives to attempt a similar feat with drones as of 
2014, both strategic moves to allow their businesses and brands to expand further globally.9  
We also know that trust-based relationships can fill institutional voids, shaping performance 
particularly in the high-tech sector of emerging markets (e.g. Miller et al, 2009). 
Yet little is known about how the absence of institutions may impact the attractiveness 
of the development of contested new markets such as crowdfunding and more recently, 
cryptocurrency trading. Similarly, markets with weaker institutions are often perceived as 
hotbeds for corruption (e.g. Luiz and Stewart, 2014), a phenomenon related to generalized trust 
(e.g. Uslaner, 2004; Rothstein, 2013); but at the same time, corruption (particularly in the form 
of bribes) can smooth business transactions in some markets. Both perceived trust and 
corruption are likely to impact the perceived legitimacy of new and contested markets (e.g. 
Miller et al, 2009; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Tonoyan et al, 2010). Finally, research on 
cryptocurrencies cryptocurrencies and trust is scarce and is sofar largely the domain of legal 
scholars (Nelms et al, 2018; Simser, 2015; Gruber, 2013). Therefore, in the fourth and final 
                                               
7 Legitimacy has been defined as “a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that 
leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper and just” (Tyler, 2006). See also Aldrich & Fiol 
(2004: 648) who differentiate between cognitive legitimacy (“knowledge about the new activity and what is needed 
to succeed in an industry”) and socio-political legitimacy (“the value placed on an activity by cultural norms and 
political authorities”). 
8 More formally, institutional voids have been defined as “a relative lack of intermediary firms, regulatory systems 
and contract-enforcing mechanisms” (Khanna and Palepu 2000; Khanna and Rivkin 2001). 
9 https://www.technologyreview.com/s/525951/facebooks-drones-will-battle-googles-balloons-to-spread-
internet-access/ 
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study, we therefore analyze the growth of the market for Bitcoin trading in 46 different 
countries over the time-period from 2013-2017 using Random Effects GLS regression (e.g. 
Laird 1982 & Ware, 1982; Diggle et al, 2002) and seek to answer the following research 
questions: 
 
RQ4a: What is the role of institutional voids in shaping the early market for cryptocurrency 
(Bitcoin) trading? 
RQ4b: What roles do differing (perceived) levels of trust and corruption play in this 
development? 
 
Taken together, these research questions promise to shed light on the roles of trust, 
communication and context in online-intermediated transactions. Next, the structure of thesis 
is laid out. 
1.3 The Structure of the Thesis 
The dissertation is structured as follows: subsequent to the introduction, four individual, 
empirical research studies are presented. The first research study, written in collaboration with 
Dr. Dennis Steininger, Prof. Dr. Michael Woywode and Prof. Dr. Daniel Veit, is presented in 
chapter two. It has been submitted to the Journal of Information Technology (VHB: A). Based 
on a sample of over 3000 loans from a leading German crowdlending platform, it examines 
deception in peer-to-peer lending and analyzes whether deception cues of borrowers are related 
to the risk of loan default. The objectives of the paper are: (1) to determine whether linguistic 
cues to deception can be detected using content analysis approaches suggested by criminalistics 
theory, (2) to find out whether soft information (particularly textual cues) can help improve 
prediction of the hazard of loan default above and beyond traditional hard information about 
loans (e.g. credit grade, interest rate and loan duration) and (3) to discuss potential implications 
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for research in the study of trust and deception in entrepreneurship and information systems. 
More specifically, the study investigates empirically whether specific properties of loan 
description texts crafted by borrowers that are predicted by theory to be related to deception –
quantity (i.e. length), expressivity (e.g. emotionality), immediacy (e.g. use of words related to 
time and places), complexity (e.g. punctuation and use of long words), formality (e.g. “Sir”), 
diversity (of vocabulary used)– are more frequently present in defaulting loans in comparison 
with loans that are paid back in full. 
While the findings of the first empirical study do not definitively relate certain linguistic 
deception cues to deception on behalf of borrowers, they nevertheless strongly suggest that 
deception is present on the platform observed and demonstrate that less creditworthy borrowers 
use different writing styles that are detectable using pattern matching techniques grounded in 
linguistics and criminalistics theory. The study therefore helps us to understand how credit 
decisions are made on online platforms, particularly in crowdlending. Further, the results may 
serve as a blueprint for lenders to further develop borrower screening systems for 
creditworthiness and deception. 
The second research study is presented in chapter three. It is co-authored with Dr. 
Dennis Steininger and has been submitted to the Journal of Strategic Information Systems and 
presented at the 2017 Academy of Management Conference in a paper development workshop. 
The study aims to open the black box of investor decision-making in equity crowdfunding. The 
research qualitatively explores the roles that trust, perceived risk and communication play in 
the investor’s decision of whether or not to (co-)fund a startup based on the analysis of three 
highly successful cases from one of the largest German crowd-equity platforms. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with all relevant parties of each case: the entrepreneurs who sought 
financing, the investors (a.k.a. “backers”) and the staff running the online platform. This effort 
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constitutes a deep-dive into critical success factors driving funding decisions and is, to our best 
knowledge, one of the first studies to take this approach. 
The findings of the second study reveal that the crowd is heterogeneous and that both 
rational and emotional signals can promote (or hinder) investment. The study suggests that how 
startups communicate in their investor pitch impacts both the diversity and quantity of 
investments received by investors in the crowd, hence influencing the perceived legitimacy of 
the venture. Similarly, proactively involving the media (or a PR agency) early on is a method 
used by particularly successful entrepreneurs in the crowd. The findings suggest that truly 
successful equity crowdfunding campaigns employ a holistic approach to investor 
communication that includes both sufficient details for the due diligence process that appeal to 
rational investors, and emotional appeals such as selling the entrepreneur’s vision and giving 
the impression of approachability. Further, the cases analyzed show that both material and 
immaterial incentives as well as industry trends draw the crowd. Overall, the study contributes 
to an in-depth understanding of mechanisms in equity crowdfunding, particularly concerning 
the contextual boundary conditions for successful campaigns. Utilizing the proposed model, 
entrepreneurs can optimize their communication and behavior towards the crowd. 
The fourth chapter presents the third empirical study. The study was written in 
collaboration with behavioral economist Prof. Dr. Christiane Schwieren (University of 
Heidelberg) and public goods researcher Prof. Dr. Yoshio Iida (Kyoto Sangyo University) and 
has been presented at (peer-reviewed) national and international conferences. The study 
examines the willingness to trust a group representative to invest on one’s behalf as well as the 
degree to which this behavior can be replicated cross-nationally in controlled experimental 
settings. More precisely, the study finds that the in-group formation of teams (in-group) plays 
a key role in determining the willingness to trust a group representative in a modified public 
goods game. The study finds that in Japan conditional cooperation rates are lower overall than 
 12 
in Germany, which is probably because the Japanese need significantly more time to form 
reciprocal bonds than allotted in the experimental chat procedure. Higher trust in strangers leads 
to increased willingness to trust a group representative to invest on one’s behalf in Germany, 
but less so in Japan, a culture in which reciprocal relationships are not usually established ad-
hoc, but require extensive relationship building (e.g. Kuwabara et al, 2007; Yamagishi and 
Yamagishi, 1994; Yuki et al, 2005). More generally, the study demonstrates that there are 
cultural differences in behaviour of representatives of interacting groups that can be detected in 
the laboratory.  
The study contributes to a better understanding of the role of trusting intermediaries to 
conditionally cooperate on investments in different cultural settings with implications for 
crowdfunding, since investors need to trust entrepreneurs (particularly social entrepreneurs) to 
act on behalf of the group of backers. Also, in some cases, crowdfunding platforms choose 
which (social) projects to invest in on behalf of backers, who invest in a set portfolio of projects 
(e.g. SeedInvest.com). Such time-efficient automatic investment distributes risk for 
crowdinvestors but nonetheless requires trusting the intermediary, something heavily impacted 
by online and often indirect communication. Finally, while crowd entrepreneurs often initially 
confine their activities to one country, many are looking to expand internationally, increasingly 
to Asia (Kromidha, 2015), an ongoing process which is partly driven by Chinese expatriates 
(Weidenbaum and Hughes, 1996; Zheng at al, 2014). Therefore, it is helpful for entrepreneurs 
and SME managers in the crowd to know what type of communication will evoke trust in which 
setting and which type of behaviour to look out for among platform participants that may signal 
deception or lack of trustworthiness. 
The fourth and final empirical study is presented in chapter five. The study is written in 
collaboration with Prof. Dr. Suleika Bort (Chemnitz University of Technology) and has been 
recently submitted to (peer-reviewed) national and international conferences. Based on a full 
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sample of Bitcoin trading transactions from coindance, a well-known global (decentralized) 
trading platform, it examines the development of the volume of cryptocurrency trading over the 
time-period from 2013-2017 in 46 countries and analyzes whether or not perceived trust and 
corruption and the level of institutional voids are related to trading volume in a given country. 
The objectives of the paper are: (1) to explore what enables a contested emerging industry to 
develop given different levels of institutional voids and (2) to examine the roles of perceived 
trust and corruption on the amount of the cryptocurrency trading. 
The study finds that perception of corruption in a country is positively related to bitcoin 
trading volume while the level of perceived (generalized) trust is negatively related. Further, 
the study finds that a given country’s emerging market status negatively impacts trading 
volume, as does any type of legal regulation. The study implies that people in countries with 
high levels of perceived corruption seem to use this perceived lack of government control to 
more frequently engage in new and contested markets; the findings therefore support profit-
seeking and tax-evasion motives for participation. That trust is negatively related implies a 
further participation motive – to compensate for lack of societal trust. Cryptocurrencies are 
designed to facilitate disintermediated online transactions without requiring trust of the 
exchange partner. Also, overall, emerging markets seem to be more poorly positioned to 
quickly take advantage of rapidly emerging and contested digital markets like cryptocurrency 
trading. 
The study contributes to a better understanding of how institutions and in particular the 
absence of institutions (i.e., institutional voids), perceived trust and corruption impact the 
digital market frontier and suggests that government intervention at early stages of new markets 
hamper market activity and growth – in the case of Bitcoins, this seems true whether the 
government declares the currency as legal or restricted. Those markets seem to fare best from 
a growth perspective, which remain unregulated. From the perspective of cognitive legitimacy 
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(e.g. Aldrich & Fiol, 1994), both knowledge about Bitcoin trading and what it takes to succeed 
in this new industry have clearly grown over the time-period of observation, increasing 
legitimacy of the industry. Also, cryptocurrencies present an example of how technology can 
help fill both institutional voids (e.g. in Sub-Saharan Africa) and “trust voids”, e.g. in countries 
in which general societal trust is low, therefore taking a compensatory role. At the same time, 
the technology can be misused to facilitate illicit activities such as money laundering and tax 
evasion with possible detrimental effects on socio-political legitimation. Therefore, further 
study is needed.  
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2. Leveraging the Value of Soft Information for Peer-to-Peer Lending Platforms: A 
Study of Linguistic Cues 
 
Abstract: Many credit decisions are now made on online platforms (e.g., in P2P lending). 
Impersonal communication in this context lowers the costs of lying and incentivizes borrowers 
to misrepresent their creditworthiness in order to improve credit conditions. However, 
simultaneously, these platforms generate a plethora of soft information such as personal profiles 
or communication data which enable new algorithms to better detect risky borrowers. Based on 
these notions and criminalistics theory, we develop a linguistic content analysis process to 
improve default detection in P2P lending, enabling platforms to improve their design to 
facilitate investor decisions and identify fraudulent lenders. To evaluate our approach, we 
combine traditional hard lending information (e.g., lending amount, interest rate, default risk) 
and linguistic artefacts of deceptive language (i.e., soft information) from a sample of 3661 
loan profiles on a popular crowdlending platform. Our results indicate that the approach taken 
can significantly improve default risk evaluation compared to classic approaches using only 
traditional hard lending information. Our results relate linguistic cues to economic transaction 
outcomes and interpret them in light of agency and interpersonal deception theory. We find that 
the linguistic deception cues of quantity, diversity, complexity, expressivity, and immediacy in 
loan descriptions are significantly positively related to the hazard of loan default by borrowers, 
while use of positive affect reduces the hazard. This demonstrates that soft information can be 
used to better detect risky P2P lending profiles, leading to potentially higher professionalism 
and profitability for both P2P lending firms and lenders as well as higher platform adoption 
rates.  
Keywords: Crowdfunding, Peer-to-Peer Lending, crowd lending, default risk, content analysis, 
decision making, linguistic cues, interpersonal deception theory, computer linguistics 
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2.1 Introduction 
Peer-to-peer (also P2P, person-to-person, crowd or social) lending allows private lenders to 
issue smaller loans to borrowers via an online platform without the need to directly engage with 
traditional banks. Private lenders each provide small sums until the target amount is reached 
and the loan is granted (the crowdfunding principle). One such firm and the subject of our study 
is PeerCo10, a large German P2P lending platform. While lenders are attracted by relatively 
high rates of return, borrowers typically resort to P2P lending when they want a loan quickly 
without facing complex bureaucratic hurdles and screening by traditional banks. Declared a 
breakthrough business idea in the Harvard Business Review in 2009 (Benyus et al. 2009), the 
P2P lending market has grown rapidly. Global crowdfunding volume (mainly P2P lending) 
exceeded $34 billion in 2015 and increased over 1000 percent in three years. It is expected to 
grow to $300 billion in 2025 (Hogue 2015; Massolution 2013; World Bank 2013). 
P2P technology has continued to enable fundamental changes in the financial sector (Wang et 
al. 2009) and beyond. However, crowdfunding and particularly P2P platforms face several 
challenges in platform design and incentive alignment between exchange partners 
(Bretschneider and Leimeister 2017; Burtch et al. 2018; Feller et al. 2017; Thies et al. 2016; 
Wessel et al. 2017). First, investors on these platforms are mainly amateurs who are easily 
influenced by many non-traditional factors surrounding the investment offering. Examples 
include the borrowers’ characteristics such as gender, age or their language when describing 
the need for a loan (Hoegen et al. 2017). Secondly, borrowers may turn to P2P platforms when 
they experience difficulties receiving loans elsewhere potentially leading to adverse selection 
in P2P lending markets. Here, adverse selection means that borrowers who privately know they 
want to finance high risk projects have higher incentives to participate in such P2P markets 
                                               
10 Name anonymized as agreed with the firm. 
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compared to borrowers who search for financing for average risk projects (Akerlof 1970). 
Third, fraud in P2P lending markets presents a substantial problem. Thus lenders are confronted 
not only with adverse selection due to information about the borrower’s true risk being privately 
held, but also with moral hazard – the risk that borrowers will not use the funds in the way they 
promised. Overcoming fraud issues is seen as central to the success or failure of P2P lending 
platforms (Knowledge@Wharton 2017). Share prices for LendingClub, the largest P2P lending 
platform, recently dropped by half (TechCrunch 2016) under scrutiny from the California 
Department of Business Oversight11. LendingClub apparently misrepresented its default rate to 
consumers as 4-6% when it was actually 7-8% (Bloomberg 2016).  
A defining characteristic of p2p lending platforms is that they fill the niche of providing small 
and fast loans left vacant by classical loan providers that typically focus on loans with much 
larger amounts (Burtch et al. 2014). While auditor training has been shown to be significantly 
linked to successful fraud detection (Drogalas et al. 2017), p2p lending platforms oftentimes 
lack the highly formalized underwriting controls of classical lenders and due to smaller staff 
size than traditional banks and therefore highly reliant on information systems to assist them in 
carrying out such screening and monitoring activities. For example, for the period from July 
13, 2009 to September 30, 2015, the platform Prosper.com verified employment and/or income 
on only about 59% of borrower loans and about 73% of originations, while 13% of loan 
applications were cancelled due to inaccurate or insufficient employment or income 
information (Prosper 2016). This demonstrates that so far little verification/due diligence is 
being done on borrowers’ creditworthiness. 
                                               
11 In the U.S., P2P lending is overseen nationally by the SEC, the CFPB and in some cases the FTC. The FDIC, 
which insures bank accounts up to $100k, applies only to traditional banks, a loophole for P2P lending that leads 
to higher risk for borrowers. In Germany, this role is taken by the German Financial Supervisory Authority 
(BaFin). According to a new law (the Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz or small investor protection law) from 2015, such 
platforms must file a prospectus and as of 2017, consumer protections as well as a self-disclosure mandate of 
income-related information for borrowers took effect. 
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While statistics and recent studies speak for themselves, P2P lending is also unique in that, 
unlike deception in online dating (where individuals meet face-to-face and risk being publicly 
shamed), deceptive borrowers in this largely anonymous and disembodied setting face few or 
no social sanctions, especially in one-shot transactions. Research suggests that lack of 
physicality increases the opportunities for deception (Toma and Hancock 2010), which has 
made online deception research highly interesting for IS researchers (Ho et al. 2016; Ludwig et 
al. 2016; Proudfoot et al. 2016; Siering et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2016). 
This paper is motivated by a problem inherent to P2P lending: platform lenders need to decide 
whether or not to lend solely on lean information provided on the platform about the borrower 
such as financials (e.g., the interest rate) and textual project descriptions on a website. This 
differs from other platforms; for instance, in reward-based crowdfunding (e.g., Kickstarter) 
further information is commonly provided in the form of videos. The absence of this type of 
information on P2P lending platforms excludes intimate personal information that could 
otherwise increase borrower accountability and lender trust. Experiments with cheap talk (e.g. 
unverifiable communication that does not directly affect who gets what) show that individuals 
pay greater attention to more credible signals (Crawford and Sobel 1982; Farrell and Rabin 
1996). Many researchers suggest that the incapability of private lenders to decide on trust- and 
creditworthiness ex-ante puts the p2p-business model at risk (Hoegen et al. 2017) and a is a 
problem that needs to be resolved. In the absence of professional screening by a third party, 
borrowers are tempted to present facts in an overly optimistic way (signaling) or to deceive in 
order to increase their funding success (i.e., the credit is issued because sufficient lenders 
provide money to reach the requested amount). Recent experimental evidence in IS shows that 
certain language-action cues (e.g., cognitive load, affective process and wordiness) can reveal 
patterns of information behavior manifested by deceivers in spontaneous online communication 
(Ho et al. 2016). Literature also suggests that the ignorance or misinterpretation of relevant 
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publicly available information is a frequent reason for misevaluation (Hildebrand et al. 2017; 
Hirshleifer 2001; Mild et al. 2015).  
Despite its importance, the assessment of the relationship between ex-ante borrower-provided 
data and default in online lending markets (whether a borrower fails to pay back the credit to 
the lenders completely as planned) has received only limited attention (Berger and Gleisner 
2009; Gonzalez and Loureiro 2014; Iyer et al. 2015; Ravina 2008).  
And, while recent articles on deception detection included studies that examine textual cues, 
none of these focus particularly on the interactions with lending (the closest is Siering et al, 
2016, which looks at the related domain of crowdfunding). To the best of our knowledge, to 
date only a small number of published articles exist which analyze textual cues or narratives on 
P2P lending platforms. Two of these focus on predicting funding success via borrowers’ 
classified types of descriptions of their financing needs (Sonenshein et al. 2011) or types of 
identity claims in the texts (Herzenstein et al. 2011). Hence, both papers take the perspective 
of a borrower. Further, some authors have begun to assess the predictive capacity of soft 
information on lending profitability by examining if borrower-provided texts comprise hints on 
creditworthiness that lenders overlook (Greiner and Wang 2010; Herzenstein et al. 2008; 
Larrimore et al. 2011; Moulton 2007).  
Overall, most existing studies mainly take a borrower perspective and look at funding success 
instead of repayment. Furthermore, they do not systematically question motivations or 
incentives that cause the observed effects (Gao et al. 2017). To fill this gap, we discuss the 
incentives of high-risk borrowers (lemons) to falsely signal low-risk. Thus, high-risk borrowers 
might provide a false, overly optimistic, or misleading (and therefore deceptive) picture of their 
creditworthiness in their loan descriptions. From this backdrop, we approach our analysis using 
interpersonal deception theory, which is also used in criminalistics. The theory suggests that 
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deception is “imperfect strategic behavior” (Buller and Burgoon 1996). Deceivers are likely to 
leave language artifacts or cues that can be detected when analyzing language style.  
We take a lender perspective and evaluate on whether or not these cues in the language of 
borrowers on the p2p lending platform studied can yield important insights that can feed into 
the automated identification of high risk borrowers (e.g., via machine learning algorithms). We 
therefore aim to answer the following research question:  
Can the occurrence of deceptive cues in soft information of IT-mediated P2P lending project 
descriptions help to explain (and predict) loan default? 
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first studies to combine research on automated 
deception detection in a computer-mediated P2P context with the evaluation of economic 
transaction outcomes (Gao et al. 2017; Herzenstein et al. 2011; Larrimore et al. 2011). On the 
basis of the structuring foundations of agency theory (Akerlof 1970), we use ‘soft’ textual 
borrower descriptions and hard information such as the credit grade from 3661 loan projects of 
the P2P lending platform PeerCo. Computer-supported content analysis and Cox regressions 
are applied in order to evaluate the research question (Zhou et al. 2004a).  
2.2 Theoretical Foundations and Hypotheses 
P2P platforms are prone to information asymmetries. Information asymmetries arise when 
borrowers have more information about their ability and willingness to repay (i.e., their 
creditworthiness) than lenders. This type of market failure puts lenders at a disadvantage and 
effects their ability to set interest rates, a major concern in credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981). When lenders do not know the risk level of borrowers they cannot perfectly price loans 
and equilibrium outcomes become unlikely. Without further information, it is difficult for 
lenders to tell high-risk from low-risk borrowers, which is known as adverse selection (Akerlof 
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1970). This situation can be exploited by borrowers. Information asymmetries help explain why 
financial intermediaries exist (Campbell and Kracaw 1980; Leland and Pyle 1977; Myers and 
Majluf 1984).  
Information can be dichotomized into hard and soft information. Hard information (e.g., 
borrowing amount, interest rate) is quantitative and easy to store and transmit, and has a 
relatively uniform (unambiguous) interpretation, while soft information (e.g., loan descriptions 
provided by loan seekers) is usually communicated in textual form (Stein 2002). Researchers 
have criticized mainstream studies for their narrow focus on “functionalist” hard information 
(Lodh and Gaffikin 1997; Roberts and Scapens 1985). In this study, we make use of both hard 
and soft information on the borrower and his/her proposed project. Depending on the 
informational context of text, soft information can be “hardened” by quantifying and storing 
parts of it in a meaningful way.  
In order to better understand information asymmetries in P2P lending (i.e., when borrowers 
have more information than lenders about their creditworthiness) and the incentives for 
borrowers to use over-optimistic (or misleading) signaling, we draw on agency theory and 
interpersonal deception theory.  
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory helps us understand situations in which one party has more information than the 
other; on our p2p lending platform, only the borrower knows his/her true risk and can choose 
what he/she discloses to lenders. More generally, agency theory (Akerlof 1970) conceptualizes 
goal conflicts between two partners in economic transactions (principal and agent) where 
bounded rationality (i.e., rationality of decision-makers is limited by their cognition, decision 
time, and available information), fears of opportunism and information asymmetries exist 
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(Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Agency theory maintains that when agents have more 
information, the principal (i.e., the lender) cannot ensure that the agent (i.e., the borrower) is 
acting in his/her best interest. 
Evidence that agency is helpful in digital settings and platforms can be found particularly in IS 
studies (e.g., Dibbern et al. 2004; Pavlou et al. 2007) but also in related management literature 
(Lin et al. 2013). In agency relationships where lenders are the principals and borrowers are the 
agents, the agents may exploit their knowledge of their own high-risk of default and spend the 
money even though they know they cannot pay it back. The loss incurred by the principal in 
such a case is known as agency loss.  
In traditional markets, mechanisms are in place to mitigate this problem; such financial 
intermediaries reduce information asymmetry between parties (and by extension agency loss) 
by providing detailed information about borrowers (e.g. their income and credit history) to 
lenders. Banks go beyond this by providing human agents who act as risk experts to screen 
potential borrowers face-to-face and foster trust relationships in order to smooth transactions 
and facilitate repayment (e.g., Moulton 2007). P2P platforms usually avoid such face-to-face 
interactions entirely for cost reasons. Banks also retain historical information on borrowers, 
something that is still scarce in online P2P lending. P2P lending sites profit by largely 
disintermediating bank agents (by semi-automating due diligence), focusing on hitherto 
underserved borrowers (e.g. those with smaller credit histories or in niche markets) and relying 
heavily on online information about borrowers, such as their self-reported information (Lee and 
Lee 2012), to help mitigate the lender’s adverse selection problem. A recent study on the US 
P2P lending site Prosper finds that providing more information improves lender screening and 
dramatically reduces the default rate for high-risk loans, with little effect on low-risk loans 
(Miller 2015).  
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While agency theory presents us with a useful starting point from which to explore p2p lending 
platform dynamics, in order to investigate (potential) deception, we first need to understand the 
decision-making process of investors in the crowd, the value of borrower signals (e.g. in their 
project/loan descriptions), and the accuracy by which ex-ante hard information impacts loan 
default. Some pieces of the information consist of exogenously verified hard facts; others (i.e., 
soft information, such as the textual description of why a loan is needed) can be influenced by 
the borrower and thus represent purposeful signals which are often susceptible to deception 
since the lender is presented with little information concerning the truthfulness of the 
description on the p2p platform. In a study of the US credit market, hard information is found 
to be less accurate for low credit grades, where soft information explains up to 39 percent of 
risk, which indicates that soft facts are more important when hard information conveys a 
negative image of creditworthiness (Moulton 2007). In classical credit markets as well as p2p 
lending platforms, borrowers often try to mitigate the negative effects of exogenous hard 
information by changing endogenous hard information (e.g., adapting the interest rate) or by 
conveying a positive image by providing reassuring (possibly inaccurate, misleading or false) 
soft information (e.g. in their crowdfunding project description). This may be particularly true 
for high-risk borrowers who stand to gain the most in relative terms by means of persuasion 
tactics especially in digital settings (Iyer et al. 2009).  
2.2.2 Soft Information and Deception 
Deception is defined as “intentional control of information […] to create a false belief in the 
receiver” (Hancock 2007, p. 290; Zhou et al. 2008, p. 119). By controlling or misrepresenting 
information an image of a borrower’s creditworthiness can be created that is higher than the 
true one with the ultimate goal of achieving funding success. The incentive to deceive depends 
on individually perceived costs and benefits (Hurkens and Kartik 2009). Potential benefits from 
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deception depend on the accuracy of verifiable hard facts: the more risk that can still be 
explained by soft information, the more a borrower has the opportunity to differentiate by 
providing overly positive soft information. Relatively risky borrowers within a given risk 
category have a higher incentive to misrepresent themselves since higher potential benefits are 
to be expected.  
The anonymous and digital setting but also the current design of most p2p platforms facilitate 
deception, not only in lending (Caspi and Gorsky 2006; Herzenstein et al. 2011; Horne et al. 
2007; Larrimore et al. 2011; Utz 2005). The internet has increased “physical, psychological, 
cultural [and] social distance” (Jones 1991, p. 372) between transaction parties as well as 
between decision and effects. Roberts and Scapens (1985) argue that organizational 
accountability benefits greatly from regular face-to-face contact and reduced physical distance 
between parties. Accordingly, research suggests that anonymity and the reduction in personal 
communication have decreased mutual empathy (Logsdon and Patterson 2010) and increased 
ambiguity and uncertainty in message decoding due to the lack of nonverbal cues  (Daft and 
Lengel 1986). These tendencies increase the ease of and incentives for engaging in deception 
(Joinson and Dietz-Uhler 2002; Logsdon and Patterson 2010, 2010).  
Evidence of the prevalence of deception on online platforms can be found in a number of recent 
studies that observe deception in the form of ‘fake’ reviews (Luca and Zervas 2013; Mayzlin 
et al. 2014; Ott et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2016). For example, Luca and Zervas (2013) find that 
16% of restaurant reviews on Yelp are filtered out as fake or suspicious and that incentives to 
commit review fraud include weak reputation. A handful of papers on P2P lending are worth 
mentioning but do not analyze textual descriptions. Michels (2012) finds that unverifiable 
disclosures matter in P2P lending and lead to more lenders responding to a loan request. Iyer et 
al. (2015) study how non-expert individuals screen their peer’s creditworthiness and find that 
such peers predict default with greater accuracy than with the credit score alone. 
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At the same time, p2p platforms have strong incentives to lower the access barriers to credit, as 
they earn interest on each loan and depend on a critical mass of users for media coverage and 
venture capital financing; by setting a low bar for access, platforms can facilitate deception and 
fraud. Researchers mostly agree that the main factors determining the costs of deception are the 
consequences, the proximity to the victim, and the societal view of a deception as fair or unfair 
(Jones 1991; McMahon and Harvey 2006). 
We assume that, for borrowers with risky projects or weak intentions to repay the borrowed 
money (lemons), the benefits of lying exceed outweigh potential costs (e.g. of having one’s 
account suspended by the platform) and that lying costs are generally low: it is difficult to 
establish a valid legal argument for discrepancies between default and the promises made in 
descriptions. This problem is strengthened by the sheer number of parties involved in peer-to-
peer settings, which make it too costly to systematically check such assertions. This is the case 
not only for the P2P-Lending service, but also for individual lenders who (due to the relatively 
small amounts lent, often to a portfolio of projects) have only limited incentives to investigate 
individual false or misleading project descriptions or moral hazard on behalf of the borrower 
(e.g. that some borrowers may spend the money on other things than their project once the loan 
is approved). While online rating systems mitigate this problem for identifiable repeat offenders 
to some degree, such systems rely on hard information (e.g., offenses reported by other users, 
official bankruptcy procedures). Also, for most one-off borrowers, a degradation of the future 
credit score (e.g. FICO12) is unproblematic.  
                                               
12 FICO (Fair, Isaac and Company) is a data analytics company in California that provides the well-known US 
consumer credit ratings used when applying for credit cards, home mortgages or motor vehicle financing. Scores 
are between 300 and 850 with higher indicating less risk. The algorithm is based largely on a given person’s debts 
and payment history and is explained here: "How Are Credit Scores Calculated? Learn What Affects Your Credit 
Score". myFICO.com. Retrieved 2018-06-06. 
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2.2.3 Interpersonal Deception Theory 
The interpersonal deception theory (IDT) institutionalizes the detection of liars through their 
language style based on a set of linguistic constructs also used in criminalistics (Buller and 
Burgoon 1996). One strategy for managing the discomfort caused by lying (or information 
manipulation) is psychological distancing from the deception and its possible negative 
repercussions (DePaulo et al. 2003; Knapp and Comadena 1979).  
Interpersonal deception theory (IDT) proposes that liars subconsciously stand out since their 
motives leave artifacts in their language (Buller and Burgoon 1996). IDT comprises 18 
propositions (see Table 15 of the Appendix).13 IDT therefore suggests that deception is 
“imperfect strategic behavior” which nonetheless requires mental effort (Buller and Burgoon 
1996). The authors list four message characteristics that reflect strategic intent: (1) uncertainty 
and vagueness, (2) non-immediacy and withdrawal, (3) disassociation and (4) image- and 
relationship-protecting behavior (Buller and Burgoon 1996).  IDT tests and meta-analyses have 
confirmed that liars manipulate clarity, relevance, association, truthfulness and completeness 
when communicating (Buller and Burgoon 1996; Burgoon et al. 1996; DePaulo et al. 2003). 
Additional ‘leakage’ signs of strategic behavior include frequent speech errors and increased 
speech hesitations (awkward pauses) due to the cognitive demands of fabricating an untruthful 
account (Buller and Burgoon 1996; Griffin 2006). 
Zhou et al. summarize and define a number of linguistic constructs or cues of deceptive intent 
in written language which we adopt below in Table 1 (Zhou et al. 2004b).  
                                               
13 While IDT was conceptualized to explain deception in communication in the form of strategic moves and 
countermoves, the core findings apply to asynchronous text as well as can be seen in Table 15 in the appendix. 
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Table 1 Definition of Linguistics Constructs, Adopted from Zhou et al (2004a) 
Construct Definition of Construct 
Quantity The quantity of information the sender wants to convey 
Expressivity  The degree to which the sender colors his writing 
Affect  The degree to which the sender describes (positive) personal emotions in his writing 
Quality  The degree to which the sender signals due diligence in his writing, e.g., by conducting a 
spellcheck 
Immediacy The degree to which the sender associates with the content of and the degree to which he clarifies 
his role or the role of a group he belongs to in his message  
Uncertainty  The degree to which the language of the sender indicates ambiguousness, e.g., leaves it open to 
interpretation 
Complexity The level of syntactical structures used by the sender 
Diversity  The degree to which the sender’s writing is multi-faceted in wordings and expressions 
Specificity The degree to which the sender specifies location and time for the conveyed information 
 
We provide a condensed overview of the findings of empirical studies on the effects of these 
constructs as they relate to linguistic deception detection using a concept matrix (Webster and 
Watson 2002) in Table 2. The empirical studies included are all based on linguistic cues since 
non-verbal cues are not available in online profiles (Toma and Hancock 2010).  
The results of these studies suggest that liars display above-average expressivity, affect, quality 
and uncertainty in their language and below-average immediacy and diversity. Findings on 
quantity, complexity and specificity are mixed but a majority of the studies categorized find 
that liars display higher quantity while displaying more complexity and less specificity in their 
text. 
Two moderating factors for effect and direction are typically differentiated: the medium (email 
vs. instant chat, etc.) and the mode (verbal vs. written). Carlson et al. (2004) integrated the 
computer-mediated communication theory and the interpersonal deception theory. The authors 
argue that linguistic features are well suited to detect deception in computer-mediated 
communication; because they are well documented as data in IS settings. The characteristics of 
a medium facilitate or prevent the occurrence of deception (e.g., capacity to store and edit text) 
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(Carlson et al. 2004). This indicates that P2P lending platforms can facilitate or pose challenges 
to deception by means of input shaping.  
Table 2 Concept Matrix – Linguistic Deception Detection (Only Empirical Studies) 
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Burgoon et al. (2003) Audio, chat Sync.  +# +# +# +# + 
 
- -* - -* 
Zhou et al. (2003b) Email Async.  +* + +* +* +* 
 
- + -* - 
Newman et al. (2003) FtF1, essay Both 
   
+* 
  
-* -* 
  
Zhou et al. (2004a) Email Async. + + 
 
(+) + +* -* -* -# -# 
Hancock et al. (2004) FtF Sync. -# + + + 
  
-* - 
  
Zhou et al. (2004b) Email Async. +* +* 
 
(+) +* +* -* -* -* - 
Qin et al. (2005) Text, audio, FtF Both - 
 
- - 
 
+# -* -* -* -# 
Zhou and Zhang (2006) Chat (IM) Sync. + + 
     
+* 
 
+ 
Zhou and Zhang  (2008)  Email (SM2) Async.  +* +* +* +* +* +* -* -* -* 
 
Hancock et al. (2007) Email (SM) Async.  + 
  
+ 
  
-* 
  
+* 
Toma & Hancock (2010) Dating profile Async. -* 
  
+# 
  
-* 
   
ten Brinke & Porter (2012) Audio, FtF Sync. -* 
 
+ + 
      
Mollick (2014) Project Profile Async.     +*      
Burns & Moffitt (2014) Audio Async. 
   
- 
     
- 
Briscoe, Appling & Hayes (2014) Chat (IM) Sync. +* 
   
-* 
     
Ho et al. (2015) Chat (IM) Sync. 
  
+ + 
  
-* 
   
Ho et al. (2016) Chat (IM) Sync. -*  + +    +   
Ludwig et al. (2016) Email (SM) Async.  +* +*       14 
 
Deception is facilitated by the asynchronous nature of online communication – liars can edit as 
often as necessary (Hancock et al. 2007; Zhou et al. 2004b; Zhou and Zhang 2008). Since liars 
also need to persuade, they tend to use carefully crafted text and speech. This allows them to 
                                               
14 Another recent study examines suspended projects on Kickstarter using machine learning techniques (Siering et 
al., 2016), however, the authors neither study the context of P2P lending nor focus on creditworthiness. They also 
limit their analysis to a battery approach, leaving individual linguistic cues as a black box. 
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manipulate and convince others by using numerous arguments and rhetorical techniques 
(Hancock et al. 2007). At the same, time, they may attempt to control information and especially 
attempt to hold back information that might reveal them as a liar. Others find that liars may 
communicate in a less diverse manner since they lack real knowledge of the issue (Zhou et al. 
2004b); this could lead to them writing less.  
Overall, signalling theory would suggest that longer project descriptions offer more 
opportunities to reduce information asymmetries (e.g. to better inform investors) and therefore 
lengthy descriptions imply a more honest lender. Flowing from these arguments, we posit: 
 
H1: Borrowers who exhibit a lower quantity of text in their loan descriptions have a higher 
hazard of loan default. 
Liars typically do not access real memory and therefore have to fabricate a convincing story, a 
cognitively taxing process (Hancock et al. 2007; Zhou and Zhang 2008). This could lead 
prospective borrowers to use more diverse wording and unnecessarily complex sentence 
structures that would otherwise have been corrected. Further, lower language diversity (e.g. the 
use of fewer unique words) can be seen as a sign of the level of education of the corresponding 
borrower; lower education is typically associated with higher levels of default (Brüderl et al. 
1992).  
Additionally, literature suggests that deceivers trying to convince groups have a more complex 
and difficult task compared to the ones only trying to convince a single person. Their language 
therefore tends to be more complex to make adequate and convincing justifications addressing 
different parts of the group (Zhou and Zhang 2006). As language diversity (higher usage of 
unique words) is sometimes used as a proxy for (language) complexity, we expect these two 
measures to go hand in hand and posit that:   
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H2a: Borrowers who exhibit higher diversity in language in their textual loan descriptions have 
a higher hazard of loan default. 
H2b: Borrowers who exhibit higher complexity in language in their textual loan descriptions 
have a higher hazard of loan default. 
Findings from computer-mediated communication, Zhou et al. (2004b) suggest that on the 
internet, the physical (and psychological) distance between sender and receiver decreases 
negative emotions experienced when lying. Moreover, the ease of communication control and 
editability of messages provoke the persuasive intent to crowd out other goals. As a 
consequence of computer-mediation, deceivers would purposely also use more (instead of less) 
expressivity in their writing. In the context of P2P loans, prospective borrowers are thus tempted 
to color their loan descriptions by using more descriptive language (e.g., adjectives and 
adverbs) and by displaying positive emotions – more positive affect – in order to signal 
creditworthiness and provoke bids on their loans. Thus, in a recent conference paper, Mitra and 
Gilbert (2014) find that emotional phrases lead people to invest in Kickstarter projects, finding 
a key role for (emotional) persuasion. Nonetheless, when it comes to repaying the debt, the 
likelihood of repayment might be correlated with the affect and expressivity which is displayed 
in the loan related project description. Therefore we posit: 
H3: Borrowers who exhibit higher (i.e., more) affect language in their textual loan descriptions 
have a higher hazard of loan default. 
H4: Borrowers who exhibit higher expressivity in language in their textual loan descriptions 
have a higher hazard of loan default. 
Typographic errors are a sign of low quality (or unprofessionally crafted text) and could easily 
be removed in asynchronous communication. Consider, for example, how frequently hastily 
crafted text messages from friends on cell phones contain sloppy spelling and grammar errors 
 36 
versus in the context of official emails written to higher ranking co-workers or managers. 
Deceivers have been previously shown to display more typographical errors than truth-tellers 
(Zhou and Zhang 2008). Liars also need time to fabricate a convincing narrative and seem less 
likely to write in a hasty fashion. Therefore, we posit that: 
H5: Borrowers who exhibit lower quality (more typos) in language in their textual loan 
descriptions have a higher hazard of loan default. 
Liars may also want to be vague in their statements to decrease the ex-post verifiability of their 
statements and thereby tend to use rather unspecific language (Zhou et al. 2004a, 2004b; Zhou 
and Zhang 2008). This could also be fostered by their ambition to avoid contradicting 
themselves. In addition, since liars need to fabricate their story, a cognitively challenging task, 
they may be uncertain whether their story is convincing or not, which in turn might be reflected 
in a more uncertain language or writing style. As a result, we expect that deceivers will use 
more ambiguous language overall and posit: 
H6: Borrowers who exhibit higher uncertainty in their language in their textual loan 
descriptions have a higher hazard of loan default. 
Following this line of argument, liars also do not want to provide too many details on specifics 
such as their place and location. This is due to the fact that giving such details might make these 
more verifiable and traceable. On the other hand, if a deceiver wants to provide such specifics, 
the task of fabricating a convincing and non-contradictory storyline becomes even more 
challenging. Not revealing specifics such as location could also be a sign of distancing oneself 
from potential lenders. Therefore, prospective high-risk borrowers seem likely to avoid 
mentioning such specifics that allow for identification (Zhou and Zhang 2008). Reformulated 
as hypotheses, we posit that: 
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H7: Borrowers who exhibit lower specificity in language in their textual loan descriptions have 
a higher hazard of loan default. 
It has been found that liars also disassociate themselves from their lies to lower verifiability and 
the psychological costs of lying (Hancock et al. 2007; Zhou and Zhang 2008). Such 
disassociation decreases the psychological costs of lying, both the rather immediately 
experienced negative affect and the more gradual perceived social costs of lying (e.g., deceivers 
violate social norms of fairness and truth-telling that are common across cultures). We therefore 
posit: 
 
H8: Borrowers who exhibit lower immediacy in language in their textual loan descriptions have 
a higher hazard of loan default. 
In summary, we infer that the significant occurrence of deception constructs in a borrower’s 
loan description suggests deceptive intent. Moreover, we propose that deceptive intent is an 
indicator for high default risk of the borrower since the benefits of lying are highest for lemons 
while we assume that costs are uniformly low for all borrowers due to the nature of the online 
medium. Since high true risk would result in a high hazard of loan default, in order to test our 
hypotheses, we analyze the relation between the frequency at which deceptive cues are used in 
loan descriptions and the loan’s respective hazard of default. 
2.3 Method 
We analyze the textual descriptions (i.e., soft information) of loan projects from a leading 
German P2P lending platform for cues to deception and their impact on the hazard of loan 
default using survival analysis. We apply content analysis to transform text into measurable 
factors (Berelson 1952), following an established procedure (Insch et al. 1997) and deductively 
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derive cues to deception from the literature for our coding scheme. Content analysis has several 
advantages. It enables the examination of rich communication data previously untapped by 
merely quantitative studies. Moreover, its observing perspective on communication (Barley et 
al. 1988) avoids the risk of influencing the behavior of borrowers, this risk is particularly a 
problem when directly surveying deceivers.  
Validity can be divided into content (also called construct), convergent, discriminant and 
nomological validity (Homburg and Giering 1998; Insch et al. 1997). We ensure nomological 
validity by embedding the constructs in the interpersonal deception theory. We test for 
discriminant validity across constructs in multicollinearity pre-tests where we exclude 
irregularly cross-correlated categories (Morris 1994; Weber 1990). Finally, we aim to 
maximize content- and convergent validity through selecting coding categories from previous 
deception literature (Zhou et al. 2003a, 2004b). 
2.4 Empirical Context, Data Collection, and Sample 
PeerCo is a large German P2P lending platform founded in 2007. We chose PeerCo as our data 
source due to transparent lending processes and the availability of textual project descriptions 
from the borrowers for funded projects. Users become either a borrower or lender by providing 
a valid email address and then going through an identity verification process. They provide 
information such as address, identity card and bank account number. Borrowers then create 
loan requests which contain information about them and their request purpose. This information 
is summarized in their loan listing, including the amount requested, interest rate offered, loan 
duration, percentage financed so far, and open amount (see Figure 1). A disclaimer under each 
description reads “The user is responsible for the accuracy of the statements, for which PeerCo 
assumes no liability.” All listings also contain an image and free-form text, where prospective 
borrowers describe themselves (e.g., signals of trustworthiness), why they require a loan and 
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what they intend to do with it. When choosing whom to lend to and how much, lenders also see 
the borrower’s credit rating, age, city of residence and self-reported occupation category (e.g., 
civil servant). 
 
Figure 1 Sample Loan Description, anonymized15 
 
To draw inferences from a sample of the population of PeerCo users, the sample needs to be 
appropriately sized to minimize both type I and type II errors (Petter et al. 2007). A ratio of 
70:1 is considered to be appropriate (Maxwell 2000). For our 13 predictors, this would require 
                                               
15 English Translation of Loan Description: 
 
Title: “Move to Hamburg”  
Text: "I am a commuter and drive 150 km every day to get to work ! I depend on my car because of rotating shift 
work and just had to buy a new one because the old one broke down. Since I have 400 € in costs for driving I want 
to move to Hamburg ! Would be really happy about your support ! I work at the city’s port and it is a very well 
paid job but paying everything at once on my own is difficult ! I chose the premium [credit report] package so that 
lenders won’t have problems in the worst case ! The great part about PeerCo is that private people help one another 
and earn money themselves without the banks ! Many thanks!” 
Disclaimer: The user is responsible for the accuracy of the statements, for which PeerCo assumes no liability. 
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at least 910 observations.16 We consider loans with 36 and 60 months duration respectively that 
were issued from 2007 through 2012. This resulted in 3661 observations. In addition, several 
hours of preparatory interviews with an executive at PeerCo were conducted to receive further 
information on our dataset and answer open questions about the specifics of the platform.  
2.5 Operationalization of Measures 
To support causation assumptions, we need to show ‘association’ (correlation), ‘isolation’ 
(rejection of alternative hypotheses) and ‘temporal precedence’ for the relationship between 
the deception constructs and our dependent variable default (Cook and Campbell 1979; Gefen 
et al. 2000).17  
Since borrowers compose their loan descriptions before they can default, temporal precedence 
is naturally established. We demonstrate association and isolation via content analysis and 
statistical tools (Shi and Tao 2008). We infer association from a correlation of our independent 
variables with the hazard of loan default.  
Dependent variable: We model loan default as a binary variable (1=true, 0=false). We count 
loans as defaulted if parts of the loan were not paid back, not however if payments were simply 
late. In our analysis, we assume that deceptive intent is an inverse indicator of an individual’s 
true ability to repay.  
                                               
16 We also conducted a power analysis using the software package G*Power 3.1, confirming that the sample size 
is adequate.  
17 We argue that lemons have a higher hazard of default but do not go so far as arguing that linguistic cues cause 
default. Instead, linguistic cues will be reflective of borrower ability to repay and noisily reflective of borrower 
intent to repay (as some borrowers may intend to repay without having the ability to do so).  
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Independent variables: For our correlation analysis, quantitative variables, such as the credit 
grade and interest rate, and qualitative constructs based on text, such as quantity and 
expressivity, are tested (see Tables 3 and 4 for operationalizations).  
The linguistic deception measures are provided by the software LIWC (using the German 
LIWC dictionary), supplemented by a Visual Basic macro written to count typographical errors 
using the spellcheck() function of Microsoft Office and by custom Microsoft Excel functions 
employed to count punctuations, greetings and emoticons.  
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Table 3: Operationalization of Linguistic Deception Constructs, Adopted from Zhou et al. (2004a) 
Construct Definition of Construct Selected Measures Examples 
Quantity The quantity of information the 
sender wants to convey 
Number of words the, I, loan, going 
Expressivity  The degree to which the sender 
colors his writing 
Number of modifiers (adjectives, 
adverbs) 
Number of perceptual verbs 
hot, small, incredibly, 
supposedly                              
see, feel, hear, taste, touch 
Affect  The degree to which the sender 
describes (positive) personal 
emotions in his writing 
Number of positive affect words 
Emoticons 
happy, love, good 
:) :-) :] :D ;D 
Quality  The degree to which the sender 
conducts writing due diligence by 
proofreading, a signal of 
professionalism/quality 
Number of typos (i.e., misspelled 
words) 
Absence of greeting  
wll (will), gaol (goal) 
Hey! Hi guys, 
Uncertainty  The degree to which the language 
of the sender indicates 
ambiguousness 
Number of modal verbs 
Negation words 
can, could, may, might, 
not, no, nor 
Immediacy The degree to which the sender 
associates with the content of and 
the degree to which he clarifies his 
role or the role of a group he 
belongs to in his message  
Number of self-references,                                       
1st Plural Pronouns 
I, me, mine                                                                
We, our, us 
Complexity The level of syntactical structures 
used by the sender 
Pausality ...I mean...why should I pay 
more at a bank?     
Diversity  The degree to which the sender’s 
writing is multi-faceted in wordings 
and expressions 
Unique words (i.e., non-repeated 
words in a set) 
n/a 
Specificity The degree to which the sender 
specifies location and time for the 
conveyed information 
Number of spatial specifications, 
Number of temporal specifications 
up, down, above, below                                    
now, before, after, 
tomorrow 
 
Table 4 Operationalization of Hard Variables 
Variable Operationalization Type 
Credit Grade18 A=1, B=2, C=3,…,H=8 Ordinal 
Debt-to-income Ratio  Values 1-4, where 1=debt burden of <20 percent of income, 2=20-40%, 3=40-60%, 4=60-cap at 67% Ordinal 
Duration 36 or 60 (months) Ordinal 
Requested Amount Provided as integer Metric 
Interest Rate Provided as percentage Metric 
Gender Categorical (male, female)  Binary 
Age Subdivision into age groups (<25,26-40,41-60, >61) Ordinal 
Occupation Categorical (see appendix) Ordinal 
                                               
18 The credit grade on this platform is proprietary but based largely on the borrower’s credit rating as reported by 
the German ‚Schufa’ service. 
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2.6 Analysis  
Survival analysis is an appealing estimation technique for modeling time-dependent processes 
in our data for a number of reasons. First, a major benefit of survival analysis (particularly the 
Cox proportional hazards model) is that it does not rely on distributional assumptions. It can 
therefore deal with left and/or right censoring of the data. Furthermore, our dataset contains 
loans that were not yet completed at the time of analysis, which would be missing values in 
OLS regression. Using a Cox-hazard rate model specification (Cox 1972, 1975) these right-
hand censored observations are included in the estimation. Finally, survival analysis 
particularly in the form of a Cox hazard rate specification has already been successfully applied 
to crowdfunding (Allison et al. 2015; Emekter et al. 2015; e.g., Kim and Viswanathan 2014; Li 
et al. 2016; Lin et al. 2013; Serrano-Cinca et al. 2015). For these reasons, we call upon survival 
analysis, which allows us to find factors that explain loan default, while predicting default 
probability based on linguistic constructs suggested by deception literature.  
Our borrower default estimates are based on proportional hazard models in which the 
borrower's hazard of default is modelled as a multiplicative function of a common base-line 
hazard and a firm-specific component. Since the base-line hazard is estimated using a non-
parametric technique while the latter component is modelled as a parameterized function of 
firm characteristics, this approach is often described as a semi-parametric estimation technique.  
Three types of loans can be distinguished: those that default during the observation period, 
those that are finished without default in the observation period and, finally, those that are 
running and have not yet defaulted at the cutoff date (censoring date). We focus on defaulted 
loans. We estimate the standalone and joint effect of linguistic variables on our binary 
dependent variable loan default. We are thus interested in the influence of hard and soft 
information on the hazard of a ‘loan default’ event occurring. We estimate a function that 
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predicts the hazard of default based on a linear combination of linguistic variables as well as 
classical borrowing risk related variables using a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazards 
(PH) regression model (Cox 1972).19  
The Cox model is inherently robust, to the degree that it is often a good approximation, even 
when its assumption – proportional hazards (PH) – is violated (Allison 2014). The PH 
assumption is that the independent variables should be time-independent. Stated another way, 
the effect of each variable on the log of the hazard should be the same at all points in time 
(Allison 2014). We check this PH assumption using two methods (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 
2001): First, we check if the Schoenfeld residuals of our explanatory variables are unrelated to 
survival time (Grambsch and Therneau 1994). Second, we incorporate time-dependent 
covariates by including interactions of our covariates with functions of time (t, ln(t) and t2); to 
test each covariate individually we fit one model per covariate and function of time. In addition, 
we fit one model including all covariates as a joint test (Model 3). The results suggest that three 
of our variables violate the PH assumption of the standard model. As suggested in literature, 
we therefore extend the standard model for time-varying covariates (see Appendix for details).  
The final specifications for Model 1 are given in equation (1). The hazard of default for a 
borrower i belonging to group j at time t is given by the (exponentiated) vector of signals Si,t, 
hard information Hi,t and linguistic categories Ci,t. Si,t includes the loan amount in Euros, the 
interest rate in percent, the number of bids in 250€ increments and the loan duration in months. 
Hi,t encompasses the loan grade ranging from 1-8 (lower is better) and individual i’s debt-to-
income (dti) ratio ranging from 1-4 (1: 0-20%, 2: 20-40%, 3: 40-60%,4: >60%, lower is better). 
                (1) 
                                               
19 See Appendix for mathematical notation details. 
	hi t( ) = h0 t( )exp β1Si ,t +β2Hi ,t +β3Ci ,t( )
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where h0 denotes the baseline hazard, the betas denote the estimated coefficients of variables 
Si,t, Hi,t and Ci,t and the subscript “i,t” indicates a time-varying measure of our covariates (here 
only the variables interest-rate, loan-grade and dti-ratio display time-varying effects).  
Our data showed signs of both multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity (Breusch and Pagan 
1979). Since 93% of borrowers do not default, the distribution of the dependent variable 
(default) in our final sample is strongly skewed towards the upper boundary. These 
characteristics lead to inaccuracies when using an OLS regression (Gefen and Rigdon 2011) or 
SEM (Gefen et al. 2000). 
We first test for multicollinearity, also to verify the empirical discriminant validity of our 
independent variables. The usual measures for multicollinearity include the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) and the condition number for the independent variables (Baum 2006; O’Brien 
2007). The VIF measures the degree to which the variance of an estimated regression 
coefficient is increased (or inflated) by collinearity (i.e., when two predictor variables in a 
regression are correlated). 
To improve model fit, we remove those variables with highly insignificant p-values (above our 
cutoff of p=.025) and with a high variable inflation factor (VIF), designated as having a value 
above 10 as suggested (Kennedy 2008; Kutner et al. 2004). 
We are left with 13 predictor variables, yielding Model 2, which include our three main hard 
facts from Model 1 as well as the loan amount, the number of bids on each loan, and eight soft 
factors20 based on each individual’s loan description. Model 2 gives a condition number of 
17.02 and all VIF values are significantly below the threshold of 10, indicating that the model 
                                               
20 Greeting included, negation words, modal verbs, modifiers, positive affect words, positive emoticons, temporal 
and spatial words 
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is free of collinearity. We compare goodness-of-fit between Model 1 and our reduced Model 2 
using two criteria: the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the log likelihood (Akaike 1974).  
We introduce robustness tests which ensure that our results are not provoked by omitted-
variable bias, fixed effects, or model misspecification. Regarding the establishment of 
causality, the tests are supposed to isolate deception as an indicator of high risk which causes 
the default (Cook and Campbell 1979). 
Model 3 is the same as Model 2, except that it adds demographic control variables (e.g., age, 
gender, occupation, borrower’s home state21) to the model, represented by an additional vector 
bi Di,t  (D for demographic).  
To test the value of soft information beyond that of the hard facts of a borrower’s given loan 
on the platform, we need a measure of the variance that is not explained by hard information. 
However, for our survival analysis model, we cannot use the standard coefficient of 
determination (R2) because it only applies to OLS models (Zheng and Agresti 2000). We 
therefore apply Somer’s D rank correlation (often referred to as pseudo-R squared) as an 
alternative goodness-of-fit test (and measure of variance) to measure explanatory and predictive 
capability as suggested in the literature (Somers 1962). Somers’ D measures how much the 
prediction for the dependent variable improves, by including an independent variable. More 
formally, it measures the ordinal association of random variables and is based on calculating 
the percentage of concordant or “matching” pairs, see also Newson (2002, 2006).22  
                                               
21 The variable female was coded 1 if true and 0 if false. The home state variable takes is a categorical variable 
with a category for each of 16 German states (Bundesländer). All of these were present in our sample. 
22 In the words of Newson (2002), we estimate DXY as a performance indicator of X as a predictor of Y. 
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As a robustness check, we fit a commonly used parametric survival model (i.e., Weibull) using 
the same covariates and setup (see Appendix). Finally, we run the analysis on a subsample of 
20% of our data with similar results. 
2.7 Results  
Out of 3661 loans on PeerCo, 258 defaulted. The average loan amount was € 9014 and loan 
amounts ranged from € 750 to € 50.000. The average interest rate was 8.8% with a spread from 
2.5% to 18%. Figure 2 denotes the loan distribution by loan grade, ranging from 1 (least risky) 
to 8 (most risky).  
Figure 2  Distribution of Loans by Loan Grade (A-I -> 1-8) 
 
The median age of borrowers of 42 years in our sample is younger than the estimated national 
average of 47 years23. While 72.2% of borrowers in our dataset are male, there is no real 
difference in default rates based on gender or age based on the descriptive statistics. Regarding 
occupation, we find that employees account for half of our sample. As expected, civil servants 
(who often have lifetime contracts in Germany), have a low default rate. Retirees and tradesmen 
have default rates that are higher than average (for an overview of descriptives see the 
                                               
23 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2177.html 
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appendix). Results estimated by the Cox model describe the influence of explanatory variables 
on the probability of a (default) event occurring and on the baseline hazard function. Table 5 
below shows the resulting coefficients and standard errors from the Cox regressions of models 
1-3, respectively, correcting for time-varying covariates. We follow Moon and Norris (2005), 
Siering et al. (2016), and Saldanha et al. (2017) for reporting significances.  
Model 1 includes hard signals from previous research on lending (Ceyhan et al. 2011), because 
borrowers with a high interest rate, a high loan amount, a large debt-to-income ratio and a 
lower credit grade are more likely to default. In addition, we add loan duration as a control, as 
our data comprises loans with durations of either 36 or 60 months. Longer loan periods tend to 
lead to higher default rates. Among the signals in all models, loan duration is not significant 
(the p-value >.25 led us to drop it from Models 2 and 3), whereas loan amount, number of bids, 
and interest rate are highly significant in relation to the hazard of default. A higher loan amount 
or higher interest rate both increase the hazard of default because they make paying back the 
loan more expensive, reflected in the positive sign of corresponding coefficients. A higher 
number of bids decrease the hazard of default; thus, less risky projects receive more bids, which 
seems intuitive as even most novice borrowers are likely to gage the risk-return ratio (e.g. the 
credit grade and interest rate offered)24. For the hard facts, we find that debt-to-income ratio is 
highly significant across models, while a higher credit grade lowers the risk of default, an effect 
which is strongest in Model 3. The negative sign for the coefficient for credit grade seems 
counterintuitive, but is not very significant, marginal in size and can be explained by mixed 
effects of riskier and less risky loans (i.e., those with an alphabetically lower credit grade) on 
the hazard. A higher debt-to-income ratio increases the hazard of default as expected. 
 
 
                                               
24 This could also be explained by social control – perceived pressure to repay loans is likely to increase with the 
number of bidders. 
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Table 5 Cox Regressions of Loan Default (Hard Facts, Signals, Soft Facts and other Controls) 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL 3 
VARIABLES Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Main Effects:       
Amount 0.0001*** (0.0000) 0.0001*** (0.0000) 0.0001*** (0.0000) 
# of bids -0.0640*** (0.0122) -0.0575*** (0.0122) -0.0561*** (0.0124) 
Duration -0.0095 (0.0074)     
# of spatial wordst   1.2030 (0.9894) 1.4455* (1.0082) 
# of negation wordst   0.1838** (0.1098) 0.2012** (0.1087) 
# of modal verbst   -0.2051** (0.0989) -0.2146** (0.0988) 
# of modifierst   0.0845*** (0.0360) 0.0903** (0.0360) 
# of positive affectt   -0.0625* (0.0483) -0.0704* (0.0478) 
# of temporal wordst   -0.0605** (0.0364) -0.0646* (0.0365) 
No greetingt   -0.9714*** (0.1735) -0.9704*** (0.1731) 
# of positive emoticonst   -1.7723** (1.0150) -1.7360** (1.0177) 
Age     -0.0071 (0.0054) 
Female     0.1718 (0.1461) 
Occupation     0.0802* (0.0418) 
Time-Varying Effects:       
Interest rate 0.0148*** (0.0030) 0.0166*** (0.0030) 0.0167*** (0.0030) 
Credit grade -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001* (0.0000) -0.0001** (0.0000) 
Debt-to-income ratio 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 
Model Fit:       
Observations 3,661  3,661  3,661  
AIC 2879  2847  2848  
Somer's D 0.570  0.655  0.653  
Log-Likelihood -1434   -1410   -1408   
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, t one-tailed  
  
 
Table 6 Cox Regression of Hard Facts, Signals and Individual Soft Variables 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
VARIABLES Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Main Effects               
Amount 0.0001*** (0.0000) 0.0001*** (0.0000) 0.0001*** (0.0000) 0.0001*** (0.0000) 0.0001*** (0.0000) 0.0001*** (0.0000) 0.0001*** (0.0000) 
# of bids -0.0620*** (0.0123) -0.0624*** (0.0123) -0.0680*** (0.0125) -0.0648*** (0.0123) -0.0638*** (0.0123) -0.0647*** (0.0123) -0.0634*** (0.0122) 
Duration -0.0094 (0.0074) -0.0094 (0.0074) -0.0090 (0.0074) -0.0094 (0.0074) -0.0094 (0.0074) -0.0095 (0.0074) -0.0096 (0.0074) 
Word Count 0.0044*** (0.0013)             
Unique Words   0.0065*** (0.0020)           
Pausality     0.0677*** (0.0263)         
# of self-references      0.0473*** (0.0183)       
# of 1st sing. pron.        0.0477** (0.0198)     
# of 2nd sing. pron.          0.2717*** (0.0865)   
# of typos             0.0580* (0.0303) 
Age               
Female               
Occupation               
Time-Varying Effects              
Interest rate 0.0150*** (0.0030) 0.0150*** (0.0030) 0.0156*** (0.0031) 0.0145*** (0.0030) 0.0144*** (0.0030) 0.0152*** (0.0030) 0.0149*** (0.0030) 
Credit grade -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001* (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) -0.0001 (0.0000) 
Debt-to-income ratio 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 
Model Fit               
Observations 3,661  3,661  3,623  3,661  3,661  3,661  3,661  
AIC 2873  2872  2821  2875  2876  2873  2878  
Somer's D 0.596  0.595  0.575  0.594  0.593  0.582  0.584  
Log-Likelihood -1429   -1429   -1403   -1431   -1431   -1430   -1432   
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In Model 2, which adds our linguistic categories to the regression, we find that our proxy 
variable indicating a missing greeting in a given loan description (i.e., low 
quality/professionalism) is significant and decreases the hazard as predicted by H1. The number 
of modal verbs (i.e., higher uncertainty) significantly decreases the hazard opposing our 
hypothesis H6 while the number of modifiers (i.e., higher expressivity) significantly increases 
the hazard of default as suggested in H4. The number of negation words (one of our measures 
of uncertainty) is positively and significantly related to hazard of default supporting our 
hypothesis H6, while the number of temporal words (i.e., specificity) is significantly negatively 
related to the hazard of default, supporting our hypothesis H7. The number of positive emotions 
(an additional measure of positive affect) is significant and negatively related to the hazard of 
default and moves in the same direction as our other measure of positive affect.  
These findings for our linguistic cues extend entirely to Model 3, which implements additional 
controls for demographic variables age, gender (female), and occupation.  
In Model 3, we find that our control variable lender age slightly decreases the hazard of default, 
though this is not significant25. This effect could be explained by the positive relationship 
between age and human capital. It may also be related to risk aversion, which is positively 
related to age. The older people are, the better they may be in realistically assessing their ability 
to repay loans. It may also be that an older person cares more about the default risk as a stigma 
than a young person. While the effect of occupation is insignificant overall, we do find some 
interesting effects per type. For example, being a freelancer lowers the hazard of default. 
Gender shows no significant effect. 
In terms of model fit, likelihood ratio tests reveal that Model 2 has a significantly better fit than 
Model 1 (Prob > chi2 = 0.0000), while Model 3 has a marginally better fit than Model 2 (Prob 
                                               
25 As a curvilinear relationship between age and default risk seemed equally plausible, we also tested the quadratic 
term for age, which remains insignificant (p=0.254). 
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> chi2 = 0.0505), indicating that our demographic control variables (in Model 3) do not hold 
much explanatory power compared with our hard and soft facts (in Models 1 and 2). Similarly, 
the AIC value drops from 2879 in Model 1 to 2847 in Model 2, also indicating an improvement 
in fit, while remaining almost the same (AIC = 2848) for Model 3. 
Since some of the linguistic cues cannot be measured in our full model (i.e., Model 3) due to 
reasons such as high correlation with other cues or controls, we measure them separately 
together with the hard facts in Models 4 to 10 as is common for Cox regressions (Serrano-Cinca 
et al. 2015). The results of Model 4 suggest that word count (i.e., quantity) is highly significant 
and positively related to the hazard of default, which contrasts H1. For Model 5, the number of 
unique words (i.e., more diversity) is found to be highly significant and positively related to the 
hazard of default. This supports H2a. A highly significant positive relation of causality in 
Model 6 was found, which suggests that a higher complexity of texts leads to a higher hazard 
of default further supporting H2b. The Models 7 to 9 are all focused on the linguistic construct 
immediacy and our highly significant results suggest that there is a positive relation to the 
hazard of default, opposing our hypothesis H8. Finally, the results of Model 10 show some 
evidence of a higher number of typos leading to a higher hazard of default as suggested in 
hypothesis H5. 
Using Somer’s D rank correlation, an alternative measure for Cox regressions similar to R2 in 
linear regressions, we observe that our Model 1 (i.e., only hard facts and signals) can explain 
57% of the variation in the hazard of default. Adding the soft linguistic cues that can be 
measured within one model improves this explanation to 65.5% for Somer’s D in Model 3, 
reducing the prediction error. The relative improvement of fit by this measure is thereby almost 
15%. Additionally, we can see that in the other models that measure the individual linguistic 
cues (i.e., Models 4-10), the explanatory power also further improves compared with the basic 
Model 1 with only hard facts. To summarize, the results suggest that the soft linguistic cues do 
 52 
have a rather large impact on explaining hazard of default on the studied p2p lending platform. 
Below in Table 7 we summarize the hypothesized and actual results. 
 
Table 7 Summary of Hypothesized and Actual Results of Deception Detection Constructs 
Hypothesis Variable 
Deceivers should use 
(hypoth. effect on 
hazard) 
Deceivers here 
use (effect on 
hazard) Supported 
Contrary 
Finding 
H1 Quantity less (-) more (+) 	 þ 
H2a Diversity more (+) more (+) þ 	
H2b Complexity more (+) more (+) þ  
H3 Pos. Affect more (+) less (-)  þ	
H4 Expressivity more (+) more (+) þ 	
H5 Quality more (+) more (+) þ 	
H6 Uncertainty more (+) mixed (+/-) þ	 þ 
H7 Specificity less (-) less (-) þ 	
H8 Immediacy less (-) more (+)  þ		
 
2.8 Discussion of Results 
We set out to study deception in IT-mediated P2P lending, particularly the informational value 
of text for explaining loan default from the backdrop of agency and interpersonal deception 
theory. Based on our literature review, we focused on the effects of the linguistic constructs 
diversity, complexity, affect, expressivity, quality, uncertainty, specificity and immediacy on 
our dependent variable. Keeping this research goal in mind, we discuss our results in light of 
the literature.  
First, contrary to our hypothesis H1, we find that a higher quantity of text in loan descriptions 
raises the hazard of default (Model 4). Thus, defaulting borrowers write more overall (Burgoon 
et al. 2003; Hancock 2007). Possible explanations for this finding might include liars trying to 
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fabricate a story which already anticipates possible objections that they try to preempt or 
circumvent by telling a longer story and explaining and justifying themselves. At least three 
studies support our finding regarding the quantity of words used by borrowers to describe their 
loan situation and purpose. Ludwig et al. (2016) find that deceivers include more superfluous 
descriptions in email exchanges. Larrimore et al. (2011) found that lengthier online loan 
requests on peer-to-peer lending sites were more likely to receive funding, while Flanagin 
(2007) found that eBay products with longer descriptions received more bids and higher 
selling prices. Once the talkative (narrative crafting) borrower has his loan he/she might realize 
that it is not so easy to pay it back (or in the worst case, he/she may have no intention of doing 
so which would be deceptive if not fraudulent). Overall, our finding for quantity is interesting 
because people that write more often receive higher rewards; this implies a role for the project 
size (e.g. coordination and other transaction costs). 
Second, as predicted, we find that more expressive lenders have a significantly higher hazard 
of default (H4). High-risk borrowers have a strong incentive to color their language in order to 
convey false low-risk and increase the likelihood of obtaining the desired loan amount. Also, 
lying is cognitively taxing to most people, which could help explain the effect of expressivity, 
a sign of cognitive effort or load (Richards 2004).  
The empirical results for the measure complexity (H2b), that more complex language is 
significantly (positively) related to the hazard of default, in line with our hypothesis, could be 
explained partially by recent neuroscientific studies: fMRI studies have shown that the 
prefrontal cortex – the brain region involved in executive control – is more heavily active when 
lying, a cognitively taxing task (Langleben et al. 2005). One reason for this could be that we 
are habitualized from a young age to tell the truth which therefore comes more naturally and 
should require less effort. Thus, we might expect to find language artifacts related to (heavy) 
cognition. Intuitively, signs of such conscious effort could be high variation in vocabulary use 
 54 
(e.g., the use of unique words), expressivity, and complexity (as measured by the increased use 
of punctuation). 
As expected, higher language diversity in loan applications is positively related to the hazard 
of default, in line with hypothesis (H2a). The findings are robust towards the inclusion of 
additional control variables and the use of different statistical models.26 The evidence supports 
the hypothesized motive of persuasion as indicated by expressivity, which is in line with Zhou 
et al. (2004b, 2008) and Newman (2003). Liars often do not access real memory, but rather 
fabricate information, a cognitively taxing process (Hancock et al. 2004; Zhou et al. 2004a). 
An alternative explanation could also help explain this result in the setting of P2P lending: the 
number of unique words used (i.e., diversity) suggests a higher variety in vocabulary of an 
individual, which can be a sign of a higher level of education. Education is a predictor of 
income, which one would expect to be positively related to repayment ability. While our data 
does not explicitly provide data on educational background, our descriptive statistics and 
robustness tests suggest that additional age somewhat raises the hazard of default, though this 
difference is not significant, even when a quadratic term for age is formed.  
Next, we find that a higher number of typographical errors, our main measure of 
quality/professionalism, is significantly related to the hazard of default, in line with our 
hypothesis (H5), which could be a sign of such cognitive overload but also in line with our 
results for complexity (H2b), as the complexity of an issue increases the chances of making 
mistakes. 
                                               
26 As a robustness check, we had a look at each of the soft variables of our data using another type of survival 
analysis: Weibull regression. Our findings remain stable, though model fit is not as good as with the more robust 
and conservative Cox model, see Table 16 of the Appendix.  
Further, to rule out that our results are simply random significance due to the sample size, we ran a regression on 
a subsample (with a comparable percentage of defaulting loans) with similar results. 
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We also find that ‘no (initial) greeting’ at the beginning of loan description texts is related to a 
significantly lower hazard of default. Intuitively, borrowers who omit an informal greeting 
could be more serious in their language, hinting at more serious behavior. The presence of such 
greeting phrases might also indicate purposefully overconstructed text (e.g. brownnosing). Our 
findings for informal greetings (which we interpret as a quality indicator) relate to studies of 
textual conversations on Reddit, which suggest a role for politeness in increasing the probability 
of receiving an answer to a Q&A request but find no such effect (Althoff et al. 2014). Uttering 
a greeting can also be interpreted as a speech act (Ludwig et al. 2016; Mohr 2007). 
Next, while we find that potential deceivers show significant specificity patterns in their 
language use (H7), our finding for this construct is mixed: While increased spatial specificity 
(i.e., location-related information) is positively but not significantly related to the hazard of 
loan default, contrary to our expectation, temporal specificity (i.e., providing more time-related 
information) in language exhibits the opposite effect, in line with our hypothesis. By providing 
more specific information, deceitful borrowers may hope to avoid outing themselves by giving 
too little information; more precisely, they might try to fabricate a convincing story, enhanced 
by specifics (Hancock et al. 2007; Newman et al. 2003). 
We also find that our measure of uncertainty (i.e. increased use of modal verbs indicating 
ambiguity) leads to a lower hazard of default, counter to our corresponding hypothesis (H7). 
However, our second measure of uncertainty, negation words, leads to a higher hazard, creating 
a mixed picture here. While only four of the empirical studies identified in Table 2 report results 
on uncertainty in language, the authors find that liars in their studies use more uncertain words. 
An explanation for our contrary finding for this construct could be that liars would not want to 
seem uncertain in the context of P2P lending, because this might seem less creditworthy (Qin 
et al. 2005). Also it is conceivable that high-risk borrowers might want to make explicit (e.g., 
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certain) promises to seem more creditworthy. The asynchronous nature of P2P lending 
communication allows the editing of written texts and might therefore support this. 
Further, positive affect (H3) and immediacy (H8) exhibit significant effects that run counter to 
our hypotheses. While some studies find that liars use more affect words, it has also been found 
that emotions draw attention (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001), which is usually what deceivers 
want to avoid, possibly explaining our result for H3, that the usage of positive affect in loan 
descriptions is correlated with a significantly lower hazard of default. Most recent deception 
studies in fact find that liars disassociate themselves from their lies due to the psychological 
cost of lying and lower verifiability (Hancock et al. 2007; Qin et al. 2005; Toma and Hancock 
2010; Zhou et al. 2004a; Zhou and Zhang 2008).  
Therefore, we expected that high-risk borrowers – given that they are assumed to exhibit 
deceptive intent – would use fewer self-references, i.e., be less immediate (H8). However, our 
findings for this variable are significant in the opposite direction – a higher usage of self-
references is significantly related to a higher hazard of default. We come up with a theory-based 
and a setup-based explanation for this deviation.  
First, when a borrower explains his reasons for requiring a loan, he might appear most 
trustworthy if he refers to himself and his miserable situation. Literature revealed that borrowers 
can improve credit conditions if they shape their identity as being in an “economic hardship” 
(Herzenstein et al. 2011). Hence, packaging of explanations in a ‘need’ frame can greatly 
influence perceptions of trustworthiness (Elsbach and Elofson 2000). Therefore, if a deceptive 
lemon’s intention to persuade and create familiarity (over)compensates for the intention to 
disassociate from the deception, we might expect the number of self-references to increase 
sufficiently to counter the expected effect on immediacy for H8.  
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Second, previous findings may also be an artifact of an obtrusive setup of the experiments 
conducted in which constructs were developed. In most such experiments, selected participants 
were given the task of consciously lying about certain facts before measuring their language 
use (e.g., Burgoon et al. 2003; Hancock et al. 2007; Marett and George 2004; Newman et al. 
2003; Qin et al. 2005; Toma and Hancock 2010; Zhou et al. 2004b). Potentially, by increasing 
the psychological costs of deception, the (perceived) need to lie is what triggers the intent to 
disassociate oneself from it in the first place. Hence, if a person the makes the decision to 
deceive the motive to disassociate might be less relevant than the incentive to be persuasive. In 
the setting of our p2p lending platform, the borrower signaling behavior we observe in project 
description texts may well be a weaker form of deception - window dressing (or impression 
management) - rather than lying in the classical sense. 
We reasoned in our theory section that liars’ lack of knowledge of the issue could lead to lower 
complexity in language use (Zhou et al. 2004a), but that the opposite effect suggested by 
neuroscience seemed more convincing. Upon careful reflection (of H2b), it seems that 
knowledge of one’s true creditworthiness does not seem to be a precondition to coloring or 
even fabricating loan descriptions. 
2.9 Implications for Theory and Practice 
These findings have theoretical and practical consequences for IS and management research 
since signaling and screening processes in P2P lending are evidently not yet far enough evolved 
to minimize transaction costs (e.g., search and information costs and the costs of policing and 
monitoring). Our evidence demonstrates that the inefficiency of a self-regulated P2P lending 
market still requires intermediaries to reduce these transaction costs (Bhattacharya and Thakor 
1993; Stigler 1961; Williamson 1981). Our findings cast doubt on the electronic marketplace 
hypothesis, which maintains that the increasing role of electronic lending marketplaces leads to 
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disintermediation by replacing banks and insurance companies (Hulme and Wright 2006). Just 
as Bailey and Bakos predict (1997), the roles of these intermediaries must be different. They 
do not need to execute the screening process themselves, like banks, but they do need to prepare 
and verify information since borrowers seem unable to decide correctly how information should 
be evaluated and weighed (Perry 2008).  
We contribute to the literature on the management of information systems in several ways. Our 
study is among the early larger studies of the informational value of texts in P2P lending and 
also addresses the fundamental issue of asymmetric information. We contribute to the growing 
literature on textual analysis by examining linguistic features that have been identified as 
pertaining to deception on a peer-to-peer platform. In addition, we contribute to specialized 
research streams in computer linguistics, social psychology and economic psychology, by 
providing baseline data on deception detection in P2P lending and by suggesting fruitful 
avenues for further interdisciplinary studies, such as the differentiation between deception of 
others and self-deception.  
Furthermore, we add to the discussion on intermediaries in financial transactions (Bailey and 
Bakos 1997; Datta and Chatterjee 2008) by observing that hard facts alone do not explain the 
variation in true risk and that lenders make inefficient decisions. We therefore confirm a recent 
finding of Mild et al. (2015) that lenders can fail to transform available information into the 
right decisions, i.e., by failing to set the correct interest rate (Mild et al. 2015). With a Somer’s 
D rank correlation of .655 (compared with .570), we find that incorporating soft information 
reduces the prediction error regarding the hazard of P2P financing related loan default 
(increasing explanatory power), lending support to our assertion that (some) lemons attempt to 
deceive (themselves or others). Further, we contribute to the literature stream on decision 
support using big data analysis for credit decisions by providing evidence of deception detection 
cues that feed into improved detection algorithms, enabling design science approaches. Finally, 
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by clarifying which parts of IDT apply most clearly to asynchronous communication (in Table 
15), we contribute to methodology that uses the theory in this setting.27 
This study also has several practical implications for improving credit risk scoring and fraud 
detection. First, for platforms looking to reduce the number of fraudulent or misleading 
statements, this study provides insights into the extent of deception in P2P lending. Managing 
the risks of default is a crucial challenge for the crowdlending industry, which largely focuses 
on higher risk loans. Such platforms should provide more verifiable information to increase the 
value and credibility of borrower signals. Additionally, the information must be presented in a 
more intuitive way to be comprehensible to inexperienced lenders. To remain competitive in a 
bustling market, this is a pivotal service provided to investors/lenders by the intermediary. 
Alternatively, the interest rate could be set professionally by the platform, as successfully 
executed by the successful American P2P lending platform LendingClub (Lending Club 2011). 
Our findings can also feed into algorithms designed to detect lemons in computer-mediated 
communication (CMC). This is applicable to the web-enabled decision support systems of 
banks or P2P lending platforms particularly when extended to other social profiles on the web 
such as in the case of large-scale credit risk scoring.28 Further, the methods highlighted could 
facilitate future research on platform design (Casenove and Miraglia 2014; Sage 1981), e.g. the 
impact of extending evaluation tools for potential investors on the platforms (e.g., through 
traffic light systems that include soft information) which increasingly also extend to mobile 
applications. Our findings also shed light on borrower ethics, as some seem to be committing 
loan description fraud in response to economic incentives and lacking sanctioning mechanisms 
                                               
27 See Table 15 in the appendix 
28 Platforms like ZestFinance and Think Finance use a combination of machine learning and large-scale big data 
analysis for improved credit scoring and underwriting. For a detailed report on this emerging software market see 
page 7 of this report: http://www.morganstanley.com/sustainableinvesting/pdf/Big_Data_Big_Potential.pdf 
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and are thereby reducing loan availability for fully truthful lenders. Platforms could rule out 
unethical behavior and highlight the legal consequences of fraud in their terms and conditions.  
Since voluntary control by P2P lenders is not sufficient, independent outside bodies should not 
only better educate small lenders about the risks and rewards of crowdlending, but also 
routinely audit small, random samples of loans. The resulting information would also benefit 
tax authorities and consumer protection agencies. A first step to improving such education was 
taken in Germany with the Retail Investor Protection Act, passed into law in 2015 that requires 
lending platforms to publicly provide a prospectus. To give the corresponding agencies or 
bodies the necessary authority for such controls, regulations on crowdlending (such as the Jobs 
Act in the US) could be amended. Such legislation should be strict enough to reduce fraud, but 
loose enough to allow for innovation and growth. It is worth noting here that P2P lending 
interest rates, while relatively high, are still lower than those provided by heavily criticized 
payday loan vendors. Therefore, by democratizing (and professionalizing) micro lending, P2P 
lenders may have positive social impacts by decreasing the size of the black market for lending 
and bringing more loans into the tax system. Further, P2P platforms also have the potential to 
reduce discrimination in lending. 
2.10 Limitations and Future Research 
In this paper, we restrict our analysis to a single crowdlending platform. Further, more work is 
needed on motivation of crowdlenders: We implicitly assume that high-risk borrowers behave 
rationally and therefore potentially have some degree of deceptive intent. We do not assume 
that all high-risk borrowers lie or in our context deceive lenders about their creditworthiness; 
rather, our model implicitly assumes that deception occurs more frequently among those with 
high default rates and that this deception is reflected in the measurement items as suggested by 
theory. It is conceivable that some borrowers lack knowledge about their own high-risk and 
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therefore borrow overconfidently (Hirshleifer 2001) and not because of deceptive intent. 
Overconfidence could be interpreted as a form of self-deception. However, we believe that our 
assumption has little effect on our results for two reasons: First, it is feasible that some 
borrowers who deceive on their loan applications just to obtain the loan may nonetheless intend 
to pay it back; in such a case, deception in the loan descriptions would remain. Further, 
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) demonstrate that deceptive behavior in a dice roll 
experiment can be inferred from the underlying outcome distribution. This implies that even if 
only a portion of defaults follow borrowers’ deceptive behavior, the effect should still be potent 
overall, given the strong incentive to provide misleading information.  
A limitation of our dataset is that we cannot control for past borrowing behavior because most 
of the loans in our dataset are first-time P2P loans. First-time borrowers may exhibit less 
professionalism in their loan descriptions, but those that misrepresent their creditworthiness are 
unlikely to have adapted their strategies, which may improve the rate of deception detection 
when compared with experienced borrowers.29 Further, the average word count for loan 
descriptions in our study is not very high but at about the value suggested by the authors of 
LIWC software for high accuracy.30 A further limitation is nonetheless given by the imperfect 
analysis algorithm of LIWC.  
The accuracy of LIWC of 68% appears to be significantly higher than that of human lie 
detectors (Newman et al. 2003). This still implies that deception is not detected in 32% of cases. 
Therefore, both false positives and false negatives are possible. This implies the need for more 
replication studies with additional dictionaries. Such misclassification affects our interpretation 
of analyzed loan descriptions in two important ways. First, the actual rate of deception in loan 
                                               
29 Proposition 9 of IDT states that: „Skilled deceivers appear more believable because they make more strategic 
moves and display less leakage than unskilled deceivers“ (Griffin 2006). 
30 We originally included both the loan titles and the description, which would increase word count by over 10%, 
but decided to remove the titles because these can be repeated in descriptions, which might have otherwise 
abnormally amplified the occurrence of certain words. 
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descriptions on PeerCo could potentially be higher or lower than detected. Second, the 
existence of false positives implies that perfectly honest borrowers may sometimes use words 
(unigrams) or sentence structures that raise suspicion of deception. However, studies suggest 
that LIWC results in many fewer false positives than human judgment (Ziegler et al. 2011, p. 
318).  
Also, we can expect mixed results. For instance, significant results are obstructed if enough 
borrowers use the constructs but do not default (e.g. due to their general expressiveness or due 
to luck), or in case some overconfident borrowers do not use the constructs (e.g. they could be 
so confident that they think they do not need to persuade others in textual form). Mixed support 
and some contrary findings seem to support the latter explanation. However, what we 
demonstrate is that lemons (e.g., high-risk borrowers) in online P2P lending write loan 
descriptions which are significantly different in style than those of low-risk borrowers. We can 
assume that they are consciously or subconsciously aware of their high risks and express this 
knowledge in a particular language style.  
Future work could extend our findings to other platforms. This may help disentangle detection 
of phenomena from their corresponding industry context (e.g., online dating vs. P2P lending).  
It might also be interesting to look at historical borrowing activities by platform members as 
more loan data becomes available. Also, the role of self-deception in loan applications could 
be further explored. Self-deception occurs when someone maintains a false belief in light of 
information that could lead to forming the correct belief (Trivers 2014). In the context of P2P 
lending platforms, it is conceivable that borrowers may become overconfident in order to 
persuade others more effectively. Also, the link between latency, e.g. the time it takes to a user 
to post a textual description and deception, could be further explored (Benjamin et al. 2016; Ho 
et al. 2016), perhaps by integrating eye-tracking technology (Proudfoot et al. 2016). 
Lastly, for IS practitioners, we reason that the role of intermediary (traditionally performed by 
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banks) could be executed through the P2P lending platform itself, independent third parties, or 
through borrower groups (Ashta and Assadi 2010; Berger and Gleisner 2009; Chircu and 
Kauffman 2000). The creation of borrower pools that share the risk of each other’s debt is 
probably the cheapest option, but also the least acknowledged. This type of contract could be 
greatly facilitated by the recent emergence of the blockchain (and cryptocurrencies), which 
make ultra low-cost transactions feasible. Incorporating the blockchain (and its global 
transaction ledger) into P2P lending would also facilitate information verification, which is 
likely to reduce transaction costs for all parties involved.31 
2.11 Summary and Concluding Remarks  
Our research enlivens debate on the use of linguistic cues to improve automated analysis of soft 
information in crowdlending. We evaluate the research question ‘Can linguistic cues in soft 
information of IT-mediated P2P lending project descriptions help explain loan default?’ on the 
basis of agency and interpersonal deception theory. We find linguistic deception cues, 
specifically the measures of quantity, expressivity, complexity, specificity and diversity, to be 
significant predictors for risk above and beyond hard facts. Our study blends research on 
interpersonal deception and asymmetric information in a computer-mediated context with the 
evaluation of lending outcomes. Further, unlike many previous studies which ask subjects to 
lie before testing for linguistic deception cues, our approach avoids the risk of influencing 
borrower behavior. Without efficient monitoring and control, information quality on crowd-
based platforms can be undermined and exploited by individuals. Our work underscores the 
need for more studies using content analysis and specifically, novel detection and prediction 
models that can play important roles in both predictive analytics and in the design of screening 
mechanisms. The high interest rates on P2P lending platforms reflect the lower cost structure 
                                               
31 The first such platforms are now emerging, e.g. celsius.network and lendoit.com  
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of semi-automating the lending process online and the focus on previously underserved niche 
markets, but also the underlying systemic risk for lenders which is in need of further study.  
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2.13 Appendix 
The Cox PH Model 
The basic Cox proportional hazard (PH) model denotes individual i’s hazard rate hi(t) as 
   (1) 
where bi xi describes the impact of the explanatory X variables and h0(t) describes the 
unspecified baseline hazard function of time (Cox 1972). As a semi-parametric model, the Cox 
PH model considers the ordering of failures which implies the need to handle ties (i.e. failures 
occurring at the same time), for which the Efron approximation is recommended (Cleves et al. 
2010; Efron 1977). In our data, there are no such ties, so we do not further elaborate on this 
here. Extending the model for time-varying covariates is rather straightforward, and is done by 
allowing bi xi to vary with t  
                     (2) 
The Weibull Model 
The Weibull model is similar to the Cox PH model, except that the Weibull model, estimated 
using maximum likelihood, specifies the following functional form for the hazard rate h0(t) 
 
                                                          (3) 
where a and p (the shape parameter) are ancillary parameters and p>0. When p>1, the hazard 
increases, p=1 denotes a constant hazard and p<1 means that the hazard decreases. When we 
fit the Weibull model, we are therefore estimating (a, p, b’x). 
The basic idea behind parametric survival models is that the survival time (i.e. the amount of 
time until individual i defaults on his loan) follows a distribution and that the dataset can be 
	hi t ,X( ) = h0 t( )e βixi∑
	hi t ,X( ) = h0 t( )e βixi t( )∑
	h0 t( ) = pt p−1 exp a( )
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used to estimate the distribution parameters. The Weibull model says that the hazard is either 
increasing or decreasing, but does not allow for a change in direction (Allison 2014). Intuitively, 
this strikes us as suitable for loan data. For example, assuming that individual a’s hazard is 
likely to either increase or decrease over time and not both seems like a suitable assumption for 
the majority of lenders. We are therefore reasonably confident that the Weibull model 
adequately parameterizes the baseline hazard in our setting. We also choose this model as a 
robustness check, because it produces results that can be directly compared with those produced 
by Cox regression (Cleves et al. 2010). 
Table 8 Tests of PH Assumption for Transformations of t 
 Model1      Model2      Model3      
(Transform.) Xi*t Xi*t^2 Xi*ln(t) Xi*t Xi*t^2 Xi*ln(t) Xi*t Xi*t^2 Xi*ln(t) 
Main Effects (rho) (p) (rho) (p) (rho) (p) (rho) (p) (rho) (p) (rho) (p) (rho) (p) (rho) (p) (rho) (p) 
Amount -0.024 0.691 -0.047 0.430 0.004 0.948 -0.007 0.896 -0.033 0.554 0.023 0.687 -0.019 0.739 -0.041 0.465 0.007 0.901 
Interest rate*** -0.231 0.000 -0.214 0.000 -0.250 0.000 -0.249 0.000 -0.230 0.000 -0.269 0.000 -0.255 0.000 -0.236 0.000 -0.276 0.000 
# of bids 0.013 0.834 0.039 0.517 -0.019 0.755 0.006 0.920 0.035 0.546 -0.029 0.620 0.015 0.800 0.043 0.461 -0.018 0.754 
Duration 0.101 0.091 0.090 0.136 0.114 0.057               
Credit grade* 0.085 0.095 0.075 0.140 0.096 0.059 0.110 0.027 0.100 0.045 0.121 0.015 0.114 0.026 0.104 0.041 0.125 0.014 
Debt-to-income 
ratio** -0.142 0.015 -0.136 0.020 -0.147 0.012 -0.124 0.038 -0.122 0.042 -0.124 0.039 -0.137 0.020 -0.131 0.026 -0.141 0.017 
*** Significant at p<.01 
 
                
 
Table 8 shows the evaluation of the proportional hazards assumption. We see that in all three 
models, three variables show significant interactions with the time variable (untransformed and 
using different transformations of time, e.g. time squared and the natural log of time). Based on 
the p-values, this effect is strongly significant for interest rate, significant for debt-to-income 
ratio and weakly significant or significant for credit-grade (depending on the model). Hence, 
we specify our following reported models by including a control for time interactions.  
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Table 9 Socio-Demographic Information 
 FULL SAMPLE DEFAULT   
Description Count % Mean S.D. Count % Def. Rate (%) Mean S.D. 
Occupation:          
Employee 1814 49.54   110 42.64 6.06   
Tradesman 827 22.58   82 31.78 9.92   
Retired 338 9.23   36 13.95 10.65   
Freelancer 344 9.39   11 4.26 3.20   
Managing Partner 183 5.00   14 5.43 7.65   
Civil Servant 155 4.23   5 1.94 3.23   
Other 1 0.03   0 0.00 0.00   
Gender:          
Male 2644 72.20   184 71.32 6.95   
Female 1018 27.80   74 28.68 7.2   
          
Age   43.08 13.40    43.86 15.92 
 
Table 10 Exogenous Financial Information 
 FULL SAMPLE DEFAULT 
Variable Mean S.D. Range Sum Mean S.D. Range Sum 
Debt-to-Income Ratio 2.89 0.91 [1,4] 10568 3.17 0.79 [1,4] 818 
Credit grade 3.94 2.32 [1,8] 14426 5.02 2.27 [1,8] 1296 
 
 
Table 11 Overview of Descriptives for Hard Facts 
 FULL SAMPLE DEFAULT 
Variable Mean S.D. Range Sum Mean S.D. Range Sum 
Amount 9013.79 7393.83 [750,50000] 33008500 9165.70 8057.03 [1000,50000] 2364750 
Interest rate 0.09 0.03 [0.03,0.18] 321.36 0.11 0.03 [.06,.18] 27.305 
 
Table 12 Loan Related Information 
 FULL SAMPLE DEFAULT 
Variable Mean S.D. Range Sum Mean S.D. Range Sum 
# of bids 17.71 14.5 [1,120] 64870 17.03 14.63 [1,103] 4393 
Initial bid 548.33 488.97 [250,10000] 2008000 560.08 360.74 [250,2000] 144500 
Duration 54.22 10.26 [36,60] 198552 55.54 9.36 [36,60] 14328 
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Table 13 LIWC results for Deception Variables of 3661 Loan Descriptions at PeerCo32 
 FULL SAMPLE DEFAULT 
Variable Mean S.D. Range Sum Mean S.D. Range Sum 
Word count 44.24 45.99 [1,500] 161989 38.38 48.03 [1,416] 9902 
Words per sentence 14.49 10.48 [0,192] 53066.94 14.17 10.94 [0,90] 3655.56 
# of sentences 3.03 2.82 [0,35] 11096 2.74 3.17 [0,21] 707 
Average word length 7.21 1.75 [0,43] 26397.19 7.25 2.16 [0,23] 1870.73 
Unique words 36.29 32.34 [0,301] 132896 31.52 33.72 [0,272] 8132 
# of 1st singular 3.29 3.80 [0,30] 12062 2.82 3.74 [0,29] 727 
# of 1st plural 0.54 1.67 [0,23] 1989 0.41 1.34 [0,9] 105.02 
# of self references 3.84 4.12 [0,33] 14051 3.23 4.17 [0,29] 832 
2nd sing. pronouns 0.34 0.74 [0,8] 1263 0.34 0.72 [0,4] 88 
Other pronouns 0.77 1.38 [0,19] 2836 0.74 1.47 [0,15] 191 
Positive affect words 1.76 2.34 [0,26] 6459 1.54 2.42 [0,18] 396 
# of negation words 0.32 0.75 [0,8] 1186 0.29 0.80 [0,7] 75 
# of negative affect 0.34 0.75 [0,9] 1253 0.28 0.67 [0,6] 73 
# of temporal words 2.67 3.48 [0,34] 9772 2.33 3.45 [0,26] 602 
# of spatial words 3.51 4.30 [0,41] 12854 3.04 4.60 [0,41] 783 
# of modal verbs 0.51 0.90 [0,8] 1883 0.40 0.82 [0,6] 104 
# of perceptual 0.03 0.18 [0,2] 102 0.02 0.14 [0,1] 5 
# of modifiers 3.18 4.18 [0,44] 11630 2.85 4.10 [0,35] 735 
Table 14 Excel Results for Deception Variables33 
 FULL SAMPLE DEFAULT 
Variable Mean S.D. Range Sum Mean S.D. Range Sum 
# of typos 1.06 1.93 [0,31] 3865 1.09 1.86 [0,14] 280 
# of punctuation 6.82 8.68 [0,155] 24961 5.77 7.75 [0,58] 1488 
# of emoticons 0.20 0.46 [0,4] 727 0.16 0.39 [0,2] 40 
positive emoticons 0.01 0.12 [0,1] 50 0.01 0.06 [0,1] 1 
negative emoticons 0.00 0.03 [0,1] 4 0.00 0.00 [0,0] 0 
greeting none 0.73 0.45 [0,1] 2657 0.72 0.45 [0,1] 186 
greeting formal 0.08 0.28 [0,1] 305 0.09 0.29 [0,1] 23 
greeting informal 0.20 0.40 [0,1] 724 0.21 0.40 [0,1] 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                               
32 Note that for the sake of comprehension, the values provided in Tables 13 and 14 are the number of reported 
occurrences of each measure, not the corresponding values used in the regression. The later were transformed, 
(i.e., standardized and divided by word count) as described in the methodology. 
33 As described on page 21, a formula was created in Microsoft Excel to count punctuation (e.g., !?,´;“:.) in the 
text field. To count typos, the Microsoft Word CheckSpelling() function was used. 
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Table 15 Relevant Aspects of Interpersonal Deception Theory to the Context of P2P Lending (adapted from: Buller and 
Burgoon 1996) 
# Proposition Relevant Reasoning 
1 What deceivers and respondents think and do varies according to the amount of 
interactive give-and-take that's possible in the situation. 
no Not the focus of our study. 
2 What deceivers and respondents think and do varies according to how well they 
know and like each other. 
yes Anonymity should increase 
deception. 
3 Deceivers make more strategic moves and leak more nonverbal cues than truth 
tellers. 
yes Implies that deceivers act 
strategically 
4 With increased interaction, deceivers make more strategic moves and display less 
leakage. 
yes Implies that a single text may reveal 
more about deception than a 
conversation 
5 Deceivers' and respondents' expectation of honesty (truth bias) is positively 
linked with interactivity and relational warmth. 
no Not the focus of our study. There is 
no opportunity for lenders and 
borrowers to form a relationship. 
6 Deceivers' fear of being caught and the strategic activity that goes with that fear 
are lower when truth bias is high, and vice versa. 
yes Fear of being caught can lead liars 
to hide information. 
7 Motivation affects strategic activity and leakage. (a) People who deceive for their 
own self-gain make more strategic moves and display more leakage. (b) The way 
respondents first react depends on the relative importance of the relationship and 
their initial suspicion. 
yes Deceivers have something to gain, 
as in P2P lending. 
8 As relational familiarity increases, deceivers become more afraid of detection, 
make more strategic moves, and display more leakage. 
partly Not the focus of our study. Clearly 
there is a large social distance 
between lenders and borrowers. 
9 Skilled deceivers appear more believable because they make more strategic 
moves and display less leakage than unskilled deceivers. 
yes Skilled deceivers may write shorter 
loan descriptions to avoid revealing 
information about their low 
creditworthiness. 
10 A deceiver's perceived credibility is positively linked to interactivity, the 
respondent's truth bias, and the deceiver's communication skill but goes down to 
the extent that the deceiver's communication is unexpected. 
yes Perceived credibility here is 
provided by the loan description. 
The aspect of unexpected 
communication may be worth 
further study. 
11 A respondent's accuracy in spotting deception goes down when interactivity, the 
respondent's truth bias, and the deceiver's communication skill go up. Detection 
is positively linked to the respondent's listening skills, relational familiarity, and 
the degree to which the deceiver's communication is unexpected. 
yes Similar to P4, fewer interactions 
can improve deception detection. 
12 Respondents' suspicion is apparent in their strategic activity and leakage. no Does not seem applicable to our 
study 
13 Deceivers spot suspicion when it's present. Perception of suspicion increases 
when a respondent's behavior is unexpected. Any respondent reactions that signal 
disbelief, doubt, or the need for more information increase the deceiver's 
perception of suspicion. 
no No opportunity for deceiving 
borrowers to view lender's 
reactions. 
14 Real or imagined suspicion increases deceivers' strategic activity and leakage. yes Conceivable in P2P lending 
15 The way deception and suspicion are displayed within a given interaction 
changes over time. 
yes Implies that a single text may reveal 
more about deception than a 
conversation 
16 In deceptive interactions, reciprocity is the most typical pattern of adaptive 
response 
no Not applicable, as no repeated 
interaction takes place in our study 
17 When the conversation is over, the respondent's detection accuracy, judgment of 
deceiver credibility, and truth bias depend on the deceiver's final strategic moves 
and leakage as well as the respondent's listening skill and remaining suspicions. 
partly Clearly leakage detection should 
effect lending decisions. Lenders 
are assumed to have reading skills. 
18 When the conversation is over, the deceiver's judgment of success depends on the 
respondent's final reaction and the deceiver's perception of lasting suspicion. 
yes While meant for interaction 
situations, the underlying argument 
of impression formation seems to 
hold for P2P lending 
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Table 16 Weibull (Survival) Regression on Loan Default 
VARIABLES Coefficient S.E. t-stat. p-value Confidence Interval 
amount 0.0001*** (0.0000) 6.5123 0.0000 0.0001 - 0.0002 
interest rate 24.3160*** (4.1622) 5.8421 0.0000 16.1582 - 32.4739 
number of bids -0.0758*** (0.0117) -6.4548 0.0000 -0.0988 - -0.0528 
credit grade -0.1024* (0.0576) -1.7774 0.0755 -0.2153 - 0.0105 
debt-to-income ratio 0.2943*** (0.0813) 3.6185 0.0003 0.1349 - 0.4537 
# of spatial wordst 0.9301 (0.9910) 0.9386 0.1740 -1.0122 - 2.8724 
# of negation wordst 0.1897** (0.1105) 1.7165 0.0431 -0.0269 - 0.4062 
# of modal verbst -0.2513*** (0.0999) -2.5163 0.0060 -0.4471 - -0.0556 
# of modifierst 0.1038*** (0.0363) 2.8563 0.0022 0.0326 - 0.1750 
# of positive affect t -0.1000** (0.0496) -2.0170 0.0219 -0.1972 - -0.0028 
temporal wordst -0.0712** (0.0362) -1.9667 0.0246 -0.1422 - -0.0002 
no greetingt -0.9333*** (0.1735) -5.3792 0.0000 -1.2734 - -0.5933 
positive emoticonst -1.9108** (1.0142) -1.8841 0.0298 -3.8986 - 0.0769 
ln_p 2.4456*** (0.0394) 62.0867 0.0000 2.3684 - 2.5228 
Constant -87.5678*** (3.3473) -26.1604 0.0000 -94.1285 - -81.0071 
      
Observations 3,661     
AIC 241.3     
Log Likelihood (Max. LH) -105.7         
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, t=one-tailed 
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3. Investor Decision-Making in Equity Crowdfunding: A Trust-building Perspective 
 
Abstract: Research suggests that the decision-making of crowd investors differs from that of 
traditional investors. For startups seeking funding, it remains unclear how decisions are made 
by the crowd. Therefore, we decided to examine how the decision-making of crowd investors 
can be influenced by founders of startups seeking equity investments via crowdfunding. We 
use an interpretive qualitative case study, examining three different cases, to gain an in-depth 
understanding of these elements linked to the investment decision. We aggregate and develop 
our findings from these cases into a model. The model consists of three core elements 
influencing the behavior of crowd investors: trust in the startup, the perceived risk of an 
investment and the received benefits in case of a positive business development. These three 
elements are driven by several precursors such as ‘personality, expertise and shared values’ for 
trust or the ‘business model and scalability’ for perceived risk. The elements strongly depend 
on the startup’s setup and behavior. Further, external factors such as crowd herding effects or 
statements of opinion leaders also influence investors’ decisions. The combined impact of these 
diverse factors can be either amplified or mitigated by the communication of the startup. The 
model depicts how decisions are made by crowd investors in order to help startups and 
crowdfunding platforms successfully approach the crowd.  
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Investor Decision-Making in Equity Crowdfunding:  
A Trust-building Perspective 
3.1 Introduction 
In the seed phase, startups are challenged by raising capital (Schwienbacher and 
Larralde, 2012), often lacking collateral (Cosh et al., 2009). Crowdfunding provides 
entrepreneurs an alternative means of financing to traditional banks or venture capital because 
the crowd uses other (often soft) criteria to assess startups and the risk is shared among a 
multitude of investors (Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2012). 
Crowdfunding changes the information flows between founders and investors. Having 
investors as a direct feedback channel fosters user-centered innovation and can improve 
products (Belleflamme et al., 2011). Additionally, Crowdfunding can also be used as a 
marketing tool to promote an idea or project (Belleflamme et al., 2011; Mollick, 2014) or to 
test market acceptance (Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2012). Thus, founders can identify 
problems early before wasting valuable resources (Mollick, 2014).  
However, not every crowdfunding campaign is successful in raising money and 
awareness through the crowd. Many startups fail to receive the anticipated funding. This leads 
to the question as to what it takes to convince the crowd. In trying to answer this question, one 
successfully crowdfunded startup stated: “In crowdfunding you don't have ultra rational VC 
investors, which are assessing 20 different cases per day and are totally blunted. Predominantly 
the crowd is comprised of private persons who can be caught emotionally” (SS_E1). According 
to this presumption, the typical criteria which drive the decision-making of traditional investors 
do not apply to crowd investors. Especially emotional factors and trust-building seem to be 
particularly important in this context. 
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To our knowledge, only two studies research success factors of equity crowdfunding in 
particular (Ahlers et al., 2015; Lukkarinen et al., 2016). The authors of the first study find that 
in Europe, preselection of startups by crowdfunding platforms as well as the utilization of public 
and private networks help determine success or failure (Lukkarinen et al., 2016). Neither of 
these studies focus on the decision-making from a trust-building perspective in an in-depth 
qualitative manner. Ahlers et al. (2015) find that providing more detailed information about 
risks and retaining equity act as signals that strongly impact the probability of success. 
Contradicting the first study, social capital is found to have no significant effect on the 
probability of success.  The authors call for research that further explores investment reasons 
in equity crowdfunding, pointing to the limitation of their quantitative dataset (Ahlers et al., 
2015). 
To obtain a deeper understanding of what leads crowdfunding projects to a successful 
outcome, one must gain insights on how the the decision-making of individuals within the 
crowd is influenced during a crowdfunding campaign. Based on this premise we investigate the 
following research question using an interpretive case study approach: How can the decision-
making of crowd investors be influenced by founders from a trust-building perspective and how 
can these influences be explained? 
The remainder is structured as follows. We first depict the fundamentals theoretical 
foundations of crowdfunding and the decision-making processes. We then turn to the 
methodology and explain the contexts of our cases. Subsequently, the results are presented and 
discussed. Implications for practice are drawn before we conclude with an outlook on future 
research. 
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3.2 Theoretical Foundations 
3.2.1 Fundamentals of Crowdfunding Investments and the Agency Problem 
With roots in the microfinance movement (Yunus, 2007; Helms, 2006), crowdfunding 
can be seen as a new segment of crowdsourcing. Crowdsourcing, a term that denotes the process 
of drawing on the wisdom of the crowd by utilizing the scale of the internet and social networks 
(Howe, 2006)34, grew out of open source and Web 2.035 (Brabham, 2008a; Kleemann et al., 
2008). In crowdfunding, the crowd provides funds to individual entrepreneurs, firms or lenders, 
intermediated by an online platform (Belleflamme et al., 2014; Lambert and Schwienbacher, 
2010). In this process, the Internet serves as a communication platform, reducing economic 
frictions by providing input, monitoring and information exchange (Agrawal et al., 2011). 
Crowdfunding can be defined more formally as: “the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and 
groups – cultural, social, and for-profit – to fund their ventures by drawing on relatively small 
contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using the Internet, without standard 
financial intermediaries” (Mollick, 2014, p. 2). 
Founders like to raise funds in a way that is consistent with their values (Aaker and 
Akutsu, 2009). It is common that small amounts are crowdfunded by friends and family, 
especially early in the funding process (Mollick, 2014). Gerber et al. (2012) suggest that joining 
an online social community can motivate investors.36 Consumers who engage in crowdfunding 
                                               
34 More precisely “crowdsourcing represents the act of a company or institution taking a function once 
performed by employees and outsourcing it to an undefined (and generally large) network of people in 
the form of an open call..” (Howe, 2006). 
35 Web 2.0 refers to second generation websites that are designed for ease of use, while encouraging collaboration 
and interactivity, e.g. social network sites such as Facebook, but also blogs, wikis and video sharing sites (such as 
Youtube). The sites are built around user-generated content in virtual communities. 
36 According to Wang and Fesenmaier (2003), such motives include efficacy (satisfying other 
members’ needs; being helpful to others; seeking or providing advice; sharing enjoyment) and 
expectancy (seeking future exchange with the project initiator) next to instrumental factors (e.g. 
seeking or providing emotional support, finding friends or expressing one’s own identity), quality 
assurance (i.e. enforcing product or service excellence, product suggestions or evaluations) and status 
(or prestige in the community). 
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often want to take part in innovative behavior (Ordanini et al., 2011) while intrinsic (as opposed 
to extrinsic) motivations are more relevant for crowd investors (Schwienbacher and Larralde, 
2012). 	
Four types of crowdfunding can be distinguished: reward-based, donation-based,  lending-
based and equity-based (Beaulieu et al., 2015; De Buysere et al., 2012).  
 
Figure 1: Four Common Models of Crowdfunding (source: author’s illustration) 
 
As depicted on the vertical axis of the figure above, these types differ in the degree that 
profit maximization is the primary goal (as opposed to maximizing social value or simply 
realizing an innovation or project) and by the amount raised. Moving upwards in the vertical 
direction is also accompanied by a higher degree of regulation. The horizontal axis denotes the 
degree that the type of crowdfunding offers a return to investors and at the same time denotes 
the level of complexity. However, the heterogeneity of crowdfunding types is high enough to 
warrant individual consideration of the four quadrants depicted. 
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Lending-based sites (also termed debt crowdfunding), shown in the first quadrant of the 
figure above, can be differentiated between those offering interest and those that do not: in the 
latter case, the interest on the loan can be thought of as being donated (e.g. Kiva). In the case 
of crowd-lending, lenders most often receive a fraction of the principal amount plus interest on 
a monthly basis, according to a fixed schedule (typically over 24 or 36 months). While 
borrowers typically seek anywhere from $10,000 up to several million dollars depending on the 
platform, crowdlenders typically lend in increments of $100-$500 each and may reduce their 
overall risk by creating an investment portfolio. This form is used by individual lenders, 
startups, and increasingly SMEs for medium-term loans. 
Donation-based crowdfunding, depicted in quadrant three above, is philanthropic; 
backers typically give smaller amounts to causes they wish to support, without expecting any 
monetary compensation and are motivated primarily by altruism and/or the warm glow of 
giving (Andreoni, 1987). Donation-based platforms are often used by charities or non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) to raise money for specific causes, typically social, 
political or environmental in nature. Donors typically receive a simple thank you mail or 
postcard or special mention in a video or brochure; significant donations are often met with 
personal invitations to cause-related events, to visit the office location of a non-profit or even 
the possibility to engage directly in the cause with the team or social entrepreneur. 
In reward-based crowdfunding, shown in quadrant four (Figure 1), backers receive non-
financial benefits for their contributions which can be intangible (e.g. the chance to participate 
in a project or to be mentioned in the credits of a film or music album) or tangible (e.g. to 
receive an early version of the product) or a mix of both. Reward-based crowdfunding thus 
includes a large number of projects that are de facto a type of pre-purchase (Hemer, 2011) with 
a relatively high risk for backers vis-à-vis other types of crowdfunding (primarily the risk of 
non-realization of the product by the entrepreneur). This type of crowdfunding is often 
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employed by startups, particularly in the creative arts and in high tech B2C (Business-to-
Consumer) products sector to raise $50,000 or less, with notable exceptions; very popular 
products are often overfunded several times over (as on most crowdfunding platforms, funding 
is allowed to exceed the goal set by the entrepreneur). An example of such pre-purchasing 
projects is the e-paper smartwatch Pebble.37 Both reward-based and donation-based 
crowdfunding are lightly regulated and legal in almost all countries. 
Equity crowdfunding, depicted in the second quadrant, represents the newest form of 
this phenomenon. Here, a plethora of online investors contribute smaller amounts in exchange 
for fractional ownership of a company (Vulkan et al., 2016). Startups and businesses typically 
seek equity funding starting from $50k all the way up to $10 million from the crowd. Some of 
the newest of such platforms have a sector focus, such as fundrise.com, which offers equity 
stakes in real estate ventures. After facing legal challenges, equity crowdfunding experienced 
rapid growth as legal barriers were relaxed in several markets (Ahlers et al., 2015). Examples 
of this are the JOBS Act in the US and Small Investor Protection Law in Germany, where equity 
crowdfunding has been exempted from most regulatory requirements, particularly that of 
making a full-fledged prospectus available to potential investors38; this is replaced in Germany 
by a three paged fact sheet (Vermögensinformationsblatt, VIB). The threshold amount for this 
requirement was raised from €100k to €2.5 million by the small investor protection law of 2015 
(Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz). Hereby individual investors can contribute up to €10,000, a limit 
that does not count for professional or incorporated investors. For social projects, up to €10 
million can be collected, as long as the interest rate charged is no higher than 1.5% per annum. 
While thresholds differ, similar regulations have been implemented in most other EU countries. 
                                               
37 http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watch-for-iphone-and android 
As accessed Aug. 30th, 2017. 
38 This was criticized by Nobel Laureate Robert Shiller (2015) for offering too little protection to online investors 
(or “backers”); see the Final Draft of the US Securities and Exchange Commission rules: 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9974.pdf 
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It is worth noting that both equity crowdfunding and its lending-based variety are heavily 
regulated (e.g. by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the US)39. 
The platform under study uses a combination of lending- and equity-based 
crowdfunding. To summarize these two forms, while, in lending-based crowdfunding, project 
owners borrow money from the crowd without traditional intermediaries (De Buysere et al., 
2012) in expectation of a pre-defined interest payment as well as indirect social benefits (Lin, 
2009), in equity-based crowdfunding (or ‘crowdvesting’ (Kortleben and Vollmar, 2012)) a 
company makes an open call for funding, offering equity in exchange (De Buysere et al., 2012). 
Investors receive shares and sometimes voting rights (Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2010). As 
investors, customers share the risks (Ordanini et al., 2011). Kortleben and Vollmar (2012) 
looked closely into the relationships found in equity-based crowdfunding, identifying several 
principal-agent problems, depicted in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: Agency Constellation in Crowdfunding (adopted from Kortleben and Vollmar, 2012) 
 
                                               
39 Laws and policies governing equity-based crowdfunding are still developing and may limit the number of 
shareholders or require authorization from national securities regulators which can be prohibitively expensive 
(Bradford, 2012; Lambert and Schwienbacher, 2010). According to US Small Business Administration (SBA) 
briefing, new regulations may address this challenge: https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/Issue-
Brief-5-Equity-Based-Crowdfunding_2.pdf 
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Within the agency relation in which the investor is the principal and the start-up is the 
agent (no. 1), adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Spence, 1973) is 
given because the founder has more knowledge about the company and the business plan than 
the investor does. Moral hazard (Arrow, 1963) occurs because the investor cannot monitor the 
work of the founder, who could exploit this. A hold up problem exists because investors depend 
on the work of the founders, which they cannot influence.  
Some papers deal with the specific case of P2P-lending in which a platform 
intermediates between an individual borrower and many lenders (peers). Herzenstein et al. 
(2008) identify the need to provide lenders detailed personal information. As soft information 
may not be enough (Pötzsch and Böhme, 2010), independent credit grades are typically 
evaluated. Membership in an affinity group can also help convince lenders (Herzenstein et al., 
2008). Interestingly, Larrimore et al. (2011) identify extended narratives in the project 
description as reducers of uncertainty for potential lenders, while the use of quantitative words 
can increase the chance of success (see also Herzenstein et al. (2011)). Such effects are 
multiplied by information cascades on the internet (Duan et al., 2009) which flow into herding 
behavior of investors (Prechter, 2001), often leading to or impeding funding success of a 
venture within a short time frame of days or hours. The goal gradient hypothesis (Hull, 1932) 
theorizes that the motivation to reach a goal is disproportionately strengthened as the likelihood 
of achieving a goal approaches. Applied to the crowdfunding setting, the theory suggests a 
deadline effect: that a larger amount of investors will provide funds when the targeted funding 
amount is within reach. Simultaneously, high funding amounts or percentages (relative to the 
target amount) should serve as a quality signal to investors, while low amounts serve as a 
warning or caution sign (Benlian and Hess, 2011; Duan et al., 2009). 
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3.2.2 Trust as a Theoretical Lens for the Decision-making in Crowdfunding 
Developing trust within investors of the crowd is a fundamental of campaign success in 
crowdfunding. Moorman et al. define trust as the “willingness to rely on an exchange partner 
in whom one has confidence” (1993, p. 92). Primarily three types (or levels) of trust can be 
distinguished (Chen and Dhillon, 2003): system trust (Pennington et al., 2003), interpersonal 
trust (Rotter, 1971) and dispositional trust (Zucker, 1985). System trust depends on an 
individual’s perceptions of the institutional environment, i.e. the structure of the system, 
including laws and regulations, have been found to play a significant role in online B2C 
transactions (Pennington et al., 2003). Interpersonal trust describes the willingness of a party to 
depend on another party on a personal level even if negative consequences are possible. Such 
trust is often formed by past experience or by the perception of commonalities with the other 
party (Zucker, 1985). Reputation, built by strong network ties, has been found to play a key 
role in funding new ventures (Shane and Cable, 2002). Finally, dispositional trust is the general 
trusting attitude of an individual independent of other parties.40  
Perceived risk is a key factor influencing trust in the transaction economy (Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 1998; Mukherjee and Nath, 2003), especially in online settings such as 
crowdfunding, where founders and investors are physically separated. Risk is defined as the 
likelihood of an undesirable outcome (Deutsch, 1958). Corritore et al. (2003) argue that trust 
in online settings is also influenced by the credibility (honesty, expertise, predictability and 
reputation) of information on a website (i.e., how believable an information is) and ease of use 
of the platform. We mainly focus on interpersonal trust in this work, however, we acknowledge 
that this is partly mediated through the platform that hosts the campaign and the information 
provided by the founders on the platform. This is fundamentally different and challenging 
                                               
40 While most researchers bundle trust and distrust into a single construct, these concepts may be disjunct in the 
sense that they seem to evoke different sets of emotional responses: while distrust is associated with feeling fearful 
and anxious, trust is associated with feeling calm and secure (Kramer, 1999; McKnight and Chervany, 2001). 
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compared to regular offline investment processes with business angels or venture capitalists 
that usually meet the founder team and prepare a due diligence prior to investing. 
A key trust model is developed by Morgan and Hunt (1994), who examine the coherence 
of trust and commitment within a business relationship as well as their dependencies on both 
antecedents and outcomes (acquiescence, propensity of leave, cooperation, functional conflict 
and decision-making uncertainty). Relationship commitment involves “an exchange partner  
believing that an ongoing relationship with another is so important as to warrant maximum 
efforts at maintaining it; that is, the committed party believes the relationship is worth working 
on to ensure that it endures indefinitely” (1994, p. 23). Support is found for a positive 
correlation between relationship commitment and trust, conceptualized as “when one party has 
confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and integrity” (Morgan and Hunt, 1994, p. 23). 
Antecedents of relationship commitment in the model are termination (or switching) costs and 
benefits, which are highly valuable to one party and are brought into the relationship by the 
other, strengthening the commitment of the former. To build trust, communication between 
partners should be frequent and high in quality, i.e. relevant, timely and reliable. Trust is also 
impacted by opportunistic behavior. Both, commitment and trust are positively influenced by 
the presence of ‘shared values’ (see Figure 3). We use this model as a theoretical scaffolding in 
our empirical work as suggested by Walsham (1995). 
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Figure 3: Model of Trust and Relationship Commitment (adapted from Morgan & Hunt, 1994) 
 
3.3 Methodology 
We utilized an interpretive, qualitative case-study approach aiming to explore and 
understand the learnings and insights of the people involved in crowdfunding (Sarker et al., 
2012; Walsham, 1995). To ensure the quality of our approach, we followed the principles 
suggested for interpretive case studies by Klein and Myers (1999).  
Focusing on the German equity crowdfunding market, we selected CrowdEquity, one 
of the biggest such platforms for startups in Europe as our meta-case. Three individual 
crowdfunding cases were selected by first interviewing CrowdEquity employees to detect very 
successful cases on the platform (Yin, 2009). Through this process, we identified EduPlayBox, 
a very successful B2C case, which seemed to be attractive to investors because of the founding 
team, SimpleServ, a B2B concept, which reached the maximum funding amount after 48 
minutes, and FeedApp, which applied for funding on CrowdEquity twice, the first time very 
successfully. We explicitly chose these cases from the most successful ones that were ever run 
on CrowdEquity because literature suggests that B2C ideas have much higher chances to reach 
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their funding goals in a crowdfunding campaign than B2B ideas (Gleasure, 2015; Lukkarinen 
et al., 2016). We wanted to gain deeper insights into this phenomenon and contrast how both 
types can be successful. To further our understanding on successful B2B fundings, we added 
the third case that was very successful in the first round but lost traction in the second funding 
round. This also allowed insights on the challenges and changes when running a second 
campaign within the same setting but with less success, rendering many of the insights from 
extant literature obsolete (e.g., founder composition and experience, Lukkarinen et al., 2016).   
From January 2014 to February 2017 we conducted, recorded, and transcribed 22 in-
depth interviews surrounding the selected cases with an average length of about 60 minutes. 
Within the startup context, it is common to have smaller sets of interviews since there are just 
not as many potential interview partners in such young environments. However, our number is 
well above the minimum of interview numbers found in the ‘Information Systems Senior 
Scholars' Basket of Journals’ and we reached theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Guest et al., 2006; Sarker et al., 2013).  
The largest group of interview participants was investors, who mainly invested in either 
one or more of the case examples. To understand the phenomenon from all perspectives, 
heeding Klein and Myers’ (1999) principles, we also interviewed employees from the 
CrowdEquity platform, founders as well as early-stage employees from the three startup cases, 
and domain experts in crowdfunding surrounding the cases (see Error! Reference source not f
ound. for an overview). Additionally, we gathered a substantial amount of documents, press 
releases, and secondary interviews from the CrowdEquity platform for triangulation and 
enriched interpretations of the case contexts (Yin, 2009).  
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Table 1a: Overview of Short-codes for Interview Quotes 
Description/Case Short Codes Description 
Metacase: 
CrowdEquity CE_E1, CE_E2, CE_E3 
Experts and employees from the 
crowdfunding platform 
Case: EduPlayBox EB_F1, EB_F2, EB_F3 Founders 
Case: SimpleServ SS_E1, SS_E2 Early stage employees 
Case: FeedApp FA_F1, FA_E1 One founder and one early stage employee 
Expert FX Crowdfunding expert 
Investors I1, I2, I3, I4 Investors that invested in some or all of the cases 
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Interviews and data analysis were conducted iteratively following a grounded theory 
approach and the coding principles of Corbin and Strauss (6C paradigm); The main concepts 
of extant trust and crowdfunding literature were used as a scaffolding (Walsham, 1995). 
Figure 3: Coding Process of Grounded Theory, adapted from Cho & Lee, 2014 
 
 Open coding was conducted first, letting the data speak. Next, open codes were grouped 
into meaningful categories during axial coding. Finally, during the selective coding process, 
categories were brought into relation to each other, forming higher-level concepts (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Orlikowski, 1993).  
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Figure 4: First and Second Order Themes and Aggregate Constructs 
 
Based on the trust/risk literature and the information received on the CrowdEquity 
platform, open questions were developed as guidance for the interviews. They were conducted 
by several interviewers. Since the interpretive case study approach is iterative and it is important 
to stay open, data was coded iteratively and questions were revised and discussed by the 
authors/interviewers constantly according to the findings of the previous interviews (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967; Walsham, 1995). 
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To ensure the quality of interpretation and results, we built the principles of Klein and 
Myers into our research process as already briefly mentioned above. Details and examples of 
how this was done can be found in Table 2 as suggested by Ellway and Walsham (2015). 
Table 2  Application of Interpretive Principles (adapted from: Ellway and Walsham, 2015; Klein 
and Myers, 1999) 
PRINCIPLE AND 
DEFINITION 
EXPLANATION AND EXAMPLES OF HOW 
PRINCIPLE WAS UPHELD 
1. Hermeneutic circle – all 
human understanding develops 
through iteration between 
considering the interdependent 
meaning of parts and the whole 
that they form. 
 
We conducted a number of iterations through the application of the 
supporting principles. For example, between platform experts insights for 
one of the specific cases and their experiences from others funding 
projects. A further example iteration included a comparison of interviews 
from the different cases in various functions, and their subsequent 
interpretation when contextualizing them within the social setting of the 
funding projects. 
2. Contextualization – to 
ensure that 
readers can appreciate how the 
existing situation arose, there 
must be critical reflection of  
background of the investigated 
setting. 
 
We gathered a substantial amount of data (besides the interviews) 
surrounding the investment process on the CrowdEquity platform and the 
three case histories was gathered, analyzed, and presented. Through the 
application of principle 6, multiple interpretations further helped us to 
develop an understanding of the uniqueness of the social context of each 
specific funding project. 
3. Interaction between the 
researcher and subjects – the 
social construction of data 
achieved through interaction 
between researcher and 
subjects must be reflected 
upon. 
 
Interviewees’ opinions about specific funding projects were sought, but 
this was supplemented with real data from the funding process and the 
funding website on the platform. Critical readings of constructed data and 
discussion between researchers enabled reflection upon the data. Further 
reflections and discussions were triggered by adapting the interview 
guidelines to challenge first interpretations of earlier interviews in later 
ones. 
4. Abstraction and 
generalization –idiographic 
details that emerge from 
interpretation of data must be 
related to broader theoretical 
concerns about the nature of 
human understanding and social 
action. 
 
The interpretation of the interviews was situated in the context of the 
specific case and the meta-case. We constantly compared insights from 
interviews and analyses particularly through the sensitizing concept of 
trust. To enable generalization, we compared and contrasted between the 
insights from the different cases.  
5. Dialogical reasoning – 
researchers must recognize the 
possibility of inconsistencies 
between theoretical 
A key theoretical preconception concerned the targeted type of market: 
We started our case selections and interviews with an understanding that 
funding projects targeting B2B markets could not be very successful in 
running crowdfunding campaigns. However, our iterative approach and 
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preconceptions that guided the 
research and the findings that 
emerged with various cycles of 
revision. 
case selection through interviews with platform experts sensitized us to 
the fact that this is an oversimplification in existing research and B2B 
funding projects might be very successful as well. However, further 
revision cycles and an adapted interview guideline revealed that this 
success might be dependent on many aspects and issues surrounding the 
specific case. However, extant theory on trust and the notions of the 
universe of discourse and universe of the undiscussed also helped to draw 
our attention to aspects of the case contexts that were present or absent in 
narratives by supporting our initial interview guide development. 
 
6. Multiple interpretations – 
researchers must be alert to 
potential differences in 
interpretations from 
participants concerning 
narratives or stories.  
 
We sought opinions from multiple perspectives through interviews with 
investors, founders, employees, and platform experts. Their 
interpretations on specific events and situations within the funding 
process were constantly compared and contrasted throughout the 
interviews and analyses to enable an understanding of espoused theories 
and theories-in-use. This was further facilitated by comparing interview 
data to funding project data gathered from the platform. 
 
7. Suspicion – researchers 
must be mindful of possible 
biases or distortions in the 
narratives produced by 
subjects. 
Critical readings of the narratives constructed by the interviewees were 
performed, firstly by recognizing the notion of the universe of the 
undiscussed, secondly by comparing them to collected documents and 
numbers of the funding process and discussing inconsistencies in 
different interviews and thirdly by acknowledging the context within 
which they were formed.  
 
3.4 CrowdEquity as a Metacase 
On CrowdEquity, young, innovative enterprises receive access to equity investments 
from private micro investors, i.e. the crowd. As compensation, lenders receive a share of profits 
and a small interest rate after the minimum contract duration (normally five years). At this 
period, the investment amount is paid out. 
CrowdEquity focuses on scalable, innovative and sustainable business models with a 
first ‘proof-of-concept’. The business idea is presented on a project page, containing a video 
and a description of how it works, the business model and the unique selling proposition (USP), 
the team, the project status-quo, goals, what is planned to be done with the money collected and 
an analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT analysis). Every startup 
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must offer at least one ‘goody’ to the crowd, which is received when investing a certain 
threshold amount. Registered users have access to a closed area in which they can communicate 
with the founders, the so-called ‘investor’s channel’. They also receive regular updates, 
business plans, and sample contracts for potential investments, and can see which of the users 
invested how much in a project (users can remain anonymous by selecting a user name). 
Investors cannot communicate directly but receive additional material and regular progress 
reports. CrowdEquity encourages users and investors to promote the startups within their 
network, helps startups advertise their funding (CE_E3) and offers the opportunity to hold an 
‘investment call’, an online Q&A session with the crowd.  
Every campaign has a funding threshold – as soon as it is reached, the contracts go into 
effect, which means that the project is funded with the minimum required amount. Every project 
has a funding limit, which closes funding automatically when reached. Since May 2013, 
startups have the opportunity to raise the funding limit multiple times. This artificial shortage 
helps startups stimulate investments (CE_E3). Figure 6 below summarizes the funding process 
of CrowdEquity. 
Figure 5: The Campaign and Investment Process on CrowdEquity 
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3.5 First Startup Case: EduPlayBox 
EduPlayBox is an explorative game box for kids aged four to ten years, which is 
delivered once per month on a subscription basis. It is grounded on the concept of ‘learning 
through playing’: child development is fostered simply through play, without any learning 
pressure.  Every box contains three different exploration games, materials and instructions, tips 
for parents about educational play, a story to read out loud and an audio CD so that parents 
have some time for themselves. Boxes can be ordered on the website of EduPlayBox for a 
monthly fee of € 19 to € 22,90 (VAT included) depending on the chosen cancelation period. 
Costs of the firm are € 10 for packaging and materials, resulting in a contribution margin of € 
6 to € 9,24 (VAT excluded) per box. The business model is based on the accumulation of these 
contribution margins through the subscription model and success is strongly contingent on the 
customer lifetime, which needs to compensate for the cost of customer acquisition. 
EduPlayBox raised € 600.000, starting with a minimum funding threshold of € 50.000, 
reached after only 29 minutes, and a limit of € 300.000, reached after about 35 hours. The limit 
was increased twice, first to € 450.000, reached after about a week and then to € 600.000, 
reached after one month. 599 investors invested, resulting in an average investment of nearly € 
1.000. Many investors invested more than once and increased their funding over time. About 
70 investors contributed more than the € 2.500 threshold and were thus invited for one of the 
EduPlayBox ‘investor’s dinners’. 
3.5.1 The Founding Team 
The founders of EduPlayBox, a couple as well as two others produced and developed 
the EduPlayBox. The female of the couple, who invented EduPlayBox, develops the contents 
of new boxes. She worked for six years as a consultant at one of the top consultancies and five 
years as a product manager for television. Afterwards, she helped found and lead several private 
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schools as their director. The male of the founders’ couple, the CEO of EduPlayBox, previously 
co-founded one of the largest online toy stores. As a CMO, he led the acquisition of over 
300.000 new customers annually. Before that, he worked for four years as a consultant at one 
of the top consultancies and after his exit from the toy store, he successfully founded another 
internet firm. The CFO of EduPlayBox previously co-founded an online music video service 
and a translation service for web videos. Before that, he worked for one of the largest auditing 
firms and for the financial services in a large automotive manufacturer. The forth founder is 
Chief Operating Officer and responsible for procurement, logistics and customer support. She 
previously worked for four years as the project manager of the chairman of one of the largest 
pharmaceutical corporations. 
3.5.2 EduPlayBox: Crowd Investor Decision Drivers and Trust-building Mechanisms 
EduPlayBox is based on the two topics ‘education’ and ‘children’ that seem to attract a 
lot of investors, especially those that have kids themselves: “Many of our [crowd] investors 
are motivated by the topics 'education' and 'children'. Several investors have many kids” 
(EB_F3). Another EduPlayBox founder (EB_F2) remarked: “During the [investor] meal we 
really noticed that a lot of investors were highly motivated by the idea and by contributing to 
education – a socially important topic”.41 The attractiveness of the idea and product was also 
confirmed directly by investors: “[As a goody] we got one of the boxes. In my case that was 
really good because we have a daughter in the age bracket and my daughter liked it a lot” (I4). 
The intrinsic motivation of the founders to support the development of children convinced one 
investor: “Mrs. [founder couple] seems to be really attached to it [EduPlayBox] and it seems 
                                               
41 The couple outlined these facts in an interview on YouTube: “The idea of EduPlayBox convinced people. It is a huge success because it 
meets the needs of the people and it wants to change society. It is about education and changing the learning culture. So the mix of economic 
potential and potential to change society...convinced people”. 
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to be her life. These are really good premises” (I2). In addition, one investor was impressed 
that EduPlayBox was actually founded by a family (I1). 
Besides that, the team itself seemed to play an important role for investors: "Before 
EduPlayBox, [the online toy store] was kind of a precursor [the male couple founder] and also 
his wife […] previously founded a school. The EduPlayBox guys were clearly on top of things. 
[The couple], I guess, come from a consulting background and [...] their appearance was very 
competent”. (I1) Especially [the male part of the founders couple] with his previous experience 
was mentioned several times as a decision criterion (I1, I2, I4, CE_E1).42 
Further, a CrowdEquity employee (CE_E3) explained that the founders’ network plays 
a key role: “[It is problematic] if there is not a crowd in the beginning which invest on a large 
scale. Therefore, we tell startups that, if they know [interested] people, they should get them to 
invest at the start of the funding to signal trust to the crowd”. The EduPlayBox team followed 
this advice. One founder estimated the amount provided by their own network as about 17-20% 
(EB_F1) and another added: “I believe [using one’s own network] plays an important role 
insofar as a lot of our acquaintances decided to invest on the first funding day or in the days 
directly after so that the money came together fast […] that presumably led to observers [in the 
crowd] getting the feeling that if so many are investing now, then this must be a good team or 
offer” (EB_F3). This herding effect was also brought forward by EB_F1 and confirmed by 
CE_E1: “It is important that there is strong investment activity in the beginning because a 
herding mindset predominates [in the crowd]”. He added that herding convinces undecided 
investors in particular. 
                                               
42 “Above all, the founding team of EduPlayBox convinced me because one of the founders, whom I know personally, is very successful with 
[an online toy store], which means he knows the market for children and toys and has proven successful in this field. That’s the crucial 
criterion for me” (I4). One investor (I2) said: ”I believe that [this founder] had a very strong influence […] [and] that many investors 
trusted in his previous success”. 
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The team of EduPlayBox approached all kinds of channels in their network - personal 
acquaintances, Xing, LinkedIn, Twitter and Facebook (EB_F2, EB_F3). They pointed out that 
no single channel is most important in crowdfunding because of crowd heterogeneity. 
Regarding Facebook one founder remarked: “Of course […] Facebook is the largest. There 
you can reach a lot of people […]. I am a communicator with 1500 plus friends on Facebook; 
I managed the community [of EduPlayBox on Facebook] with about 26.000 fans back then. 
Today we have about 56.000” (EB_F2). This quote illustrates the extensive network of the 
EduPlayBox founders. In addition to their own endeavors, CrowdEquity supported 
EduPlayBox with their own social media activities (EB_F1). 
Several investors were also very impressed by EduPlayBox’s business model 
presentation on CrowdEquity (I1; I2; I4). EduPlayBox described it (EB_F3): “We tried to show 
that this business model has economic logic. Through subscriptions, which cumulate small 
income streams over time, profitability is based on subscription lifetime. We were able to show 
impressive growth figures from our first four months, a clear indication […]. I think this 
combination – idea and comprehensible business model – makes sense for laymen [...]”. One 
investor (I4) emphasized that he was convinced by the realistic approach of the business plan 
without any daring assumptions or exaggerated numbers. Another one added (I1): “If you see 
them calculate on a cent level what a box costs and what you can earn through it with lifecycle, 
etc. then you get a good feeling. The idea […] they looked into it in depth. The presentation of 
the numbers was convincing”. One founder (EB_F1) commented: “[…] you have many 
unprofessional investors [in crowdfunding], you can say that colorful, beautiful, 
understandable, aesthetics, etc. work the best here”. One convinced investor (I1) agreed: “I am 
quickly impressed by beautiful graphics. Some startups value highly that their SWOT matrix is 
pretty, that the numbers, the charts look good and the text is well processed. That impresses a 
lot”. 
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According to CrowdEquity employees, the video on the project page plays a very 
important role in investor decision-making (CE_E1, CE_E2, CE_E3). That coincides with the 
statements and experience of the EduPlayBox founders. We asked a crowdfunding expert (and 
also founder) about the relevance of the different elements on the project page on CrowdEquity, 
who responded: “I would say the video weights about 80 % - I am pretty sure. I still know [the 
influence of moving images] from the online-marketing […], the investment increases 
proportional to video views” (FX). One of the founders emphasized the importance of the first 
seconds of the video: “I believe the first 20 seconds are most important […] many people do 
not even watch it to the end [...]. Either you attract people or you do not [...]. In TV series, you 
can advertise but the first impression needs to excite people and that is the same on 
CrowdEquity [...]. From different people, especially from our friends, we got the feedback that 
the video was brisk and convincing, although it is unprofessional and self-produced. Therefore, 
the video has a very high influence on the decision” (EB_F3). EB_F1 also sees an important 
role in the revenue statements of the couple’s male founder: “...I guess 30 or 40 % of the video’s 
success led back to [him] and his statement [about how EduPlayBox earns money] because it 
is just a huge trust factor. He already understood e-commerce for children and is trying it 
again. You buy that - the video is also beautiful”.  
The investor dinner also influenced the success of EduPlayBox. One investor (I1) said 
that he liked that the founders made themselves tangible for investors and mentioned it as a 
trust-increasing factor. I1 was angry afterwards that he had not raised his investment to over € 
2.500 to be part of one of the dinners. EB_F3 confirmed: “the reactions were very positive. 
Investors were excited and happy to meet the founders and we got very positive feedback on 
it”. One founder (EB_F3) emphasized his belief that some investors raised their investment 
again just to qualify for participation in one of the dinners and that this offer was successful. A 
participating investor summarized: “[In the investment dinner] it was great to meet the founding 
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team but also various other interesting participants… I would recommend it and think it is an 
awesome idea as a complement to the goody” (I4). 
Concerning the communication with investors one of the interviewees (I4) said: “[That is 
something [which] stuck me, the communication [of EduPlayBox] was extraordinarily good. 
For every question, regardless how short there came a detailed answer […] very positive 
because they continued this also after the funding. Even today their communication is very 
quick, comprehensive and very open”. The responsible founder for investor relations at 
EduPlayBox (EB_F3) reflected: “…I got the feedback from CrowdEquity […] that our 
comprehensible, detailed and respectful explanations when answering questions created 
additional trust. In the end, the crowd is investing and investments are always a trust topic. I 
invest with a large risk, try to reduce uncertainties and if the [team] behind the idea makes an 
experienced and professional impression then the [perceived] risk factor is reduced”. This was 
confirmed by another investor (I2): “I dived deeply into the topic and asked a lot of questions 
to [the male part of the founder couple]. Also unpleasant ones, which he answered openly, 
impressing me”.  
3.6 Second Startup Case: SimpleServ 
SimpleServ develops and produces what they call ‘the world’s simplest server’, the 
‘SimpleServ-Box’, directed at small and medium-sized companies and private households. The 
product has just one button and a one-page instruction sheet. It is designed to protect users from 
dangerous data leaks and security flaws. With a SimpleServ-Box, users keep all their data on 
their own server at home or in the office, while at the same time having the possibility to 
collaborate from everywhere and to share data through their own cloud. The box consists of 
up-to-date hardware ‘Made in Germany’ and an extensive software package. SimpleServ also 
provides their own social network for the SimpleServ-Box, a content management system, a 
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browser-based collaboration interface and specially designed applications, such as a team 
calendar. It also allows for third party apps.  
The team positions the SimpleServ-Box as a high quality product on hardware, 
software, security, design and service. For the future, the startup plans to offer a SimpleServ-
Box version for private households, premium service contracts, mobile apps, wireless repeaters, 
and software licenses for other hardware providers. The main revenue stream of SimpleServ is 
the sale of the SimpleServ-Box for € 2.14943. When the firm began looking for funding, they 
had already provided a first proof of concept by selling 46 units to early adopters.  
When SimpleServ funding opened it took exactly 48 minutes until the funding sum of 
€ 200.000 was reached (SS_E2). The funding threshold of € 50.000 was collected after only six 
minutes, € 100.000 within twelve minutes. 220 people invested, with a funding average of about 
€ 909. 
3.6.1 The Founding Team 
The current CEO and original founder of SimpleServ previously worked for several 
companies including a large online portal and one of the leading professional social networking 
sites (SNS), developing accounting, inventory, and ERP systems. During his time at the SNS, 
he met the second founder. Today both are responsible for software development. The second 
founder previously started a file sharing service at age 16, studied marketing and management, 
and worked for some time as a freelance developer before going to work for the SNS where he 
met his co-founder and the first prototypes of the SimpleServ-Box were created. During the 
crowdfunding campaign, three more employees joined SimpleServ. 
                                               
43 The 2016 price range is from €1511 (entry-level box) to € 5998 (with 18 Terabytes of storage). Hardware costs are well below these 
amounts, with the contribution margin the highest for the top model.  
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3.6.2 SimpleServ: Crowd Investor Decision Drivers and Trust-building Mechanisms  
Two investors (I1, I2) were attracted by data security, sovereignty and innovativeness 
of the product. “Internet security was a huge trend”, explained one investor (I2). SimpleServ 
tried to emotionalize the topic by storytelling: “We can tell people ‘Hey, it’s all about your data 
sovereignty and that you really own the data’ and then they notice ‘Yes, that’s true! I like that!’ 
” (SS_E1). One of the CrowdEquity employees said: “They [SimpleServ] told a cool story in 
their video - story-wise they are really good. They build a boring product an enterprise server 
but sell it as the 'simplest server of the world', with the cloud on your own server at home […]. 
THE answer in the age of the NSA and the uncertainties of the cloud […]. And you have to 
watch the video and see how the story is told! The founder […] is absolutely inspiring, really 
well done with some humor that causes investors to really like the startup” (CE_E3). SS_E1 
explained that the story is an important reference point for people to remember. 
By conveying emotions, one can (partly) circumvent the cognitive selection process: 
“In crowdfunding you don't have these super rational VC investors who check out 20 different 
cases per day and are totally serious, but rather private people whom you can catch on an 
emotional level. When approaching a [professional], number-oriented investor, it is an art to 
catch him off guard with emotions. Private people, who just decide 'Ok, I have some play 
money', are a completely different story” (SS_E2). This explains the importance of the video: 
“With a video one can transport distinctly more emotions and authenticity – a unique 
opportunity!” (SS_E2). Investors want to lean back and relax and therefore prefer a convincing, 
easily consumed, video (SS_E2). I1 also confirmed the impact of the video: “I was really 
impressed by the story and the film was the door opener”. SimpleServ presented themselves 
professionally overall (CE_E3): “The presentation had this strong pull like the keynotes of 
[Steve] Jobs. Likeable, focused and prepared […] and you enjoyed being gripped by the story”, 
one of the investors recalls (I1). The comparison to Apple is also made by a CrowdEquity 
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employee: “…their’ appearance is like Apple, all people work with the same mindset - from 
marketing to the product - and not: one is building the product while the other is selling it” 
(CE_E3).  
However, in communication with investors, SimpleServ employees (SS_E1; SS_E2) 
noted improvement potential: “We didn't have a large PR agency back then. I would definitely 
change that next time because press coverage distinctly increases the probability of success 
and therefore also the chance that it really takes off […]. We talked to people who wanted to 
raise € 100.000 on Kickstarter but accidently got ten million and in all the conversations they 
stressed that it was essential for their success that they did massive PR in the months before the 
start” (SS_E2). The reason, he argues, is that with so much PR, hundreds of people are already 
convinced and will invest within the first hours. 
Funding still went very quickly (I2). Investors needed to decide quickly before the 
funding limit was reached. In addition, the business plan was not provided until the funding 
start so that nobody was able to read it beforehand (SS_E2). Therefore, investment decisions 
were more “reflex decisions” (I2). Still, the investor stating this said that he was sure about his 
investment decision (I2). This was confirmed by I1 who said that he would normally take more 
time to decide but was already fully convinced about SimpleServ and waited impatiently for 
the start. 
The SimpleServ-Box goody substantially influenced funding: “[Funding went 
incredibly fast] because we offered this goody. We told investors that they would receive a box 
if they invest more than € 2.000. An amazing deal […] on purpose…it accelerated our funding 
immensely” (SS_E2). Another employee (SS_E1) pointed out that this was especially attractive 
to early adopters, who received the product at a discount. One investor said: “The box was cool 
regarding its look and feel and the well-designed surface” (I1). Some investors want to be 
among the first to support a company (SS_E1) and are proud to be involved in funding and 
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business development: “The people write […] ‘Yes, I invested, I invested in SimpleServ!’. The 
people are proud about it” (SS_E1).  
Many investors initially wanted to invest less in SimpleServ, but then decided to raise 
their amounts to get the box (SS_E2). 55 investors invested € 2.000 or more to receive a 
SimpleServ-Box. I2 added: “[In SimpleServ] investors invested quite a lot on average. If the 
funding sum is high and only few investors invested so far but the funding limit is nearly 
reached, then this is a good argument for me to invest”. The SimpleServ-Box as a goody also 
had a marketing effect: “Every box in the market does marketing for us.'” (SS_E2). Because of 
this boosting effect, SS_E2 said that SimpleServ would use the Box as a goody again, which 
evidently turned out to be a good decision.  
The team also played an important role for investors (I1): “I was really impressed by 
their whole appearance and commitment to the product and the idea” which was supported by 
I2. Further, the team’s experience (I1) and successful business development (CE_E3) were 
outlined. SS_E2 remarked: “Because the whole team was convincing, especially the founders 
I guess. Especially [the first founder], is very charismatic and natural”. This was also 
confirmed by both SS_E1 and CE_E3. 
The team also used their own social networks to boost success: “We called all our 
acquaintances and friends, telling everyone 'come to CrowdEquity', tell all your friends, invest 
yourself because we didn't know if [the campaign] would be successful or not” (SS_E1). They 
used all available social media channels to communicate with potential investors (SS_E1; 
SS_E2). For the funding begin, SimpleServ created a Facebook event and invited everybody 
from their network (SS_E1). I1 pointed out that SimpleServ is well connected in the region they 
are located in and that they are very apt at Internet-related communication and networking. 
Their post-crowdfunding communication effort was also praised: “I also liked the 
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communication policy of SimpleServ a lot, who record update videos from the founder from 
time to time. I was very attracted by this.” (I2). 
3.7 Third Startup Case: FeedApp 
FeedApp enables firms to receive fast and anonymous feedback from their customers 
via smartphones. The end user can provide feedback to firms in the following ways: by scanning 
a QR code or entering a short-URL provided by the feedback-seeking company, via a 
smartphone app, via near field communication NFC) or SMS. If the target firm is not an 
FeedApp customer, the feedback is forwarded to the firm anyway. This is part of FeedApp’s 
sales strategy. Giving feedback is free for end-users. Participating firms can put up posters, 
table displays or add information on the receipt to advertise the mechanism. The feedback is 
sent in real-time to a web surface, which allows administration of the comments and responding 
to critique via the FeedApp messaging-system.  
Customer satisfaction and loyalty can be increased significantly through direct contact 
between the end-user and the firm’s chief executive as well as via the possibility for companies 
to send coupons to customers. FeedApp can also deliver context information e.g., at which table 
the feedback providers were sitting to identify location-based problems. Business customers 
pay a fixed fee per month to FeedApp depending on the scope of service plus a one-time set-
up fee. During the first CrowdEquity funding, FeedApp offered a three month (paid) trial 
period. 
On the first day € 63.500 were raised. The funding threshold was reached after two 
weeks. The normal campaign length is two months, which was extended. The funding limit of 
€ 400.000 was not reached after the campaign duration of four months and funding closed with 
a sum of € 160.000 with 245 investors involved, resulting in an average investment of about € 
653.  
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3.7.1 The Founding Team 
FeedApp was founded by four former students from a technical university, two 
industrial engineers and two computer scientists. The team combines expertise in software 
development, marketing, finance, and sales. With the investments from the first CrowdEquity 
round, FeedApp was able to hire additional employees to grow the firm. 
3.7.2 FeedApp: Crowd Investor Decision Drivers and Trust-building Mechanisms 
In this case, the business idea also played a large role. One investor (I3) explained: “I 
am backing the idea of FeedApp because I find the goal they are following really desirable, 
that is customer feedback and honesty as values”. I1 and I4 also invested because they were 
convinced by the idea, which was very important for FeedApp (FA_E1). However, according 
to FeedApp, the B2B business model was also a problem: “We think it is a big problem that 
many of the people which participate on crowdfunding platforms are private investors that 
invest predominantly in consumer products, since it is easier for them to understand the 
business model. Complex business models, encountered in B2B relations, are much harder to 
illustrate. They are simply not as sexy, lack the herding effect you encounter with all these cool 
products, which - in the best case - you can even buy and use for yourself” (FA_E1).  
FA_E1 argued also that viral spreading is much higher for B2C products. CrowdEquity 
added: “Mostly B2B topics, to be honest [have difficulty getting funded]. There is the investor 
that is B2C thinking at home on the couch. You have to make them aware of the problems of a 
B2B provider [...] And the task is to show good testimonials, which essentially say ‘yes, we use 
it and it is so good, that we are satisfied’” (CE_E3). That is what FeedApp tried when including 
their famous business angel in their investment story and their video.  
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The importance of the video especially in B2B was outlined by the interviewed 
FeedApp employee (FA_E1) who said that it helps investors understand the product. One of 
the investors called the video presentation very powerful (I3). I2 liked the video and how it 
illustrated the product. However, the video was an element in which one of the founders saw 
an issue: “We produced a video in which we also described which negative experiences we 
made. These lead to doubts and that is a mistake, which I wouldn't repeat. We were too honest 
I guess” (FA_F1). 
The ‘negative experiences’ addressed in the video were about customer acquisition and 
PR and the readjustment of their target group (FA_F1). This led to changes in the business 
model and new billing structures. FA_E1 sees one reason for the less successful second round 
on CrowdEquity in these changes: “Cash flow changed because we introduced a new business 
model and therefore […] for investors who compared the second to the first round, it looked 
like we missed our targets, disastrous in crowdfunding. [Then] the atmosphere changes”. One 
investor (I3) explained that although the revenue goal was hit the costs were higher than 
expected and therefore the margin dropped. Another investor recalled similar thoughts: “In the 
second round [I was not longer attracted by the business model] because it became discernible 
that the [business] model and the growth rates apparently weren't that realistic or didn't occur 
as anticipated by the team. Further, they did this big readjustment and so I didn't invest in the 
second round” (I4).  
They tried to get as much as possible out of the PR hype triggered by the first round and 
so they used their new press contacts also for the second round in order to raise more attention: 
“…we were relatively self-confident […]. We said that it will be the largest crowdfunding, to 
date and resulting in a high PR impact” (FA_E1). This strategy was not perceived as positive 
by every investor (e.g., I3). 
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FeedApp also tried to activate their personal network to accelerate funding as 
CrowdEquity recommends (FA_F1). One of their acquaintances (I3) confirmed that many of 
their personal contacts invested. In addition, FA_E2 described that beyond this, they relied on 
the (PR-) actions of CrowdEquity. 
FeedApp offered an investor call (FA_F1), where one founder explained the plan for 
the next months and answered participants’ questions about cash flow, turnover, customer 
acquisition costs, lifetime value and so forth. The questions raised by private micro investors 
are not really critical for the startups on CrowdEquity because investors cannot dig very deeply 
into the cases to assess the business model (FA_F1; FA_E1). Investors perceived the call as 
very positive. I2 explained that it showed that the founders back their product, know what they 
are doing and react sensibly to the questions raised leading him to raise his investment further. 
As mentioned before, FeedApp offered their software as a goody which was not 
redeemed at all (FA_F1; FA_E1). The employee interviewed (FA_E1) explained that the 
software is only suitable for specific firms and they were not able to offer a B2C product, which 
could really be used by most investors. Thus, investors were not attracted by their goody (I2, 
I5). 
The team, on the other hand, convinced most investors interviewed (I1; I2; I3). Only I4 
was critical about the teams’ composition due to the founders’ youth. As they do not have “20 
years of professional experience in the field”, he was not sure if they would be able to predict 
growth. 
A technical problem at the start of the second campaign had a substantial influence on 
the success of the second round. FA_F1 described the start and technical problems as a ‘fail’ 
because the initial funding boost was not triggered: “You know, this is the herd effect: if you 
see a lot of people walking in one direction you follow. And if you don't have this effect because 
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of a technical problem, it won't work [...] and the effect is exponential”. CrowdEquity 
conjectured that the disadvantage was a decrease of the funding sum by about 10-20 % 
(CE_E3).  
The other interviewee from FeedApp (FA_E1) outlined how important the first wave of 
investors is for the funding drive because initial investors often thrill others to invest as well. 
During the first funding round, FA_F1 also noticed some kind of a last minute panic – it 
accelerated because everyone wanted “a piece of the cake” (FA_F1). I3 identified these effects 
in his own behavior during the first round: “I saw that the funding went relatively fast, […] and 
this definitely influenced me. If it had proceeded really slowly, I would have interpreted that as 
a lack of interest in other people who maybe even know the ropes better than me. It was an 
emotional action […]. I thought 'Come on'. It went really fast”. Due to the fact that the people 
were not confronted with herding in the second round they hesitated and waited to see what 
would happen before deciding (FA_E1). 
CrowdEquity recommends that startups, which extend the funding period to raise 
attention, provide additional updates about business development (CE_E2). One FeedApp 
founder (FA_F1) admitted that at some point in the second round they were not able to provide 
more updates, which led to funding stagnation. They tried to acquire additional investors and 
referred every business angel they could to the platform. The importance of updates was also 
outlined by another interviewed crowdfunding expert (FX) who said that one should push 
intense PR about the funding duration for quick wins, which can be communicated to the crowd. 
According to him, many investors split their investment and observe how funding develops. 
Additional updates can trigger their investment. This idea was confirmed by investors (I1; I2). 
FA_E1 mentioned another possible explanation regarding the low sum that was raised 
in the second crowdfunding campaign: “Another effect possibly is that on that date there wasn’t 
enough capital on the [CrowdEquity] platform…I think at the same time there was a startup 
 122 
which also raised quite a large sum”. CrowdEquity responded that there are clear indications 
that when a new project starts their funding it influences the other available projects. One reason 
is that new startups take over the first position on the investment list (CE_E3). 
In addition, the higher funding limit was mentioned: “In general, fundings got slower 
on CrowdEquity. The reason may be that the sums [which are raised] are larger. People have 
more time to read the plans, to think about it. For me it was the same - I first invested only the 
minimum amount and then waited for the [investment] call before [investing further]” (I2). The 
investor added that you have more time to be critical and to question the model. This was 
confirmed by one of the CrowdEquity employees (CE_E1). I1 and I2 both said that they always 
wait until the very end with their investment to see how funding develops.  
FA_F1 said that if they could repeat the second round, they would lower the funding 
threshold and funding limit significantly; after reaching the initial goal, they would increase the 
funding limit successively until reaching the truly desired sum. This is also recommended by 
CrowdEquity because the impact of an investor’s investment looks much bigger on the 
investment bar (CE_E1). Further, investors are led to believe that a lot of capital was raised 
since their last visit. 
3.8 Discussion and theoretical Implications 
3.8.1 Cross-Case Comparison 
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Table 3  Comparison of the Cases 
Element 
CASE 1: 
EDUPLAYBOX 
CASE 2: 
SIMPLESERV 
CASE 3: 
FEEDAPP [2n round] 
Target Market B2C B2B B2B 
Amount Raised € 600.000 € 200.000 € 100.000 [2nd round: € 
160.000] 
Time to Reach 
Amount 
30 days 48 minutes 3 hours [120 days] 
Number of Limit 
Increases 
2 (€ 300.000, € 450.000, € 
600.000) 
0 0 [0] 
Number of 
Investors 
599 220 131 [245] 
Average 
Investment 
€ 1002 € 909 € 763 [€ 653] 
Threshold: 
Incentives 
• € 250: Product 
• € 2500: Investor’s dinner 
• € 250: € 250 discount for 
product 
• € 2000: Product 
• € 250: 50% discount for 
contract 
[€ 250: 6-month premium 
license] 
Trust-building 
Mechanisms 
• Investor’s dinner; tangible 
founders 
• Open and continuous 
communication; 
comprehensive & 
respectful answers 
• Industry experience of 
founders 
• Social attachment to 
product/incentive 
• First investments driven 
by founders’ network 
• Convincing explanation 
of business model in 
video 
• Impressive growth figures 
from first four months 
• Realistic business plan 
 
• Impressive storytelling 
• Data security of product 
• Sold as answer to NSA 
scandal 
• Founder’s humor, charisma 
and emotional, inspiring 
video 
• Apple-like branding 
• Team’s commitment to the 
product and idea 
• Founder’s previous 
experience 
• Social media competence 
• Use of testimonials 
• Investor call/Q&A: good 
fielding of questions shows 
team expertise 
• Renown supporters 
• Video 
• Product associated with 
honest feedback 
• Use of press contacts and 
PR hype from first round, 
raising attention 
• Activation of personal 
networks 
Trust-challenging 
Mechanisms 
• (None mentioned) • No use of PR agency 
• Very short decision 
windows to invest, not 
allowing enough time for a 
rational decision 
• Complexity of business model 
• Video also mentions negative 
experiences (with customer 
acquisition and PR), creating 
doubt 
• Cash flow & business model 
changes from first round, 
creating uncertainty 
• Lower margins than in first 
round; demonstrating that 
initial growth rates were 
unrealistic 
• Young team = inexperience to 
some 
• Initial funding goal too high 
• Technical problems at funding 
begin slowed momentum-
building 
• No updates in part of 2nd round 
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We summarize and contrast the findings in Table 3. The cross-case comparison denotes 
the business type (B2C/B2B), total amount raised, time it took to reach this amount, any 
increases in the funding limit, the total number of investors, as well as any investment 
incentives. Next, trust-building and trust-challenging mechanisms are compiled to facilitate 
comparison. While in the first two cases, trust-building mechanisms are predominant, the third 
case presents a balanced picture, hampered by trust-challenging factors in the second round. 
3.8.2 Emerging Theoretical Framework 
We discovered that two levels play an important role in investor decision-making in 
crowdfunding: the micro-level, which describes the direct factors on which the decision is made 
(i.e. the impact through the setup of the startup) and the macro environment, which represents 
external influences. Both levels share strong interdependencies and can be influenced by 
communication of the startup. These elements comprise the proposed ‘Crowd Investor Decision 
Influence Model’ that combines existing literature as the overarching framework and in-depth 
insights from our qualitative case studies to understand interlinks and concrete actions that 
entrepreneurs can take (see Figure 7 below). 
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Figure 7: The Crowd Investor Decision Influence Model 
 
3.8.3 Components of the Macro Environment 
The crowd: as supported by the conducted case studies, the crowd highly influences the 
borrower’s investment decision. Herding effects and/or the last minute panic or ‘race-in’ effect, 
prevail even without direct communication between the individuals in the crowd. As mentioned 
in the EduPlayBox case, CrowdEquity suggests sparking herding effects directly at funding 
begin by making acquaintances invest, because as soon as the funding drive stagnates it directly 
decreases investor trust as seen in the case of FeedApp. Further, economic, social, political or 
cultural trends can influence campaigns; for example, EduPlayBox investors mention their 
interest in investing into the trending education field. 
Opinion Leaders: the opinions of experts, gatekeepers and other trusted and well-known 
individuals influence investors, i.e. when a famous German business angel invested in 
FeedApp. Other examples were mentioned by a crowdfunding expert (FX): “[You need] 
multipliers, advocates – famous people from the crowdfunding scene like [the founder from 
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SimpleServ] or someone like Rene Obermann who was still chairman [of the Deutsche 
Telekom] during our funding, to say ‘I believe in [name of the startup]’. […] this has an 
immense effect”.  
The platform: CrowdEquity influences the funding drive in several ways, i.e. by creating 
artificial shortages, via the rank in the investment list; the pre-selection of startups and the 
number of projects online at the same time, impact the availability of capital for each project. 
With regard to CrowdEquity, CE_E1 states “we want to stay neutral and give everyone the 
same chance […], which is difficult regarding the advertisement”, i.e. communication by the 
platform influences investors. CrowdEquity tries to position itself as transparently as possible 
(CE_E1; CE_E3). 
Unpredictable conditions: unforeseeable events can directly impact the decision-making 
process of investors, i.e. the technical problem during the second CrowdEquity funding of 
FeedApp, or the NSA affair, which probably influenced the second crowdfunding of 
SimpleServ.  
The media: we found some evidence that investors, who heard of a particular startup before 
seeing the project on CrowdEquity, were more willing to invest (I1). The media have a direct 
impact on investor’s decisions by driving awareness, which explains why many founders and 
CrowdEquity employees outline the importance of PR. This was also shown in the SimpleServ 
case. 
3.8.4 Trust 
Considering the findings of the case studies and the literature, especially the 
Commitment-Trust Theory (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), trust builds a core element of our model. 
However, the theory does not fit to the relation between an investor and a startup because the 
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information asymmetries in crowdfunding are not balanced as in an equal partnership (see 
Kortleben and Vollmar, 2012; Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2012). The Crowd Investor 
Decision Model is therefore based on the viewpoint of the principal (the investor). However, 
some of the elements of Morgan and Hunt’s model (1994) were observed in crowdfunding. The 
investor’s trust in a startup is influenced by the ‘shared values’ and ‘opportunistic behavior’ of 
the precursors. Another factor we identified is “perceived reputation”, referring to existing 
findings (e.g., Corritore et al., 2003; Ganesan and Hess, 1997). Corritore et al. (2003) see 
reputation as a sub-dimension of credibility, as well as honesty, expertise and predictability. As 
seen in the cases, personality and expertise of the founders and team also play important roles 
in trust-building. Next, we associate predictability with ‘opportunistic behavior’ as we argue 
that a startup whose actions are predictable and transparent will decrease the risk of 
opportunistic behavior (cf. Kortleben and Vollmar, 2012). Finally, the business idea with the 
investor’s subjective preference leads to either trust or mistrust regarding success. The four 
precursors of trust in the Crowd Investor Decision Model are further detailed below. 
Personality, Expertise and Shared Values: trust can be built when both parties in a relationship 
share the same values, aim to reach the same goals and reach agreement on what is appropriate 
or inappropriate (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). The importance of shared values is illustrated by 
the following quote: “[About a social startup:] I participated in the investor call but it did not 
appeal to me. It was too idealistic, not realistic enough. I am a bit unemotional at this point - 
for me it depends on the return rather than improving the world!” (I2). Thus, when 
identification with the startup’s values is lacking, investors may decide against investing. 
Further, personal traits of the team can build investor trust – charisma, honesty and the 
appearance of the founders are explicitly mentioned in the interviews. Moreover, investors look 
for expertise and experience in the given market, which, we find, plays a crucial role in their 
decision-making process. Investors often look for a combination of different personalities and 
backgrounds (I4, I2; CE_E2). These decisions in crowdfunding are often made on a subjective 
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and affective level, which can be seen by the following comment: “Having no trust in a team 
[…] is a gut feeling […], no hard criteria which can be applied” (I4). The investor (I4) outlines 
that it is also much more difficult to get an impression of the founders’ personalities online. 
Perceived Reputation of the firm plays a strong role regarding trust-building and is formed by 
communication and the external environment. The relationship of the investor to different 
external factors and their subjective importance determines how strong and in which direction 
communication influences him. The crowd signals reputation through herding, opinion leaders 
through their recommendations, or the media by reporting on the startup. The platform also 
plays an important role: due to CrowdEquity’s pre-selection of startups, the firms already have 
a positive reputation before beginning their funding period. Investors trust CrowdEquity and 
therefore also their selection (FA_E1; I4). These external influences together form the 
perceived reputation, which either increases or decreases the level of trust. 
Predictability and Opportunistic Behavior: opportunistic behavior correlates negatively with 
trust (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). The principal-agent model of Kortleben and Vollmar (2012) 
underlines the danger of opportunistic behavior. In the interviews one of the founders says 
(EB_F1): “Crowdfunding gives founders a lot of freedom but freedom can always be misused 
by founders, who could use the money for whatever they want”. CrowdEquity protects the 
crowd from fraud, but the Kickstarter crowd in the US was already confronted with several 
fraud cases (Nunez, 2014). To overcome this perceived danger of free-riding, Kortleben and 
Vollmar (2012) recommend transparency and open communication which make the startup’s 
actions more predictable. 
Business Idea: our findings indicate that the startup’s idea significantly influences the investor’s 
trust. According to CrowdEquity, investors seek innovative ideas and game-changers (CE_E1; 
CE_E2). I1 reports that he is attracted by technical vision.  
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3.8.5 Risk 
Investment decisions are not based on trust alone: “[about not investing in FeedApp] 
That had nothing to do with their communication […] or that no trust was given - it was a 
number based decision for me” (I4). Our findings show that, comparable to relations in the 
banking sector (cf. Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998; Mukherjee and Nath, 2003), perceived 
investment risk plays an important role in crowdfunding. While trust is more dependent on 
emotional factors, perceived risk is instead presumed to be based on rational elements. The 
cases show that an experienced team increases trust in the team and idea, which in turn 
decreases perceived risk (I1;I2;I4;CE_E2). The factors influencing perceived risk are described 
in the following. 
Business model and scalability: the subjective assessment of the business model seems to 
strongly influence perceived risk. This is shown in the case of EduPlayBox, where investors 
are attracted by the clear explanation of how they earn money. On CrowdEquity, it became 
apparent that some investors did not invest in specific startups because they did not believe in 
the business models (I2; I4).  Scalability is also mentioned as relevant (I4, CE_E1). Startups, 
which can already show revenues, reduce perceived risk, which in turn strengthens trust 
(CE_E3). 
Market: one of the employees of CrowdEquity (CE_E2) remarks about SofaSurf: “The crowd 
decided quite well and said 'Perhaps there is no market opportunity or the market is already 
fully developed' […] explaining the reluctance of the crowd”. If the investors get the feeling 
that there is no market opportunity, then the perceived risk is high, which results in a lack of 
trust: "One main challenge of building trust is achieving high revenues and a proof of market. 
It is the best thing you can have because then you know that the idea is working and you don't 
have this uncertainty as an investor anymore” (CE_E3). An interviewee from CrowdEquity 
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adds: “Lately proof [of basic assumptions] matters more to investors. Maybe because we are 
placing more startups which are further developed”. 
USP and differentiation: “Clearly differentiating from the competition and a strong USP pull 
the crowd – the most important aspect” (CE_E1) – this quote underlines the importance of the 
USP and differentiation of the startup in the investor’s decision. SofaSurf, a for-profit copycat 
of Couchsurfing and the only project on CrowdEquity that did not pass the funding threshold, 
according to CE_E1, positioned itself between two large players in the market which did not 
clarify to investors why a third approach was needed. Interestingly, copycats often prove 
unsuccessful in crowdfunding, because the risk arising from competition is perceived to be too 
high (CE_E1). This might be a subjective attitude of crowd investors since follower strategies 
have also proven to be very successful (Shankar et al., 1998).  
All the sub-elements of trust and perceived risk can be influenced by the macro elements. An 
opinion leader’s concrete comment about a business model does not necessarily influence the 
startup’s overall reputation but may increase or decrease perceived risk. 
3.8.6 The Investment Deal 
A third factor, the investment deal, influences the final decision. The first part of the 
deal is the valuation. Startups in a very early phase usually offer a much lower self-valuation 
to crowd investors than those that already have some market-based proof. On CrowdEquity 
valuation is done by startups themselves in consultation with the platform. In the case of 
SofaSurf, CE_E1 believed that the valuation was too high, i.e. the risk and trust levels did not 
justify the high valuation. One investor (I4) remarked: “The valuation is very important for me. 
Especially on CrowdEquity there have been a few cases where I found projects really attractive 
but the valuation was exaggerated and so I didn't join.” One startup he considered overvalued 
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was SimpleServ, for which he saw too high a risk to position in the hardware market. Other 
investors also outlined the importance of the valuation for their decision (I2; I3).  
In the case of CrowdEquity, the goody is part of the investment deal. As seen with 
SimpleServ and EduPlayBox, goodies can strongly influence the investor’s decision, especially 
regarding investment size. For example, a crowd-funded startup offered a purchase option for 
the first helicopters produced to investors who offer € 10.000. According to CE_E3 this strongly 
influenced the investors’ decisions, resulting in an average investment amount of € 1.598, very 
high on CrowdEquity. 
Finally, communication is an effective way for startups to impact both the micro and 
macro levels. On CrowdEquity, for example, the project page and video, investment story and 
business plan influence how the startup is perceived. This presentation can influence every sub-
element of trust and perceived risk e.g. make the team and the idea tangible, their intentions 
transparent, explain the market, outline the USP, or underline the advantages of the business 
model. In the macro environment, opinion leaders, the platform, and the media may be 
particularly influenced by the project page. Further, answering critical questions and 
communicating openly with the crowd lead to success in funding, as indicated both in the cases 
and theory (Larrimore et al., 2011). A startup team must possess the skills to communicate with 
the crowd: openness, honesty, promptness and regularity are essential (CE_E1; CE_E2; 
CE_E3; I4). The ability to emotionalize is necessary, as seen with SimpleServ, because most 
crowd investors are not as rational as traditional investors (EB_F3; FX). However, rational 
investors should also be addressed, which was done effectively by EduPlayBox through their 
business model calculations.  
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3.9 Implications for practice 
This paper provides deeper insights into the decision-making of crowd investors, which 
often clearly departs from pure rationality and comprise affect and social or experiential trust 
as decision components. Startups should understand how to reduce perceived risk, how to build 
trust and which benefits convince the crowd. Our findings can enable platform providers and 
future startups to better understand how to approach investors in the crowd. For example, a 
startup without an experienced team can derive from the model that this may lead to a lack of 
trust, which then needs to be compensated, i.e. by a good PR strategy, which influences the 
media or convinces opinion leaders. We have gathered some recommendations for founders 
from our results in Table 4 below. 
Table 4  Overview of the Recommendations for Founders 
ACTION DESCRIPTION 
Timing Founders should not start their campaign while another successful and large campaign is 
running on the chosen crowdfunding platform. 
Communication Founders should try to build up a large number of early investors to leverage herding effects. 
This can be done through personal networks but also social media and PR strategies. 
Constantly updating investors and potential investors about the progress will support to 
convince more follower investors and will also encourage existing investors to increase their 
initial investment. 
A great and convincing storyline around the team and the product will help to support 
creating a buzz. 
Presentation The presentation of the idea, business model, and team should be presented in an authentic 
and easily comprehensible style. Providing a video with the most important insights at the 
beginning has shown to be most effective. Not being overly optimistic also seems to be a 
good recommendation, especially if a second round of crowdfunding might be needed and 
expectations have to be managed. 
B2C Products or 
Services 
Easy to understand products that are targeted towards end consumers and the mass market 
are much more likely to receive a large sum via crowdfunding. B2B products should be 
presented in a way that end consumers can also easily understand their value and 
application. 
Testimonials Well known and reputable testimonials will tremendously increase trust of crowd investors 
in  project. 
Limitations Limitations have shown to be very effective. Initially setting a lower funding goal, which 
closes funding when it is reached, will foster investors to invest more quickly. The funding 
goal can then be increased stepwise.  
Goodies Offering goodies such as an investor’s dinner or one of the first products on the market can 
largely increase the average funding, especially when combined with a threshold amount 
that must be given to receive the specific goody. 
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3.10 Limitations and Further Research 
This study has several limitations. First, our sole focus on the CrowdEquity platform 
implies that our model might not generalize to other types of crowdfunding, such as donation-
based crowdfunding. In donation-based settings, the warm glow from giving is likely to play a 
significant role and the presence of additional donating parties may lead to crowding out 
(Andreoni, 1990). Corroborating the Crowd Investor Decision Influence Model with other 
equity or lending-based crowdfunding platforms as well as donation and reward-based concepts 
could reveal findings about the role of the platform itself in the decision-making process. The 
evidence for the model could also be strengthened by quantitative research, testing for 
interdependencies between the identified components. Moreover, it would be interesting to 
investigate the relative importance of trust for affective decision-makers on the one hand and 
the roles that perceived risk and knowledge of benefits play for rational decision-makers on the 
other. Here a more fine-grained look at trust (and distrust), as discussed in the theory section, 
could be enlightening. 
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3.12 Appendix: Guiding Questions - Summary 
 
The guiding questions below were translated from German by a dual native speaker. 
 
3.12.1 Questions - CrowdEquity 
 
3.12.1.1 General questions about the platform 
• How strongly were the ideas and business models tested on your side before you put them 
on the platform? 
• What additional information do investors receive on top of what is available in the restricted 
section of the homepage? 
• On the website it states that your task is to attract new investors - what are your concrete 
steps in this direction? 
• To what extent can you boost your funding through marketing and PR? Which channels are 
the most important for you? 
• Which elements on the website support the start-ups to gather funding (from the crowd)? 
• Question on the investment opportunities list of the site: If several projects start 
simultaneously (or during overlapping timeframes) and one is quickly pushed out the top rank 
of the list - do they have a harder time? Do you have experience values? 
Goal: to clarify remaining ambiguities, to capture the influence of the CrowdEquity team and 
platform 
 
3.12.1.2 Factors influencing success 
• What does CrowdEquity recommend for founders to succeed? 
• Which recommendations do you personally have for founders to succeed?  
• Which elements on the platform help to increase funding for individual projects? 
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• How is the investment opportunity list generated? How is prioritized? Does the same 
prioritization apply in the overview area? 
• To what extent can you boost your funding through marketing and PR? Which channels are 
the most important for you? 
• How is the project length defined? What influence does the project length have on (funding) 
success? 
Objective: To identify success factors, to inquire details about success-influencing elements 
 
3.12.1.3 Crisis Management 
• What kind of actions do you take when the funding process for a start-up is going rather 
slowly? 
• What recommendations do you make to the startups in such a situation? 
Goal: What factors have short-term and strong effects on the funding process? How can one 
quickly attract investors? 
 
3.12.1.4 Funding process and group effects 
• At which points during the funding process are challenges more likely, at which points less 
likely? 
• For what reasons do start-ups (on the platform) have the possibility to increase their funding 
limit afterwards? 
• What is the effect of an increase in the funding limit on the funding process? 
• To what extent do (CrowdEquity) investors interact? 
• How did the project team in particular jump-start the funding process at the beginning? 
• How could you help with this process? 
• What can be done when the funding process is cumbersome? 
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Goal: Are group effects in crowdfunding? What are the main hurdles for the start-ups? 
 
3.12.1.5 Investor Motivations 
• Can you tell us about your investors? 
• Who is the typical CrowdEquity investor? 
• What motivates your investors to invest? 
• Did you receive negative feedback from investors when a project failed and investors lost 
money? How do you deal with this? 
• What is the difference between a Crowdfunder and a traditional investor? 
• Based on which criteria do your investors make their decisions? 
• Are there cases where investors closely cooperate with start-ups (on CrowdEquity)? 
 
Goal: Which criteria do crowd investors use when making investment decisions? What 
motivates investors (in this setting)? 
 
3.12.1.6 Prestige Projects 
• Which projects do you consider your 'prestige projects'? 
• For what reasons was the project particularly successful? 
• Which project has been particularly successful recently? 
• For which reasons? 
• Can you remember what the founders of X did on the first day to drive fundraising (i.e. to 
kickstart the funding process)? 
• What is particularly important in terms of the startup’s communication with investors? 
 
Goal: Which projects were particularly successful and for which reasons? To identify 
potential interview partners 
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3.12.1.7 Failed Projects 
• Are there any projects on CrowdEquity that have not received funding? 
• In your opinion, what are the reasons why project (x) did not reach the funding threshold? 
• Are there any projects where the funding process progressed only slowly? 
• What did the founders do wrong in this case so that funding did not start or progress well?  
• Which factors determine success on CrowdEquity? 
• What things do startups frequently not execute very well (on CrowdEquity)? 
 
Goal: The identification of: What mistakes were made? What could be learned from the 
project? 
 
3.12.2 Questions - Startups 
• When and why did you choose Crowdfunding (as a funding option)? 
• How much preparation time was required? 
• What had to be done during the preparatory period? 
• How did you prepare for the funding? 
• What did you focus on when you presented XY at CrowdEquity? (Video / story / business 
plan)? 
• How did you produce the video? 
• How was it on the day that the funding process began? 
• How has it been during the course of the (entire) process? 
• How did you react to the funding development? 
• Are you satisfied with the result that you achieved? 
• What was a very special learning for you in the investor search via Seed-match? 
• What went very well in the process, what went less well? 
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• What is important when Crowdfunding a startup? What do you need to pay particular 
attention to? 
• How could your Goody help lure additional investors? 
• How did the crowdfunding process affect your team? 
• Why did XY choose Crowdfunding? What were the advantages and disadvantages? 
• What is the image of CF today in the financing sector? 
• How did you get the crowd to invest? 
• How did you approach potential investors? 
• With which means did you win the most investors? (How many investors did you bring with 
you to the process yourself? (i.e. out of your own network)) 
• How deep do 'potential investors from the crowd dig? 
• How did you deal with criticism? 
• What were your most important communication channels? 
• How did you try to attract investors through the video? 
• How did you use social media to attract investors? 
• How did participation in crowdfunding affect your motivation? 
• What were the most important elements of your (startup’s) representation on CrowdEquity? 
(To what extent did the graphical preparation of your content play a role?) 
• How did you build up/design the video in oder to be successful? 
• Why did you decide to present the funding goal in detail in the video? 
• How critical were the questions asked by Crowd investors? 
• How was the crowd able to help you over the past year? 
• How do you try to use the Crowd as a resource? 
• How would you run a crowdfunding campaign today, what would you do differently? 
• What led you to choose CrowdEquity? 
• How did you benefit from being funded at CrowdEquity? 
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• How could CrowdEquity support you? 
• Were there times when you were particularly dependent on the help of the CrowdEquity 
team? 
• Which channels did you use during the funding process to communicate with the crowd? 
• Did you have a moment when communication with the crowd was difficult? 
• Do you have a sense of what types of people (investors) are sitting on the other end and have 
invested in you? 
• Were you able to build up close relationships with individual investors via crowdfunding? 
• To what extent do you still have contact with the crowd today? 
• Why were you successful? 
• What did you learn from the crowdfunding process? 
• What would you do differently today? 
• What advice would you give to a startup that wants to crowdfund? 
• What surprised you especially about Crowdfunding on CrowdEquity? 
 
3.12.3 Questions - Investors 
• How did you land on CrowdEquity? 
• In which companies did you invest? Tollabox, Protonet, Honestly? 
• How did you hear about the project? 
• When XY showed up on the platform, what did you like about the project pitch? 
• When did you decide to invest? 
• What convinced you most about XY? 
• Why did you invest / what kept you from investing? 
• What unanswered questions remained before you invested? 
• How did you get into contact with the company (investor channel, investor calls, email, 
investor relations)? 
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• How well was startup X reachable for you? 
• How did they provide feedback to the company? 
• Video / Investment story / Businessplan? 
• How did the startup present itself? 
• How did you feel about the communication of XYZ? What was especially noticeable? 
• How did you experience the first day of funding? 
• How did you like the goody (incentive) XY? 
• Why was XYZ successful / unsuccessful? 
• What do you do/what is your process when you invest in CrowdEquity? 
• How did you like the team of XYZ? 
• Did you participate in the investor call? 
• To what degree do you pay attention to how much is invested by other investors? 
• To what extent do you make your (investment) decision dependent on the funding process? 
• What is important to you in your decision (to invest or not)? 
• What role does trust play in your investment? 
• How can the company build confidence (i.e. gain confidence of crowd-investors)? 
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4. Reaching Agreement on Contribution Behavior – Evidence on Cultural Differences 
from a Public Goods Game with Representatives in Japan and Germany 
 
Abstract 
 
We discuss the results of an experimental public good game with group representatives in 
Germany and Japan, countries with varying levels of individualism. Representatives are 
permitted to communicate with their constituencies, but not with other representatives. We 
focus on accountability between representative and his constituency and on the risk taken in the 
interaction between representatives. German and Japanese subjects differ not only in their 
contribution behavior, but in their ability to reach agreement on strategy in pre-play 
communication. We find that between-country differences can be explained to a large extent 
by the framework for group behavior proposed by Yuki (2003). 
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Reaching Agreement on Contribution Behavior – Evidence on Cultural Differences 
from a Public Goods Game with Representatives in Japan and Germany 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Tradeoffs between individual and group/societal interests, as exemplified by the case of the 
provision of public goods, are common subjects of debate across human societies.  
A fundamental and much studied question across the social and behavioral sciences, is to which 
degree individuals behave according to their individual interest compared to the interest of the 
larger group in various settings (i.e. given prevailing norms and local incentive structures). 
Thus, understanding and identifying causes of group differences is important to explicate the 
role of culture in economic development. Social identity is commonly defined as a person’s 
sense of self derived from perceived membership in social groups (e.g. Chen and Li, 2009). A 
stream of literature in social psychology explores social categorization into (perceived) 
ingroups and outgroups (e.g. Tajfel et al, 1971). Economists are increasingly studying the effect 
of group membership on preferences (Akerlof and Kranton 2010; Benjamin et al, 201044). Also, 
due to the discontinuity effect45, competition and conflict may be better observable when groups 
rather than individuals interact (e.g. Wildschut & Insko, 2007). Game experiments provide 
rigorous measurement of group differences in preferences (van Hoorn, 2018). While in-group 
favoritism is often reported, Pan and Houser (2013), using a modified trust game, find that 
groups formed around cooperative production did not engage in in-group favoritism or out-
group discrimination. Such mixed results call for further studies on out-group bias. In particular, 
                                               
44 Benjamin et al. (2010) find that Asian identity can affect time preferences.  
45 The discontinuity effect suggests that interacting groups display more competitiveness than interacting 
individuals. Social psychologists believe it is due, among other things, to in-group favoritism and diffusion of 
responsibility (e.g. Pinter et al, 2007; Wildschut & Insko, 2007). 
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less research has been conducted with a focus on the interests of a small group against those of 
larger societies, which is one contribution of the current paper.  
We focus on a specific setting: interactions between representatives of groups. The conflict of 
interest is between the interest of the group of each of the representatives and the interests of 
“society” as a whole, in our case comprised by three groups with one representative each 
(captured by our representative treatments “R1” and “R2”, as will be explained in the following 
sections). The possible personal interest of the representative is not part of our study and not 
modelled in the experiment. As demonstrated in an earlier paper (Iida & Schwieren, 20015), to 
risk behaving cooperatively towards other representatives, representatives must know that their 
constituency46 (the group they represent) accepts them taking this risk. In the paper (Iida & 
Schwieren, 2015) it was also shown that, in a Spanish context, representatives’ knowledge of 
whether or not their constituency accepts their (risky) cooperative behavior towards 
representatives of other groups is indeed important in determining cooperation. Here, we build 
on this work by studying the additional aspect of intercultural variation along the dimension of 
individualism, which captures the degree to which an individual’s self-image is defined in terms 
of ‘I’ or ‘we’ (Hofstede, 2010; Minkov, 2017). The principle distinction between individualist 
and collectivist societies “lies in the degree of ingroup identity and loyalty” (Yuki and 
Takemura, 2014: 39). People in collectivist cultures may subordinate personal goals to 
collective goals or make no distinction between them (Yuki and Takemura, 2014; Triandis, 
1995). Japan is a prototypic example of a collectivist country (Ibid). 
Yuki´s (2003) framework for understanding group behavior in collectivist countries (which 
drawing on Triandis, 1995) leads us to expect differences in relatively “minimal” intergroup 
situations47 between individualistic and collectivistic countries (emphasizing the group over the 
                                               
46 Constituency is defined by Merriam-Webster Dictionary as „a body of citizens entitled to elect a representative“. 
We use the term more loosely to mean the group someone represents. 
 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/constituency, as accessed on May 21st, 2018. 
47 In a seminar paper, Tajfel et al. (1971) specified a number of criteria required for a group classification to be 
‘minimal’, including no face-to-face interaction, anonymity of group membership, etc. For details see the paper. 
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self) in general, but also in the effect of communication between representative and 
constituency on cooperative behavior of representatives (Yuki, 2003; Yuki and Brewer, 2014).  
Such differences in ingroup identity and loyalty have been shown to manifest themselves in 
communication styles, social judgment, etc. (e.g. Fiske et al, 1998; Smith & Bond, 1999). 
Our expectation of behavioral differences between subjects from each type of society is further 
strengthened by the work of Yamagishi (1998, 2011) who finds that in comparison to Japanese 
respondents, American respondents, from an individualistic country, are more trusting of others 
in general and consider (individual) reputation to be more important. We therefore compare 
public good contribution behavior in Germany, a rather individualistic, European country, with 
Japan, the classical example of a collectivistic country (Hofstede, 2010; Minkov, 2017)48. Our 
research questions concern intercultural differences in negotiations of group representatives 
that do not know each other and also do not know their constituency very well in the public 
goods setting. More precisely these are: 
(1) How does behavior differ between countries?  
(2) How does communication content differ? 
The next sections are structured as follows: we first discuss a relevant framework for group 
behavior and the concept of individualism before developing our hypotheses. This is followed 
by an explanation of the experimental setup and procedure and presentation and discussion of 
the results. We conclude the paper with limitations of the study and suggestions for future 
research. 
                                               
48 The two countries differ in other aspects as well, but the most prominent – and for the current research most 
relevant – difference is in individualism/collectivism.  
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4.2 Yuki’s Model of Group Behavior 
The core framework for our research is the model of Yuki, which directly focuses on a 
comparison between group behavior in Asian und “Western” countries. Yuki and colleagues 
stress that in Asian collectivist cultures people need to form strong personal relationships in 
order to be able to trust each other and, therefore, do not cooperate with strangers easily (Yuki, 
2003; Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, & Takemura, 2005). Thus, there is a specific word for a network 
of reciprocal relationships in Chinese, Guanxi, without a direct English equivalent49. Clearly 
such relationships rely on experience through interaction (e.g. communication/signalling). 
Yuki furthermore stresses that joint category membership is less important (and not sufficient) 
for building trust in collectivist countries, unlike in individualistic countries (Yuki, 2003; Yuki 
et al., 2005), thus we expect that we need meaningful groups to get group-favoring behavior 
(ingroup bias) in collectivistic cultures, while in individualistic cultures “minimal” groups 
might be sufficient (e.g. Falk, Heine and Takemura, 2014).  
Behavioral economic studies of public good behavior, with notable exceptions (Hauge & 
Rogeberg, 2015; Rode, 2010), typically fail to consider the role of third parties or group 
representatives. Only one of these two studies deals with group representatives (Hauge & 
Rogeberg, 2015), but mainly focuses on gender differences 50(the authors find that women make 
less self-interested choices as group representatives than men, implying the importance of 
socialization).  
                                               
49 There is an equivalent term in Russia – at the intersection between Europe and Asia – termed Blat; Thus, in 
Russia and China, informal relationships are often used to circumvent formal procedures to obtain goods and 
services, traditionally hard to obtain in centrally planned economies, at least until 1989 (e.g. Ledeneva, 2008). 
50 Also, in the experiment by Hauge and Rogeberg (2015), three subjects were randomly forced to go public by 
writing their contributions on a flip chart for other subjects. This is a very different mechanism then we use here. 
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4.3 Cultural Variation in Individualism  
 
Figure 1: Manifestation of Individualism by Country (Hofstede, 2010) 
 
Highly individualist countries have “a loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are 
expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families” as opposed to 
collectivist countries, which show “a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in which 
individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular ingroup to look after them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty”51. Characteristics of a collectivistic society include putting 
harmony of the group above the expression of individual opinions and people having a strong 
sense of shame for losing face. Thus, the construct individualism measures the degree to which 
an individual’s self-image is defined in terms of ‘I’ or ‘we’.  
Japanese and German cultures differ significantly on their degree of individualism, as depicted 
in Figure 1 (e.g. Hofstede, 2010); thus, on a national level, Germany reaches 67 out of 100, a 
relatively high value on this dimension, while at 46 Japanese show much lower levels of 
individualism (a relative difference of over 30%). For a number of reasons, we focus solely on 
variation in the degree of individualism. First, with respect to the behavior we are interested in, 
we would not expect any of the other dimensions to play a major role. Second, frameworks by 
                                               
51 http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html as accessed on Apr. 27th, 2018. 
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other cross-cultural researchers, Hall and Trompenaars (Hall & Hall, 1990; Trompenaars & 
Hampden-Turner, 1998), have independently conceptualized similar individualism constructs, 
implying both high relevance and a degree of theoretical consensus.  
Third, recent empirical replications of individualism-collectivism have good internal reliability 
and face validity and the individualism dimension has shown to be robust to different 
operationalizations and settings (Minkov, 2017). These include a recent large study by Minkov 
(2017) and Merrit’s (2000) study of airline pilots worldwide. Further, the updated individualism 
index in Hofstede’s work (2010) is highly correlated with similar measures in the large-scale 
panel data from the World Values Survey (Minkov & Hofstede, 2010), individualism as 
captured in the GLOBE study of advanced societies (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & 
Gupta, 2004; Minkov, 2017) and Welzel’s (2014) emancipative values index. Fourth, the 
degree of individualism is a factor that receives support from both comparative studies in social 
neuroscience (Oyserman & Lee, 200852; Chiao et al., 2009; Harada, Li, & Chiao, 2010) and 
genetics (Chiao & Blizinsky, 2009). Finally, the individualism/collectivism dimension serves 
for us as a background concept that helps to describe differences between the countries we 
study. We do not measure individualism but compare subjects from two countries that have 
been found to differ in a way that seems to be important for intergroup-behavior (e.g. Yuki, 
2003), which is the main focus of our study. 
4.4 Theoretical Expectations 
Based on the theories discussed and the results from previous closely related work (e.g. Iida & 
Schwieren, 2015) we form a series of hypotheses regarding our research questions. The first set 
                                               
52 In a meta-analysis of individualism priming literature, Oyserman and Lee (2008) find moderate evidence for a 
relationship between individualism and cognition (or the way we think) and relationality (or the way we relate to 
others, including social sensitivity, perceived social obligations and perceived support from others). Priming refers 
to the use of cues with the aim of activating specific mental frames (e.g. norms), leading to subsequent mental 
processes and/or behavioral outcomes (e.g. Oyserman and Lee, 2008; van Hoorn, 2018). 
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(H1-H3) denote expectations about contribution behavior and the second set (H4-H6) our 
expected differences in communication content. We expect that the more individualistic a 
culture, the easier that trust can be placed in a stranger´s cooperativeness, thus the higher the 
willingness to contribute to a public good in a relatively anonymous laboratory setting.53 
Further, collectivist subjects are less probable to “cheat” on those with whom they have 
established a cooperative relationship. We therefore hypothesize that: 
 
H1: Germans will trust a stranger’s cooperativeness more readily, such that baseline 
contributions to the public good will be higher in Germany than in Japan. 
 
H2: Over time, we will observe a significant end-effect54 (lower average contributions in the 
last two periods than in the first eight periods) in Germany but less so in Japan. 
 
In more individualistic cultures, by being able to talk to one´s constituency, representatives can 
obtain “permission” to contribute to the public good. If there is no possibility to discuss a 
strategy, but some ingroup identity has formed between representative and his constituency, we 
expect that all will play selfishly for “their” group. In collectivistic cultures, by talking to the 
constituency, personal ties are developed within this group that will increase favoritism within 
the group but that will obstruct cooperation with strangers (the outgroup).  Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
 
H3: In both countries, contributions in (representative) treatment R1 (where participants stay 
completely anonymous) will be lower than in (representative) treatment R2. 
                                               
53 However, at the same time, shame aversion is likely to be higher among Japan subjects in treatment R2, where 
additional feedback/accountability is possible in form of a second chat. 
54 Repeated public-goods games conducted in the lab with US or European subjects typically result in some 
positive contributions to the public good, contrary to the Nash equilibrium of zero. Over many rounds, the average 
contribution tends to drop as subjects begin to free-ride, the so-called ‚end-effect’, see Andreoni (1988).  
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H4: In Germany (an individualistic country) but not in Japan, groups will more frequently reach 
agreement (that a representative may try a cooperative strategy) in treatment R2 (where subjects 
can discuss strategies within their groups) than in treatment R1, such that mean contributions 
to the public good will be higher in treatment R2 than in R1. 
 
H5: Since reciprocal relationships take longer to establish in collectivist countries, Japanese 
subjects will not contribute more to the public good when allowed to chat with their 
constituency for a limited time (in treatment R1 and especially in treatment R2) than in the 
baseline (without chat). 
 
H6: Groups from collectivist societies tend to need more time to build a relationship with their 
constituency than groups from individualistic societies, such that German groups will be more 
able to (more frequently) discuss a strategy (within a limited timeframe) than Japanese groups.	
 
4.5 Experimental Setup55 
 
We used a standard public good game as the basic tool for our experiment, as in a 
previous paper on the topic (Iida & Schwieren, 2015). Based on our research questions, we used 
one baseline treatment and various “representative” treatments that differed in terms of the 
informational structure and the number of interactions between the subjects of a given group. 
The baseline treatment is a simple three-person public good game of ten periods (the groups 
are fixed throughout the rounds). Subjects have five tokens in each period that they can 
                                               
55 The experimental set-up is essentially the same as in Iida & Schwieren (2015), with some exceptions especially 
in the German group, where we eliminated all “unnecessary” aspects of the design with respect to our main 
research question, intercultural differences in negotiations of representatives that do not know each other and also 
do not know their constituency very well. The Japanese dataset comprising the majority our data, hast not been 
previously reported. 
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distribute between a personal and a public account. One token in the personal account pays one 
token for oneself, while one token in the public account pays 0.75 tokens for each subject 
playing, including oneself.  The payoff to individual i, Ui, is derived from the following function 
   (1) 
where Ei is the initial endowment and gi is a voluntary contribution to the group project 
and 0.75 is the MPCR56 (e.g. Isaac, Walker and Williams, 1994). The dominant strategy of such 
a game is to contribute nothing to the public good (i.e. to free-ride) even though the subjects 
would be best off if everybody contributed all of their tokens to the public good.   
The subjects received feedback after each round on the total contribution of the other 
team members, but not on the individual contributions of each member of their group. The same 
basic game was used in all treatments; The representative treatments differed in one main 
respect from the baseline treatment: representatives of three-person teams played the game. 
Therefore, as illustrated in Figure 2, we have three groups of three people, each involved in one 
public good game, but out of each group, only one person (the representative) is playing the 
public good game.  
 
 
Figure 2: Representative Treatments (1 Unit = 3x3 Subjects) 
 
                                               
56 Marginal per capita return to the public good; a higher factor typically leads to higher contributions. 
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Contributions to the public good have an effect on all nine subjects within one game. 
Earnings made by the representatives are equally distributed among all of the subjects of one 
group, both those playing (the representatives) and those not playing. This is known to subjects 
in advance of the game. This means that individual earnings are held constant with respect to 
our baseline-treatment, while “society-wide” earnings are bigger in the representative 
treatments than in baseline.  
In all of the representative treatments, the three-person teams were allowed to talk to 
each other for five minutes using a chat program before the public good game began. The 
representative treatments differed with respect to the information available for the chat as well 
as with respect to repeated chat possibilities and knowledge thereof. For the intercultural 
comparison we use two different representative treatments that have been played in a similar 
way in Japan and in Germany57. They differ in the following ways from each other:  
In treatment R1, subjects were allowed to chat for five minutes with their ingroup before 
reading the instructions for the public good game. This chat served the only function to enhance 
their identification with their ingroup and increase the salience of being a group representative 
for them.58  
In treatment R2, the subjects received the public good game instructions before chatting 
for five minutes with their ingroup members. The subjects were instructed to discuss their 
strategies during the chat time. After the first 10 rounds of the game, they received a second 
chance to chat with their ingroup members. We introduced the second chat to enhance 
accountability and give them the chance to justify their actions in front of their group members.  
                                               
57 In Iida & Schwieren (2015) another treatment is used that is in-between our R1 and R2 here: Subjects do have 
a second chat, but do not know about it beforehand. Results for this treatment (run only in Spain) lie in-between 
results for R1 and R2 described here.  
58 This aspect of our design was inspired by previous experiments that have demonstrated that the salience of group 
membership can be enhanced by communication (e.g. Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009). 
Chen and Li (2009) report that in their experiment, participants matched with an ingroup member show a 47 
percent increase in charity concerns and a 93 percent decrease in envy. Further, van Hoorn argues convincingly, 
that identity primes can be used to strengthen the inferential power of experiments (van Hoorn, 2018). 
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In Japan, but not in Germany59, we ran an additional 10 periods after this chat unknown 
to the subjects before. Therefore, we report on the first 10 periods here, which were not affected 
by the fact that they were followed by 10 more periods in Japan, as subjects learned about them 
only at the start of these 10 periods. 
4.6 Procedure 
The experimental sessions were conducted at labs of two universities of similar size and 
rank in Southern Germany and Western Japan. Due to subject availability and laboratory size 
our two national groups differ in sample size. We have 87 subjects in Germany and 144 subjects 
in Japan (n=231). In Germany, 15 subjects were in the Baseline treatment and 36 in each of the 
representative treatments. In Japan, 27 subjects participated in the baseline, 45 in R1 and 72 in 
the R2 treatment. Student subjects with various academic backgrounds were recruited via 
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015), in both cases60.  
Table 3: Summary of Treatments 
 Subjects 
 
   
Treatment Germany Japan Total 
"Active" 
Decision 
Makers 
Sessions Female Share Mean Age 
Baseline 15 27 42 42 2 0,39 23,11 
R1 Treatment 36 45 81 27 4 0,32 22,95 
R2 Treatment 36 72 108 36 4 0,4 22,11 
Total 87 144 231 105 10 0,37 22,72	 
In the representative treatments (R1 & R2) "active" decision makers are the group representatives who decide how much to contribute for 
their group based on the in-group chat. Therefore, 54 subjects in R1 and 72 subjects in R2 completed calculation tasks in the remaining 
time. 
 
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experimental economics 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions were provided in Japanese in Japan and in 
                                               
59 This is certainly not the optimal way of designing an experiment, but it should not affect our results, as Japanese 
subjects were not aware during the first ten rounds that there would be additional rounds. Due to the temporal 
ordering and surprise, we therefore believe this difference is unimportant for this paper. Contribution results on 
the second set of 10 periods in Japan and the underlying raw data can be provided upon request. 
60 As our hypotheses are not about gender or age, we do not discuss this further here. More detail on these can be 
provided in the online supplemental material or on request. 
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German for Germany. Translation was conducted by dual native speakers experienced with 
translation and a pre-test was conducted to validate comprehension of the experiment and 
instructions. An experimental session lasted about one hour on average and subjects earned an 
average of €12 (including a €4 show-up fee; payment in Japan was in Japanese Yen, with 
average earnings of approximately 2000 ¥ per hour61). Payments were made privately and in 
cash. When the subjects arrived at the laboratory, they were randomly seated at computers that 
were separated by partitions so that they could not see the experimenters, each other or each 
other’s screen. The subjects were organized randomly into non-overlapping three-person 
groups (using Z-Tree’s random() function) and, in the representative treatments, into larger 
nine-person entities comprising three such groups to play the public good game together.  
Depending on the treatment, the small groups were first allowed to chat for five minutes 
about everything except individually identifying information (R1) or they first received 
instructions for the public good game (R2), which were also read out aloud62, before chatting. 
In treatment R2 the groups were asked to chat for 5 minutes about the strategy to follow after 
reading the instructions – before knowing who would be the representative. Subjects in the 
baseline treatment were not allowed to chat, but immediately received instructions for the 
public good game.  
After reading the instructions, subjects took a brief test at their computer terminals to 
verify that they correctly understood the rules (Bigoni & Dragone, 2012). The experiment did 
not start until all of the subjects had answered the questions correctly. After this training 
procedure, in the representative treatments, the computer selected a representative for each 
group at random. Subjects did not know who would be the representative at the time of their 
ingroup chat.  
                                               
61 The average exchange rate at the time was 0,0061 €/¥. Earnings are comparable to that of Pan & Houser (2013), 
where subjects earned about $15 per session (of similar length). 
62 Instructions were read aloud for three reasons: First it ensures exposure to the instructions. Second it creates 
common knowledge, needed to test economic theories – everyone knows that everyone knows. Third, this reduces 
suspicions of deception by reassuring subjects that everyone received the same instructions. (Croson, 2005: 141). 
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In all of the treatments, the subjects played 10 rounds of the public good game described 
above. In the baseline treatment, the experiment ended when the public goods game was 
finished and subjects were privately paid a show-up fee plus their earnings from the experiment. 
In R2, groups where allowed after the 10 periods to chat again for 5 minutes, to increase feelings 
of accountability. In the representative treatments, the experiment continued for an additional 
round in Japan, but this came as a surprise to participants, so it cannot have affected behavior 
in the first 10 periods. We did this with the idea of obtaining data on further developments, but 
decided not to repeat it in Germany and not to analyse it in Japan, as we could not reach the 
sample size necessary for meaningful analyses in both countries. Figure 3 summarizes the 
baseline and representative treatments.  
 
Figure 3: Overview of Baseline and Representative Treatments 
 
At the very end, representatives completed exploratory questionnaires63. Then subjects 
were paid and dismissed. The second chat served only to increase feelings of accountability 
during the contribution rounds – subjects knew that they would talk to their group members 
again and thus would most probably feel accountable to them.  
4.7 Results 
In the following section, we report our results both for contribution behavior and for the chat.  
                                               
63 We do not report the questionnaire data as they were only collected for exploratory reasons to inform future 
research and differed between the countries. As they were collected after the experiment, they cannot have 
influenced behavior.  
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To validate our hypotheses, we analyze differences in contribution levels using a combination 
of parametric and non-parametric test procedures. To increase the validity of our study, we also 
provide additional tests of within-country differences in the Appendix which further support 
our hypotheses. Table 2 below depicts mean contributions over all periods of the public good 
game for Germany and Japan. 
Table 4: Germany and Japan, Mean Contributions over all Periods (Std. Dev.) 
Treatment Mean: Germany  Mean: Japan  
Baseline 2,820 2,164 
 (2,171) (1,763) 
R1 2,450 2,167 
 (1,855) (1,968) 
R2 3,517 2,308 
  (2,021) (1,933) 
 
Hypotheses 1&2: Germany and Japan 
Since we have two independent samples, we use the Mann-Whitney rank-sum test to compare 
contribution levels between countries in the baseline-treatment and find that contributions are 
higher in Germany than in Japan (p=.002, z=3.086). The same holds for both representative-
treatments, but while the R2 treatments differ significantly (p<.001, z=5.565), differences for 
the R1 treatment are not significant (p=.166, z=1.386). Since contributions differ in variance 
especially between German and Japanese subjects, we repeated the tests with the more 
conservative Robust Rank-Order Test, which relaxes the assumption of equal variances, (i.e., 
the underlying distributions may be different when testing equality of medians) with similar 
results (Baseline: p=.005, U=2.76; R1: p=.174, U=1.360; R2: p<.001; U=5.413). Thus, our 
results support H1 that German subjects will contribute more in the baseline treatment.  
Using a simple eyeball examination, Figures 4 – 5 (see next page) show an end effect 
for Germany, but nor for Japan, lending descriptive support for H2. Our contribution data 
showed no signs of heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagen test and variance inflation was 
not an issue with our data. Further, we tested the normality assumption using the Shapiro-Wilk 
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test, which showed that at least some treatments were normally distributed (particularly the 
German Baseline and the Japanese R1 treatments). Therefore, below we use linear regression 
to formally test the significance of the decline in contributions (y) over time (t) over periods 1-
10 for each country and treatment group, respectively.64 
 
Table 5: Significance of Contribution Decline over Time by Treatment, Linear Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Baseline Japan R1 Japan R2 Japan Baseline Germany R1 Germany R2 Germany 
              
Period -0.116** -0.0949+ -0.0712 -0.215** -0.161** -0.171** 
 (0.0334) (0.0544) (0.0437) (0.0593) (0.0587) (0.0649) 
Constant 2.804** 2.689** 2.700** 4** 3.333** 4.456** 
 (0.214) (0.351) (0.269) (0.366) (0.386) (0.375) 
       
Observations 330 150 240 150 120 120 
R-squared 0.036 0.019 0.011 0.081 0.062 0.059 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses   
Note: in Japan, much less of the variation in contributions (1-4%) is explained by the Period than in Germany (6-8%) 
 
First, we can observe that the beta coefficients of the Period variable are negative; This decline 
is highly significant for both control groups, as expected. For treatments R1 and R2, while the 
decline is significant at the p<.01 level for Germany, it is insignificant in Japan (p>.05) 
providing support for H2. The coefficients for Japanese R1 and R2 treatments are both below 
.1, while those for Germany are both above .15 lending further weight that differences here are 
not due to chance. 
Next, we test for the end-effect itself, which we operationalize as a Mann-Whitney Test for the 
significant difference in mean contributions of the last two periods65, i.e. between periods 1-8 
                                               
64 Since both the German and Japanese R2 treatments are non-normally distributed and to control for our panel 
data structure, we also ran random effects Tobit regression with similar results (Nelson, 1976). As contributions 
are doubly censored, with a lower limit of 0 and an upper limit of 5, this model reduces bias of simple linear 
regression. Period has a significantly negative effect on contributions at the p<.001 level. Also, previous period 
contributions have a significantly positive effect on contributions at the p<.001 level; the slope magnitude of the 
previous contributions variable shows that reciprocity is clearly taking place. As we kept in mind the contribution-
to-length ratio, Tobit outputs can be made available in supplemental online material or on request. 
65 To rule out specification bias, we ran the same tests using an alternative operationalization using only the last 
period instead of the last two. Results are generally stronger than those reported here, implying that our chosen 
operationalization for the end effect in contributions is a conservative measure. However as can be seen graphically 
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and periods 9-1066, respectively, for each treatment in both countries. Again, we use the robust 
rank-order test to confirm our results. Results are depicted below: 
Table 6: Mann-Whitney Test for End-Effect of Contributions, a=.05 
Mann-Whitney Test for End-Effect of Contributions, α =.05  Robust Rank Order Test 
Country Treatment Mean P1-8 Mean P9-10 P-Value Z-Value P-Value (2-tail.) U-Value 
Germany Control 3,083 1,767 0,003** 2,938 0,012* 2,518 
Germany R1 2,740 1,292 0,000*** 3,469 0,000*** 3,718 
Germany R2 3,771 2,500 0,010* 2,576 0,068+ 1,822 
Japan Control 2,218 1,833 0,052+ 1,945 0,054+ 1,927 
Japan R1 2,350 1,433 0,022* 2,287 0,024* 2,260 
Japan R2 2,333 2,208 0,640 0,467 0,668 0,429 
***: p<.001; **: p<.01; *: p<.05; +: p<.1 
    
 
Based on the test results, we can confirm an end-effect in Germany for all treatments, with the 
caveat, that using the more conservative robust rank-order test, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the means are the same for treatment R2 (p=.068). For Japan, the end-effect is 
insignificant for both the control and R2 treatments at the p<.05 level and significant only in 
treatment R1 (p=.022).  Overall, we therefore find empirical support for H2 – that there is an 
end-effect in Germany and less so than in Japan. 
 
Hypotheses 3&4: Germany 
Comparing the German baseline and R1 treatments over all periods, contributions over 
time appear fairly similar, with lower contributions in the R1 treatment particularly in the early 
and late phases of the game. Therefore, group representatives that cannot discuss the strategy 
with their constituency play more selfishly in a public good game than do individuals that are 
not group representatives.  
                                               
from Figure 4, the end effect of the last two periods for the R1 treatment is not captured if looking only at the last 
period. 
66 As a robustness test, we also ran these tests with an alternate operationalization of end effect, comparing only 
periods 1-9 with period 10 with similar results. 
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Figure 4: Germany, mean contribution over all periods 
 
The first period of a public good game is important as it sets the stage for future interactions in 
terms of the degree of reciprocal behavior between the subjects. In the first period, we find that 
contributions in the German R2 treatment are significantly different from those in the R1 
treatment (p=.019, z=2.352) but not significantly different from the baseline (p=.211, z=1.252), 
as can be seen in Table 5 below. First period contributions in the German R2 treatment are 
slightly higher than in the respective baseline and R1 treatments.  
Table 5: Germany, 1st Period Contributions 
    R1 R2 
  Average P z p Z 
Baseline 3.200 .134 -1.495 .211 -1.251 
R1 2.000 - - .019* -2.352 
R2 4.167 - - - - 
 
Over all periods, we find a significant difference between contribution levels in the German 
baseline and R2 treatments (p=.013, z=2.483) and a highly significant difference between 
contribution levels in German R1 and R2 treatments (p<.001, z=4.241). While we do see a 
difference between the German baseline and R1 treatments in absolute terms, this difference is 
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not significant (p=.163, z=1.394). This confirms our H3 (that R1 contributions will be lower 
than in the baseline) and H4 (that contributions will be higher in R2 than R1 when groups reach 
agreement on letting the representative pursue a cooperative strategy) for Germany. 
 
Hypotheses 3&4: Japan 
If we now look at the Japanese data, we see a different tendency. Contributions in all 
treatments in the first period are very similar, particularly for R1 and R2 (p=.881, z=.150). 
Table 6: Japan, 1st Period Contributions 
    R1 R2 
  Average P z p Z 
Baseline 2.788 .583 -0.549 .660 -0.440 
R1 2.333 - - .881 -0.150 
R2 2.375 - - - - 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5 below, this result holds over all periods, where Japanese treatments 
do not significantly differ from each other in terms of average contributions. We confirmed 
these results with the rank-sum test67. 
                                               
67 The rank-sum test shows that differences in mean contributions to the public good between the Japanese Baseline 
and Jap. R1 (p=.775, z=.286), between Japanese Baseline and Jap. R2 at all (p=.498, z=.678) and between Japanese 
R1 and Jap. R2 treatments (p=.507, z=.664) are clearly not significant. This also holds for the Robust Rank Order 
Test. 
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Figure 5: Japan, mean contribution over all periods 
 
Thus, for Japan H3 and H4 are not supported. 
 
Comparing overall contribution levels over all periods, we find that while for Germany, only 
the comparison between R1 and R2 is significant over all 10 periods, for Japan, the no-
difference result remains the same as before. This comparison also confirms  
Hypothesis 4. Next, we explain the chat data analysis and report the results for Hypothesis 5 
and Hypothesis 6. 
4.8 Analysis of the Chat Data 
After studying the chat logs for each interaction in treatments R1 and R2, we analyze the text 
data using a simple coding scheme. First of all, we categorize the data of each discussion in 
terms of whether or not subjects discussed a strategy for playing. We code everything as 
“strategy discussion” where some reference is made to “what to do in the game”. This implies 
that even in the R1 treatment, where subjects did not know the exact rules of the game, they 
could have discussed a strategy, though only in very general terms. 
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Second, we observe the strategy mainly discussed or – if agreement was reached – agreed upon. 
Here we again apply a simple categorization scheme for coding: We distinguish between a 
cooperative strategy, a non-cooperative strategy and no clear strategy. Further, as this was 
mentioned in many groups, we count it as “cooperative” when subjects plan to start 
cooperatively and then react to what others do, while we count as “non-cooperative” when 
subjects plan to start free-riding and then react to what others do. The third category is “no clear 
opinion”, for groups where many different suggestions were made and no final agreement is 
reached.  
Finally, we look at whether the group reached an agreement about a specific strategy to pursue. 
Again, we do this in a very simple way. If, at the end of a discussion, each of the subjects says 
“ok, I agree” or something to this effect, the statement is counted as having reached agreement. 
If the discussion continues or is stopped without such an explicit agreement, it is coded as “no 
agreement”.  
Table 7: Coding Scheme for Pre-Game Chat 
# Coded Variable Manifested Outcomes Chat Example 
1 Was strategy discussed? 1: yes 0: no 
P1: “My strategy is every- 
        thing in B” 
P2: “I would say that too..” 
2 Which strategy was discussed? 
1: cooperative 
2: no clear  
    opinion 
0: non- 
cooperative 
P1: “So, I would suggest 
investing all the dollars in B 
and convincing the other 
representatives as well. What 
do you all think?” 
3 Did the group reach agreement? 1: yes 0: no 
P1: “yes, I agree”  
P2: “ok”  
P3 “OK.” 
 
Our first category reveals no striking difference between Japanese and German subjects. In the 
R1 treatment, where the specific rules of the game are not yet known, only 8% of the German 
groups and 13% of the Japanese discuss a strategy. As subjects do not yet know the exact 
instructions, they cannot discuss details of a strategy. However, one group in the Japanese 
sample reached agreement on a general strategic orientation, referring to past experience (an 
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experienced subject said: “being cooperative would be better for the result” and the others then 
replying “ok, we trust you”), but this did not occur in the German sample.  
In R2, 100% of the German as opposed to 62.5% of the Japanese subjects discuss a strategy. 
66% of the German groups now reach agreement on a specific strategy, but only 20% of the 
Japanese do.  
Figure 6: Percentage of Groups that discuss strategy and reach agreement (R1 & R2) 
 
 
Of those who do discuss a strategy, in Germany 75%, but in Japan only 29.03% have a tendency 
towards cooperation. The latter however is not because more subjects in Japan tend towards 
free-riding (6.45% in Japan and 8.33% in Germany), but because Japanese subjects show no 
clear tendency to a larger extent (64.52% in Japan and 16.67% in Germany). Of those groups 
who reach agreement, 75% in Japan and 87.5% in Germany vote for a cooperative strategy 
(25% or one group in Japan agrees on disagreement).  
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Figure 7: Strategic Tendencies of Groups in Germany and Japan (R1 & R2) 
The focus on discussing and agreeing upon a strategy is much stronger in Germany than in 
Japan, which confirms H5. Also, German groups are indeed more frequently able to discuss a 
strategy (within a limited timeframe) than Japanese groups, confirming H6. 
Table 8: Summary of Hypothesized and Actual Results 
Hypothesis Hypothesis based on Germany Japan Finding 
H1 Contributions data ✓ ✓ Supported 
H2 Contributions data ✓ ✓ Supported 
H3 Contributions data ✓ ✓ Mixed 
H4 Contributions &      Chat data ✓ ✓ Mixed 
H5 Chat data ✓ ✓ Supported 
H6 Chat data ✓ ✓ Supported 
 
4.9 Discussion 
Revisiting our research questions, we asked ourselves how contribution behavior and 
communication content would differ between German and Japanese subjects in our 
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experimental setting. In summary, we find support for our basic hypotheses with respect to the 
differences in contribution and communication behavior between (and within) individualistic 
and collectivistic countries, with the caveat that two of our hypotheses, H3 and H4, are 
supported only in Germany.  
We can show that cooperation with strangers is more easily established in the individualistic 
country (Germany) as compared to the collectivistic country (Japan)68. The flip-side of this is 
that individualistic subjects have no problem “betraying” trust at the end of the experiment, 
whereas this is different for collectivistic subjects (who presumably remain concerned with 
their reputation for loyalty69). Mainly because our Japanese subjects hardly manage to come to 
conclusions with respect to a strategy in the time allotted, because they need more time to build 
trust than our German subjects70, chatting has less of a positive effect on contributions in Japan 
than in Germany. That one group in Japan agrees to disagree confirms that group solidarity can 
be self-defeating in public goods settings (e.g. as reported by Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini, 
2007 in an experiment using the Prisoner’s Dilemma). In Germany, representatives that did not 
talk about their strategy with their constituency assume that selfish-for-the-group behavior is 
what is expected from them. In contrast, we do not see this kind of behavior in Japan, which is 
again in line with the idea that these recently formed groups are not considered relevant in-
groups for our Japanese subjects.  
 
Our research has implications for understanding how cooperation development differs among 
small groups of actors embedded in different nationalities when the leap of faith involves 
“allowing” own group representatives to contribute to a wider public good instead of free-riding 
                                               
68 Variance in contributions in Japan also remains fairly low over time, compared to Germany, providing further 
evidence that groups are more easily established in Germany, during the given timeframe.  
69 For an extreme example of loyalty in Japan, consider the Yakuza, who demand unconditional loyalty, with severe 
punishments for betrayal. 
70 One way to interpret this is that in Germany, a 5-minute chat is often enough to reduce social distance between 
strangers to form a minimal group in the lab, while in Japan this is more difficult due to the aforementioned cultural 
differences. 
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“for the group”. Cooperation between representatives of groups and these representatives and 
their constituencies is critical in many business and political interactions (e.g. leadership of top 
management teams of multinational firms and international organizations, in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions, negotiations, etc.) and is thus important to understand, also in an 
intercultural setting.  
Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000) argue that expectations of reciprocity from ingroup members 
is the source of ingroup favoritism in minimal groups. An important aspect for experimental 
design, but probably also for ad-hoc real-world groups is that collectivistic cultures (Japan) by 
far do not always act in favor of a group they are assigned to. This simple “minimal group” 
effect works well in individualistic cultures (Germany), but for the Japanese, these “minimal 
groups” in the lab have no meaning and are not seen differently from simple aggregates of 
strangers.  Thus, group building is necessary first, whereas in the individualistic context merely 
belonging to an artificial group makes people act selfishly for this group.  This confirms our 
expectations based on Yuki´s (2003) model. Further, the findings imply that team-building and 
negotiation between group representatives in organizations and educational settings require a 
longer time horizon (and thus sustained effort) in collectivistic societies.71 Language 
permitting, future experiments along these lines could include treatments with mixed teams 
with subjects from both countries. This could allow further differentiation of cultural effects.  
Future research might also explore the role of hierarchies in interacting groups negotiating for 
the public good, that is telling subjects in one treatment that they are on equal footing as the 
representative, while in another treatment, representatives are clearly framed as leaders or 
managers (e.g. of an imagined non-governmental organization). 
                                               
71 Thus, our groups can be regarded as proceeding through stages of the team-building process: forming, storming, 
norming and performing (Tuckman, 1965). While a detailed discussion of the group chats was out of scope for 
this paper, we did find evidence that the formation of minimal groups follows a similar pattern, especially in 
Germany. 
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The research discussed here is a first step towards meaningful intercultural comparisons in 
game-theoretical laboratory experiments on public goods. But, it certainly has limitations which 
we now discuss and provide an outlook for future research.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
A limitation was the time-frame for communication: Even though we expected our Japanese 
subjects to require more time, we did not expect this effect to be so strong. Future experiments 
should provide longer time windows for group members to chat in order to build group cohesion 
and relationships and observe what happens in collectivistic cultures when groups do have 
“meaning” as an in-group. Also, while our samples are not perfectly balanced in size due to 
organizational issues, we conducted a post-hoc power analysis, which showed sufficient power 
to detect country-level differences.72 Also, a limitation is that we did not measure trust on an 
individual level but rely on well-established external findings on studies of society-level 
differences in trust. 
Another limitation is that some subjects seemed to have had experience participating in 
behavioral experiments; Thus, some subjects discussed some very general strategy in treatment 
R1, before reading the full instructions (for chat examples see the Appendix). Nonetheless, 
overall, self-selected students have been empirically demonstrated to be an appropriate subject 
pool for the study of social behaviour using games in the lab (e.g. Exadaktylos, Espin, & 
Branas-Garza, 2013). Also, the identification of specific causes of group differences in 
preferences via identity priming of course only works if the identity prime is actually able both 
to affect the salience of the specific group-level trait of theoretical interest and to affect 
observed behavior (van Hoorn, 2018). For this, it is (1) necessary to collect data “other than the 
observed behavior that testifies to the effect of the identity prime” – e.g. our detailed chat logs 
                                               
72 Since contribution means and standard deviation are known, we implemented the power analysis using Stata’s 
samplesi command with the default alpha level (.05, two-sided test), which resulted in power = 1.00 (n1/n2=1.66).  
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which supplement our contribution data and (2) to provide evidence showing that variation in 
the affected group-level trait does indeed go on to affect individuals’ preferences (van Hoorn, 
2018). That some strategy was discussed in treatment R1 demonstrates that the chat served its 
purpose of increasing the salience of being a group representative and the identification with 
the ingroup, a goal of our experimental design. Further, this result, that pre-play communication 
in the absence of full instructions can have behavioural consequences is interesting for future 
research on public goods. That we see differences in contribution behaviour between our 
baseline and representative treatments testifies to the second condition (van Hoorn, 2018).  
As always in laboratory research, the general question of external validity can be raised. Further 
research could try to establish in how far generalizations from laboratory experiments to field 
situations are feasible in this context – and perhaps add to the literature with field experiments. 
Overall, we believe that further interdisciplinary research along these lines would be fruitful 
both to confirm or reject our findings and to deepen our understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms and mediators involved in our willingness to trust group representatives. In the 
words of Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007: 25) “group influence and social identity are 
important issues that can be ignored only at the peril of researchers in the social sciences”.   
Conclusion 
For now, we can conclude that there are cultural differences in behavior of representatives of 
interacting groups that can be detected in the laboratory. While the robustness of individual 
findings will need to be confirmed by further studies, we believe that Yuki´s (2003) model can 
to a large part explain the behavior observed and that our results can be insightful for future 
studies that should improve on some of the design features of our paper and might even examine 
negotiations between cultures. 
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4.11 Appendix A: Chat Examples 
 
Time 
left 
R1 Chat (Translated), Unit 1 - Group #3 (before 
game) 
Time 
left R2 Chat1 (Translated), Unit 1 - Group #1 (before) 
294 hi 297 Hello 
289 hi 279 also Hello 
280 short introduction round 266 So I would say, it is best to invest everything in b 
270 who is the third person in the group? 250 
So, I would suggest investing all the dollars in B 
and convincing the other representatives as well. 
What do you all think? 
267 very funny..to discuss/coordinate on something, if one does not know what one is supposed to do… 241 
I would say the same - no matter what, everything 
in B, should give the biggest profit 
266 hi 235 the loss one has/would have  when the others do not invest in b is worth the risk 
256 precisely… 227 definitely 
250 therefore one cant really coordinate 226 what you said [player #] s3 
241 I'm excited too 223 I think so too 
210 me, I dont like risk 203 Then we seem to agree, right? 
204 probably we should act more loyal to our groups if we get to know each other beforehand 196 
Of course it would be bitter if they all invest in a, but 
that is worth the risk 
197 :-) 161 
Good, then the representative has to convince the 
others only to invest everything in B. Best profit for 
all: 6.75 Talers versus 3 Talers total profit 
188 could of course be the case 147 
One would just have to give it a try, but the profit 
that everyone has when you invest in B is bigger at 
the end - and all people start with the same 
preconditions  
176 risk..well..it depends on the trade-offs 116 Most people here in the experiment are reasonable, that is what I learned from my experiences here so far 
174 I try to decide very rationally, using expected utility 97 
I do not believe it [player] s1: if someone is the only 
to invest in a, he collects the most compared to 
others 
173 certainly evesdropping 60 
So, no matter who we represent. The task will be to 
convince the others of "Everything in B". if it does 
not work, bad luck. 
168 :-) 60 The risk would be worth it and then to reevaluate the strategy after the first round. 
151 expected utility is always good 30 So, rather, take a small residual risk and be able to look one's self in the mirror 
149 that they are recording and evaluating this chat is clear 26 but then we can not communicate anymore [after round 1] 
141 sounds good to me    
139 agreed 19 ok, so everything in b 
115 well in the Prisoner's Dilemma I usually give people a trust advance and try to cooperate 14 I agree 
96 in the worst case the others each more money ;-) 9 everything in B 
90 hehe 3 Let's try it. 
79 I think, everyone should decide on their own 1 ciao 
75 I dont think it makes sense to think about it yet now    
72 participating helps the students in general because it increases our (university) research funding   
 
51 ok..but it is totally unclear (what we're supposed to discuss)   
 
20 we'll see what happened    
4 have fun    
1 so far my head was in the game in every experiment, wait and see     
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Table 9: Pre-Game Chat, Detailed Examples (German Representative Treatments) 
 
Period Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
T=1 2,556 1,942 0 5 
T=2 2,694 1,836 0 5 
T=3 2,681 1,912 0 5 
T=4 2,097 1,863 0 5 
T=5 2,000 1,906 0 5 
T=6 2,417 1,774 0 5 
T=7 2,056 1,883 0 5 
T=8 1,931 1,771 0 5 
T=9 1,958 1,674 0 5 
T=10 1,736 1,884 0 5 
Table 10: Contributions: Basic Statistics (over all Treatments: Japan) 
 
Period Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
T=1 3,128 2,154 0 5 
T=2 3,462 1,998 0 5 
T=3 3,692 1,852 0 5 
T=4 3,615 1,756 0 5 
T=5 2,872 2,067 0 5 
T=6 3,026 1,871 0 5 
T=7 2,923 2,018 0 5 
T=8 2,795 2,123 0 5 
T=9 2,435 2,186 0 5 
T=10 1,256 1,743 0 5 
Table 11: Contributions: Basic Statistics (over all Treatments: Germany) 
 
Major (Q9) Freq. Percent Cum. 
1: Economics or Business 96 40,51 40,51 
2: Humanities 38 16,03 56,54 
3: Other Social Sciences 46 19,41 75,95 
4: Engineering or IT 20 8,44 84,39 
5: Unspecified 20 8,44 92,83 
6: Natural Sciences 13 5,49 98,31 
7: Psychology 4 1,69 100,00 
Total 237 100,00 100,00 
Table 12: Distribution of Majors 
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4.12 Appendix B – Instructions  
 
Dear Participant, 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment in decision making. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This is an experiment in decision making. You will be paid for your participation.  
The amount of money you earn will depend on the decisions made by you and the other decision-makers. 
At no point in the experiment will you be asked to reveal your identity to anyone. Your name will never 
be associated with your decisions. To keep your decisions confidential, please do not reveal them to any 
of the other participants. 
At this moment, we will give you 3 euros for arriving on time. All money that you earn from now on 
will be yours, and your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of today’s experiment. 
 
THIS EXPERIMENT 
 
In this experiment, you will be in a group of three people. In the first stage of the experiment, you will 
have time to meet the members of your group and talk to them via a messenger program for five minutes. 
In the computer screen you will see soon, you can type any question or comment that you would like to 
make to the other members of your group. 
In the second stage of the experiment, a representative from your group will play an interactive game 
with representatives from the other groups in the experiment. You may or may not be chosen to represent 
your group. If you have been chosen to represent your group will be shown to you on the screen. Before 
the first stage starts, you will be given the instructions for the game in the second stage. 
(In the last stage of the experiment, you will again meet the members via Messenger for five minutes.) 
*This is used only in the R3 treatment 
 183 
Some general advice before the experiment begins: 
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait until the experimenter 
comes to your table. 
Do not communicate with any of the other participants except when the experimenter asks you to do so. 
Payment will be based on your performance during the experiment. It will be paid to you privately and 
in cash after the experiment has concluded. 
Do you have any questions? 
(Move to the instructions for the second part) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SECOND PART 
 
During the second part, a representative from your group interacts with representatives from the other 
groups in the room. The screen will indicate whether or not you have been randomly selected to 
represent your group. 
If you have been selected to represent your group, you will interact later with representatives from the 
other groups. 
If you have not been selected to represent your group, you will be asked to complete a short 
questionnaire. 
The representatives will play 10 rounds. Only after these 10 rounds have been completed will you be 
told the outcome of their play. 
New representatives will then be selected to play another 10 rounds following the same rules. You and 
your group members will receive payments based on the decisions taken by the representatives of the 
groups during the experiment. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR REPRESENTATIVES 
 
You have been selected to represent your group. You will now interact with representatives from the 
other two groups in the laboratory. 
You and your group members will receive payments based on the decisions you make in your interaction 
with the other representatives. You will interact for 10 rounds and make 10 decisions. The structure of 
the interaction is as follows: 
 
You will be asked to make a series of decisions about how to allocate a set of tokens. You interact with 
the representatives of the other two groups in this laboratory. 
You will not be told the identities of the others with whom you will interact. For each decision, you will 
have five tokens to allocate. You must decide how many of these tokens you wish to invest in project A 
and how many you wish to invest in project B. The amount of money you earn depends on how many 
tokens you invest in project A, how many you invest in project B, and on how many the other 
representatives invest in project B. 
 
EXAMPLE OF DECISIONS THAT YOU WILL MAKE IN THIS EXPERIMENT 
 
Each decision that you make will be similar to the following: 
Example:  Each of the three representatives has five tokens to allocate. You (and your group) will earn 
1 cent for each token that you invest in project A. For each token that you invest in project B, you (and 
your group) will earn 0.75 cents and the other representatives (and their groups) will earn 0.75 cents (a 
total of 2.25 cents for all of you together). For each token that the other representatives invest in project 
A, their respective group will earn 1 cent. For each token that the other representatives invest in project 
B, this representative and associated group will earn 0.75 cents and you and your group will earn 0.75 
cents (a total of 2.25 cents for all of you together). In summary, you (and your group) will earn:  
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1 cent multiplied by the number of tokens you invest in project A 
+0.75 cents multiplied by the number of tokens that you invest in project B 
+0.75 cents multiplied by the number of tokens that the other representatives invest in project B 
Any amount you earn now, as a group representative, will be divided equally among you and the other 
members of your group. The cents in this experiment are converted into € in the following manner: 1 
cent =  0.02€ . 
If you have any questions now, please ask the experimenter. If you have no questions and we can start, 
please press ‘ok.’ 
*Test starts. 
*Chat starts. 
*PG game starts. 
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4.13 Appendix C – Questionnaires 
 
 Identification 
 
 (1) I have positive feelings towards my team members 
 (2) I have confidence in my team members 
 (3) I feel comfortable depending on my team members 
 (4) I think the other team members performed well 
 (5) I think that, generally speaking, I have more in common with the members of this team than with  
       the members of the other teams 
 (6) I trust all of the members of my team equally well 
 
 Answers to the identification questions were based on a 6-point Likert scale. 
 
 
 Accountability 
 
  (7) I feel accountable for my actions in this experiment. 
  (8) I feel that my group members hold me accountable for my decisions. 
  (9) If things don’t go the way they should, my group members will be angry with me. 
(10) If things go well, my group members will be happy with me. 
(11) The success of my group members depends on me. 
(12) I feel that I would like to be able to explain why I did certain things in this experiment. 
(13) Overall, my efforts in this experiment were very important. 
 
 Answers to the accountability questions were based on an 8-point Likert scale. 
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4.14 Appendix D – Screenshots from the Game  
 
C.1 Group Chat Window (Example from Treatment R1) 
 
 
 
C.2 Information Screen for those not selected (R1 and R2) 
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C.3 Simple Calculation Task (for non-representative group members in Treatments R1 and R2) 
 
 
 
C.4 Allocation Decision Screen for Group Representatives (R1 and R2) 
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C.5 Feedback Screen for Group Representatives (R1 and R2, example from Period 10)73 
 
 
 
 
                                               
73 The screenshots provided were taken for illustrative purposes with three test players-- the “Sum of the 
Investments in B column” here would normally take on values from 0-15, not just 0-5. 
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C.6 Collection of Demographic Information (after Period 10) 
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4.15 Appendix E – Additional Tables and Figures  
Table 7: Correlation Matrix 
  Contribution Session Period End Effect Gender Age Major 
Contribution 1       
Session -.14841168 1      
Period -.18646811 9,71E-15 1     
End Effect -.15623251 -1,99E-15  .69631062 1    
Gender -.02788849 -.17040416 0 3,89E-14 1   
Age  .09244858 -.49540854 -6,28E-16 2,82E-15   .1336589 1  
Major  .00578531 -.00894251 2,30E-15 -1,27E-15 -.05076093  .11503041 1 
 
 
Figure 6: Contributions Over Time in Germany and Japan (Lowess Smoothing with Jitter) 
 
The Random-Effects Tobit Model 
 
To appropriately account for the doubly censored nature of the dependent variable of our model 
(contributions to the public good are both left and right censored, i.e. contributions have a lower 
limit of zero and an upper limit of 5) and to thus obtain unbiased, consistent and efficient 
estimates of the parameters, we use the censored Tobit estimation procedure (Amemiya, 197374; 
Nelson, 1976). Since some subjects typically free ride, but others contribute to the public good, 
our dependent variable Y will contain a significant number of zero observations as well as many 
positive observations between 1 and 5. A panel data model offers two distinct advantages over 
the traditional linear regression model. First, a panel model can capture both cross-sectional 
                                               
74Amemiya, Takeshi, 1973. "Regression Analysis when the Dependent Variable is Truncated Normal," 
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 997-1016, November.  
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and time-series variation in the dependent variable under investigation. Secondly, this type of 
model is able to measure not only the effects of observable variables on the dependent variable, 
but also the effects of relevant unobservable or non-measurable influences. Observable 
variables are incorporated into the model in the usual manner. The means by which the 
unobservable variables are incorporated depends upon whether a fixed-effect (FE) or random-
effects (RE) model is used in estimation. The RE model assumes that the unobservable (i.e. 
non-measurable) factors that differentiate cross-section units are best characterized as randomly 
distributed. As subjects vary by their gender, age, major of study and many other factors, it 
seems quite reasonable to assume that the differences between them are randomly distributed. 
As such, we feel that the use of the RE model is well suited for analyzing contribution 
behaviour. The resulting RE model is presented below:  
Yij= α+ β1 PreviousContribution + β2 Period + β3 Session… + σ(v)i + σ(u)I, 
where i indexes the subjects in our analysis and t the time series units, e.g. the period of the 
game, such that t={1,2…10}. PreviousContribution captures the effect of the contribution from 
the last respective period on the current period. Session controls for multiple sessions of a given 
treatment. EndEffect is described in the main body of the paper. Gender, Age and Major of 
study are self-explanatory. For readability, σ(v) and σ(u) are omitted from the tables. 
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Table E.8:End Effect in Japan vs Germany, Random Effects (Censored) Tobit Regression 
  Japan   Germany  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Baseline R1 R2 Baseline R1 R2 
              
Previous Contribution 0.197+ 0.402+ 0.0270 0.561* 0.378* 0.624+ 
 (0.104) (0.210) (0.124) (0.264) (0.165) (0.377) 
End Effect -0.642* -2.070** -0.280 -3.881** -1.974** -4.832** 
 (0.322) (0.694) (0.370) (1.075) (0.634) (1.545) 
Session 0.0268 -0.532 -0.0298 -30.65 -0.110 -2.262 
 (0.711) (1.314) (0.571) (876.9) (0.640) (1.853) 
Constant 1.460 8.434 2.521 33.85 2.465 17.27 
 (8.217) (17.69) (4.904) (876.9) (2.325) (10.53) 
Observations 330 150 240 150 120 120 
Individuals 33 15 24 16 12 12 
Dependent Variable: P.G. Contributions 
Standard errors in parentheses      
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1      
 
Table E.9: (bivariate) Country-Level Treatment Effects, R.E. (Censored) Tobit Regression 
Pooled 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Baseline R1 R2 
        
Country -1.192 -0.833 -2.614* 
 (0.893) (0.923) (1.184) 
Constant 3.225** 2.644** 4.827** 
 (0.739) (0.683) (0.969) 
    
Observations 480 270 360 
Individuals 49 27 36 
Standard errors in parentheses; Country: 0=Germany, 1=Japan 
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1   
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Table E.10: Japan, Results using R.E. Tobit Panel Regression 
Japan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Baseline R1 R1 w. Demogr. R2 R2 w. Demogr. 
            
Previous Contr. 0.164 0.415+ 0.443* 0.00322 0.00429 
 (0.101) (0.215) (0.221) (0.122) (0.122) 
Period -0.177** -0.206* -0.209* -0.137** -0.138** 
 (0.0439) (0.0962) (0.0973) (0.0507) (0.0507) 
Gender   -2.773+  -1.184 
   (1.683)  (1.386) 
Age   1.072**  0.572 
   (0.366)  (0.408) 
Major   0.129  0.714* 
   (0.220)  (0.343) 
Session 0.0206 -0.518 -2.100+ -0.0309 0.0129 
 (0.722) (1.300) (1.108) (0.577) (0.564) 
Constant 2.573 5.832 -4.394 3.100+ -10.47 
 (4.032) (9.721) (7.605) (1.635) (8.510) 
      
Observations 330 150 150 240 240 
Individuals 33 15 15 24 24 
DV = Contributions to the Public Good; Standard errors in parentheses   
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1     
Note: for the representative treatments, three times as many participated (e.g. 45 and 72, respectively), 
but only the representatives contributed for their respective group and are thus relevant for Stata 
Table E.11: Germany, Results using R.E. Tobit Panel Regression 
Germany 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Baseline R1 R1 w. Demogr. R2 R2 w. Demogr. 
            
Previous Contr. 0.669* 0.550** 0.462** 0.883* 0.999** 
 (0.276) (0.175) (0.136) (0.430) (0.323) 
Period -0.659** -0.283** -0.277** -0.818** -0.869** 
 (0.155) (0.0880) (0.0855) (0.242) (0.244) 
Gender   -0.151  4.555** 
   (0.666)  (1.699) 
Age   -0.136+  -0.0755 
   (0.0746)  (0.185) 
Major   0.437*  -0.526+ 
   (0.171)  (0.311) 
Session  -0.0570 0.449 -1.996 -4.189* 
  (0.547) (0.554) (1.665) (1.774) 
Constant 5.698** 2.980+ 3.850 16.52* 27.71** 
 (1.468) (1.531) (2.361) (8.012) (10.37) 
      
Observations 150 120 120 120 120 
Individuals 15 12 12 12 12 
Standard errors in parentheses     
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1     
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5. The contested Market for Bitcoin trading: A cross-national comparison of the Role of 
Institutional Voids and Corruption 
 
Abstract 
We study the interplay between institutions, institutional voids and corruption on the 
development of the emerging but highly contested market for digital currencies. Digital 
currencies are rapidly expanding in scope and popularity with the potential for fundamental yet 
controversy-provoking changes to the financial industry and beyond. Building on institutional 
theory, we theorize how institutional voids in conjunction with corruption determined the 
attractiveness of the market for digital currencies by analyzing the market for Bitcoin trading 
from 2013 to 2017 in 46 countries. Contrary to our expectations we find that corruption is 
negatively related to bitcoin trading and that institutional voids facilitate rather than hamper the 
amount of bitcoin trading. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the role of 
institutional voids for the development of a new contested market. Our findings may empower 
corporate and institutional entrepreneurs as well as policy makers to better serve this market 
(e.g. by filling identified gaps and combating possible negative externalities) and thus master 
the digital transformation. 
 
Keywords: Institutions, Institutional Voids, Corruption, Corruption perception index (CPI), 
Bitcoin trading, Cryptocurrencies, National culture 
 
JEL Classification: E42; E58; L51; O11; O17; O1 
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The contested Market for Bitcoin trading: A cross-national comparison of the Role of 
Institutional Voids and Corruption.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Organization theorists have recently paid considerable attention to the emergence and 
development of new industries (Padgett & Powell 2012; Navis and Glynn, 2010; Georgallis et 
al., 2018). For example, prior research has investigated how policy shifts and the state impact 
the emergence of the solar photovoltaics (PV) industry in Europe (Georgallis et al., 2018) or 
the biotechnology industry in the US (Powell et al., 2012). A common issue of emerging 
industries is that their legitimacy is often highly contested (e.g., Rao 1998), which makes it 
difficult to judge the attractiveness of the new industry. The discussion of digital currencies is 
highly contested since on the one hand their trading has been commonly stigmatized as a 
criminal artefact, while on the other hand they are viewed as the future of banking (Bariviera 
2017). Digital currencies, such as Bitcoin, have the potential to disrupt not only existing 
payment systems but also to change entire monetary systems (Böhme et al. 2015). 	
In the situation where regulations and standards are highly unevenly distributed or even absent, 
- i.e., the presence of institutional voids which are characterized by the absence of institutions 
that shape market transactions, that is the relative lack of intermediary firms, regulatory systems 
and contract-enforcing mechanisms (Khanna and Palepu 2000; Khanna and Rivkin 2001), what 
enables such a contested emerging industry to develop? On the one hand, recent institutional 
theory research suggests that the lack of institutions results in high uncertainty. For example, 
Khanna and Palepu (1997) argue that institutional voids are likely to hamper economic 
exchange in the capital, labor and product markets of emerging economies. An environment 
that lacks effective political governance and regulatory institutions may facilitate corruption or 
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theft to conduct business. On the other hand, institutional voids present opportunities for 
entrepreneurs – a space to engage in (often innovative) profit maximization without the shackles 
of regulatory authorities (Mair & Marti 2009).  
In this paper, we bring together these two perspectives and examine the conditions under which 
institutional voids offer opportunities or constrain behavior. In particular, in this explorative 
study, we examine the emergence and development of a new contested market: the market for 
digital currencies (i.e., Bitcoins). Digital currencies, are rapidly expanding in scope and 
popularity, bringing with them the potential for fundamental changes to the financial industry 
and beyond. For several years, Bitcoins were only something for technical nerds or gamers. 
However, recently a rapid growth process emerged, and in early 2018 cryptocurrency market 
capitalization surpassed the $700 billion mark75, with an estimated $2 billion transactions per 
day with Bitcoins alone76. Below, the development of Bitcoin trading from 2013 through 2017 
is depicted for a frequently used global platform (localbitcoins.com). 
Figure 1: Bitcoin Trading Volume from 2013-2017 
 
                                               
75 http://www.businessinsider.de/bitcoin-price-global-cryptocurrency-market-capitalisation-january-3-2018-1?r=US&IR=T 
76 https://www.forbes.com/sites/ktorpey/2017/11/20/bitcoin-now-processes-2-billion-worth-of-transactions-per-day-a-10x-
increase-in-2017/#6c4274212fba 
Note: BTC transaction volume has since declined from this peek value to the level of mid-year 2016 where it has remained for 
the last 6 months: 
https://blockchain.info/charts/n-transactions 
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While the period between FY2013 and FY2016 is marked by steady growth, this is better 
described as exponential in FY2017, which was confirmed to us in an interview with the 
platform’s founder, a recognized expert of the field: “Currently we are processing about 30000 
trades each day and it has been going up. I think last year because of the huge growth in volume, 
there was growth from 10000 trades early 2017 to 20 or 30 thousand trades on normal days, on 
weekends it is less” (F1: 3). 
Organizations have also responded to this trend. For example, Ebay is seriously considering 
accepting Bitcoins (BTC) as a payment method (Dec. 2017). Efforts involving established 
banking industry players are taking place globally to make Bitcoins a feature of mainstream 
financial services (Financial Times, 2014). Governments and citizens of developing countries 
are placing large hopes on digital currencies as a means not only to mitigate poor financial 
infrastructure and to reduce transaction costs but also as a potential remedy for corruption via 
disintermediation. At the same time, such innovations are placed within institutional voids 
which opens the possibility of fraud and abuse. Specifically, the largely anonymous 
mechanisms are attractive to illicit sectors of the economy as a way to launder money earned 
through the drug trade and other means. Thus, Bitcoin trading is still a highly contested setting 
characterized by the lack of an institutional framework that regulates the market, further fueling 
the tensions about the legitimacy of Bitcoin trading. 
In research, the topic has also gained some importance. For example, in the Academy of 
Management Journal, Dodgson et al (2015) single out bitcoins and digital money as a fresh 
new research area in management. The authors explain that digital money dematerializes by 
moving (even more) cash transactions to the digital world and at the same time 
disintermediates, bringing money and people closer together (Dodgson et al, 2015). At the same 
time, we know little about the role of institutions in this context, for which cross-national 
comparison should be particularly helpful. For example, Mair, Marty and Ventresca (2012) call 
for papers exploring impact in settings with particularly complex and/or underexplored 
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institutional contexts. Similarly, Stephan, Uhlaner and Stride (2015) based on a study in 26 
nations, advocate greater consideration of institutional configurations in institutional theory and 
comparative entrepreneurship research. Yet, to our knowledge, little or no work has been done 
on this topic in top journals in organization studies, management or even entrepreneurship to 
date. We aim to bridge this gap by exploring the interlinkages between the growth in bitcoin 
trading, the level of institutional development and corruption. While several theoretical lenses 
come to mind in order to examine the topic under study, institutional theory and imperfect 
markets can be particularly insightful when examining corruption cross-nationally (e.g. 
Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Mair, Marty and Ventresca, 2012; Puffer, McCarthy and Boisot, 
2010).  
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we first explain our empirical setting, after 
which we define institutional voids and corruption, followed by our methodology, analysis and 
results which are then discussed in the light of extant literature. Finally, we conclude with 
limitations of our approach and suggestions for future research. 
 
5.2 The Empirical Setting for Bitcoin trading 
Localbitcoins is a platform launched in early 2013 with the mission of covering cities 
worldwide with Bitcoin trading, with a particular focus on developing countries: “The mission 
of localbitcoins was always bringing bitcoin everywhere (…) We wanted to enable access to 
bitcoin in each city, everywhere in the world.” (F1:2) “The main idea of the service was to 
enable access to bitcoin everywhere.” (F1: 2). For countries such as Venezuela and Ghana, until 
late 2017, the platform was often the only option available:  
“Localbitcoins is kind of a place which works when the other exchanges don’t work, so in 
countries where there is limited access to centralized exchanges and so on” (F1: 2). Asked to 
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elaborate, the founder interviewed went on to say that “most of the time it’s just that the country 
doesn’t have really good financial infrastructure and there aren’t any centralized exchanges in 
such country. For example, in an African country it might be really difficult or pretty much 
impossible to send or even to have an account in Coinbase [a key website for transmitting digital 
coins]” (F1: 2). 
Figure 2: The Trading Process 
 
To trade on Localbitcoins, users are given a free and secure online wallet (e.g. two factor 
authentification, encrypted database) when signing up, after which they have two options to 
conduct trades (1) trade locally in cash in the local currency and (2) trade online in the local 
currency. If the users trade in cash, they typically indicate a preferred meeting location in 
their local city and provide their phone number along with the minimum and maximum 
amount of Bitcoins available for the transaction and their requirements of the buyer (e.g. 
identification). If the user elects to trade online, both parties commit to the use of the escrow 
service. Once the buyer clicks on ‘buy’ and selects his or her payment method, the buyer is 
given 90 minutes to make the payment to the third-party Escrow account. If the payment is 
not made, the transaction is cancelled and the buyer receives negative feedback unless he 
convinces the seller otherwise. In the usual case, that the payment is made within the time 
window, the funds are released to the seller as soon as the Bitcoin transfer is verified (the 
average Bitcoin transaction time is approximately one hour, but can last anywhere from 10 
minutes to 24 hours77). Localbitcoins charges 1% of the transaction volume in fees for the 
escrow service, the platform’s primary business model: “the escrow service (…) that’s where 
we make the money” (F1: 2). The founder went on to specify that “the escrow service has 
always been like 99% of the revenues” (F1: 2). For the online trade, the buyer must also 
follow the seller’s terms of trade, which typically include email and SMS verification (i.e. 
linking a buyer to a unique phone number and Sim Card), providing photo identification, 
having a bank account in the seller’s country and having conducted a set number of previous 
transactions (e.g. 25 previous trades) on the platform with positive feedback over a certain 
period of time (to prevent fraud, typically, accounts should be in existence for at least 30 
                                               
77 https://coincentral.com/how-long-do-bitcoin-transfers-take/ 
The transaction time also depends on the fee the selling is willing to pay, as higher fees allow for faster transactions 
as miners typically select the most profitable transactions first. 
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days). Sellers are also initially limited to five ads until they reach certain transaction 
thresholds. Trading restrictions for both parties are successively lifted as these gather a 
number of trades under their belt and reputation-score milestones. 
The platform uses a so-called open limit order book model, where sellers decide on a price 
and amount range (minimum and maximum they are offering at the given price) and the offer 
is typically valid until fulfilled unless the seller removes the ad. When setting the price of an 
ad, sellers typically look at the current average Bitcoin price (e.g. as determined by Bitstamp) 
and incorporate their experience with local buyer’s willingness to pay (e.g. local demand). 
Buyers typically sort trades by price and select the best price among sellers with their 
preferred payment option and a good reputation. 
Localbitcoin targets first-time customers in particular: “Our target market is the first-time 
buyer” (F1:2). When asked to elaborate, the interviewee stated “the majority of them [platform 
users] might be bitcoin investors that might be doing a little bit of bitcoin trading on the side. 
This situation is kind of common” (F1: 2). Professional Bitcoin traders especially in the first 
three years of the platform’s existence were typically experts in their mid 30s, often with an 
international background who would trade or promote Bitcoins on the side of their regular 
employment. When asked about Bitcoin meetups and hackathons in different parts of the world, 
the founder replied: “The people you would meet all over the world [from 2013 to about 2015] 
were quite similar. Expats, male, white like in their 30s no matter where you go. There were 
some locals but mostly experts, the international focus people” (F1:2). 
5.3 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
5.3.1 The emergence of the contested market for bitcoin trading 
New industries, are defined by those “business environments in an early stage of formation” 
(Santos and Eisenhardt 2009: 644). Contested industries have been defined as industries that 
face widespread disapproval because some sectors of society find them “offensive, 
inappropriate, or harmful” (Davidson 2003: 2). Previous research has identified contested 
industries such as arms (Durand & Vergne, 2015) or the tobacco industry (Simons et al., 2016). 
New and contested markets are often ill-structured and their development is uncertain (Navis 
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and Glynn, 2010) and there is evidence that cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin have the features 
to be viewed as a new contested industry. 
In 2008, in the middle of the world’s latest financial crisis, one or several anonymous creative 
minds, under the pseudonym “Satoshi Nakamoto”, devised the idea of creating a new currency: 
one that is independent of institutions such as banks, central banks and investment companies 
and is more direct, faster and more transparent than traditional currency systems. In this sense, 
Bitcoins are currently “sustained by sociological features that are directly at odds with the 
political ideology of the theory of money that underpins it (Dodd 2017). The Bitcoin system 
relies upon a decentralized network in order to verify all the transactions via a public ledger 
(i.e., the block chain). Currently, Bitcoins are not directly backed by a government or a central 
bank and are therefore truly decentralized (Weber 2014). The number of bitcoins is limited to 
21 million, which are successively mined by performing complex calculations.78 The 
underlying price of a bitcoin is therefore based on both the cost involved in mining the coins as 
well as on this artificial supply shortage. While a growing number of cryptocurrencies exist, 
the Bitcoin algorithm remains a dominant design in this new market (Geroski, 2003). 
This increasing virtuality of transactions is akin to a further disassociation of money from 
physical reality, posing both risks and benefits. On the one hand, the increasing anonymity 
made possible by blockchain transactions makes this innovation interesting for money 
launderers, criminal organizations and for tax evasion. For example, Bouri et al. (2017a) 
scrutinize safe haven and hedging properties of Bitcoin; in a related paper, the authors 
hypothesize that the digital currency is used to hedge global uncertainty (Bouri et al, 2017b). 
In fact, the value of bitcoin gained ground (or spiked) during the Cyprus financial crisis of 
201379, lending further credence to this hypothesis. On the other hand, this technology holds 
                                               
78 Note, these calculations need a lot of energy. According to a study from ING Bank, one Bitcoin-transaction equals the 
monthly energy demand for a one-person household. 
79 https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2013/04/02/are-bitcoins-safer-than-cyprus/#13cacb9152f2 
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the promise of reducing transaction costs and of spurring additional novelties and 
recombinations of products and services to create customer value. Thus, consider how coin 
mining leads to markets for specialized mining rigs and hardware wallets for (encrypted) 
safekeeping of digital assets. 
A recent literature review of entrepreneurial finance points to bitcoins and crowdfunding as 
signs of changing institutional conditions (Cumming & Vismara, 2017). While some countries, 
such as Japan, have legalized bitcoin as a currency and where it is already possible to pay energy 
bills and food such as Sushi with Bitcoins, other markets such as China have taken drastic 
measures to forbid trading entirely, while much of the world has yet to regulate this novel 
market. This was confirmed by the (now infamous) bitcoin entrepreneur we spoke to: “Yeah, 
well…we have some discussions ongoing all the time with different regulators and offices 
around the world. Mostly (at least) for us [our platform], there haven’t been that many 
restrictions” (F1: 4). These contrasting institutional (and cultural) environments are likely to 
have different effects on the growth and development paths of bitcoin and on cryptocurrencies 
in general. One key difference in these environments is corruption, the economic cost of which 
has been estimated at $2.9 trillion.80 
5.3.2 Regulative Institutions and Entrepreneurial Activities 
In analyzing the emergence of new industries, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) distinguish between 
cognitive legitimacy, or the degree to which the knowledge about a new industry is diffused in 
a society, and sociopolitical legitimacy, which refers to the extent to which a new industry is 
seen as appropriate and right by the general public, key stakeholders, government people and 
opinion leaders (see also Scott 2001 and Suchman 1995). One type of sociopolitical legitimacy 
that directly affects the emergence of new industries is the regulative dimension which entails 
                                               
80 https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2015/12/22/where-does-the-2-6-trillion-corruption-cost-estimate-come-from/ 
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“rule setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities” (Scott, 2001: 52). These rules are set by 
powerful actors, such as the state or other regulative organizations. These rules have the ability 
to define what is acceptable and what not in a given society. They regularize and constrain 
behavior (Scott, 2001: 51) and they have a strong impact on the emergence of a new industry. 
For example, Aldrich and Fiol (1994: 655) refer to the example of the emergent pay-per-call 
information-services industry (using 900-prefix phone numbers) which was growing rapidly in 
the early 1990s in the US. However, the development of this industry slowed down because it 
lacked consistent government regulations and uniform standards. In addition, prior institutional 
research has, for example, studied the role of regulative institutions for the genesis of the solar 
photovoltaics (PV) industry in Europe (Georgallis et al., 2018) or the biotechnology industry 
(Powell et al., 2012). Also, the emergence of the Biotechnology industry was slowed down by 
strong regulations that were perceived as hindering the growth of the biotech industry in the US 
(Aldrich and Fiol 1994: 662). The German biotechnology industry was also hampered by a 
hostile regulatory environment for genetic research throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Only 
strong regulative changes for example the liberalization of genetic testing regulations in 1993 
and beginning in 1995 the introduction of substantial technology promotion programs, led to 
the growth of the German biotechnology industry.  
There is also strong empirical evidence that both formal institutions play a role in enabling 
entrepreneurship (e.g. Sephan, Uhlaner and Stride, 2015). Entrepreneurs are often 
conceptualized as exploring and exploiting the nexus of opportunity (Shane, 2003) in their 
respective environments (March, 1991).  Eventually, institutional entrepreneurs enter the fray 
in new markets and “leverage resources to create new institutions or transform existing ones” 
(Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence, 2004: 657). Institutions can constrain as well as foster 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Eckhardt and Shane (2003: 336) define entrepreneurial 
opportunities “as situations in which new goods, services, raw materials, markets and 
organizing methods can be introduced through the formation of new means, ends, or means-
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ends relationships. These situations do not need to change the terms of economic exchange to 
be entrepreneurial opportunities, but only need to have the potential to alter the terms of 
economic exchange.”  
For example, Sine and David (2003) explain how changes in the environment impact 
entrepreneurial opportunities in the US electric power industry. The authors argue that 
environmental jolts enable search processes and led key actors to reformulate existing 
regulatory institutions, thereby developing entrepreneurial opportunities.  
Institutional Regulations and Bitcoin Trading 
Scholars have begun to study the emergence of new markets. One theme centers on the 
emergence of new market categories (Navis and Glynn, 2010) and the role of state-based 
regulation (Georgallis et al., 2018). Although this work explores how regulation impacts the 
emergence of a new industry in a cross-national setting, a few studies address how strong 
regulative institutions versus their absence impacts the emergence of new markets. 
Changes in government regulations can raise or lower the attractiveness of a new industry as it 
alters the incentives for all players in the affected sector. However, on the one hand, if 
regulations provided a supportive legal environment and financial support and thus lower entry 
barriers for a new sector, prior research shows that new firm foundings in the new sector 
increase (Sine et al. 2005). Yet, if government regulations are missspecified, they may lower 
the entrepreneurial opportunities.  
5.3.3 The regulation of Bitcoins 
Bitcoins were developed to ensure a high level of transparency and with no apparent influence 
from lawyers or regulators. Their trading includes tools to facilitate honest participation 
(Böhme, et al 2015). Thus, besides the common underlying software (the Blockchain), Bitcoin 
trading does not build on a common governance structure which distinguishes Bitcoin trading 
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from conventional payment systems. This has several implications for the functioning of the 
system (see Böhme et al., 2015: 219): First, with Bitcoin trading there is no need for a financial 
institution, payment processor, or other intermediary to verify a user’s identity. Second, in 
contrast to credit card networks which normally do not permit unlawful transactions in the place 
of sale, Bitcoin imposes no such prohibition on the sale of particular items. Finally, Bitcoin 
payments are not reversable because the protocol has no possibility to change an unwanted or 
an accidental purchase.  
During our extensive interview on the topic, the founder explained: “Of course it [the legal 
status] is quite unclear but that is the situation for the regulators most of the time. Regulation 
right now [2018] looks a little better since there is a new European Union directive coming this 
year and it will be much more clear in the European Union compared to previously” (F1: 1). 
We therefore assume that perceived uncertainty is a crucial factor mitigated by legal regulation. 
While we expect that partial legalization or light regulation would reduce such uncertainty, 
without negatively effecting trading volume, when governments take a strong stand and 
decisively restrict or outright ban the use of Bitcoins, we would expect to see a reduction in 
trading. In the words of the founder of the trading platform under study “In this kind of 
businesses or industry like finance, this way to do business or move money or wealth it is 
always about the regulation” (F1: 1).  
We therefore posit that: 
H1: Strong legal regulation will be negatively related with Bitcoin trading volume over time. 
5.3.4 Emerging Market Status and Bitcoin Trading 
“Of course localbitcoins is kind of a place which works when the other exchanges 
don’t work, so in countries where there is limited access to centralized exchanges and 
so on” (Interview with Jeremias Kangas, Founder of Localbitcoins.com on July 4th, 
2018) 
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While a comparatively large share of innovations originate from developed countries, 
developing countries stand to benefit disproportionately from them, particularly when these are 
not yet regulated and their control is decentralized (as in the case of cryptocurrencies). 
Developing countries are faced with often systemic challenges, such as inequality, climate 
change, limited resources, corruption and in many cases phases of social unrest. The diffusion 
and application of innovative digital and financial technologies can contribute to promoting 
greater access to resources and technologies to people who currently have no such access. At 
the same time, due to globalization, developing countries can face strong competitive pressures. 
New markets can provide a potential pathway for such countries to more quickly catch up with 
developed countries in individual sectors of the economy by leapfrogging over outdated 
technologies (e.g. Brezis & Krugman, 1997; Fudenberg, Stiglitz & Tirole, 1983 and 
Goldemberg, 1998). Therefore, some African countries have skipped the development of 
landline phone infrastructure in favor of the direct move to the use of newer technology - mobile 
phones. Similarly, Kenya has used M-Pesa (a type of mobile phone bank account) to 
compensate for a comparatively poorly developed financial infrastructure and banking system. 
In China, entire cities have been constructed as test-markets for solar photovoltaic at scale, 
considered a future (renewable) energy technology with the potential to replace fossil fuels and 
nuclear energy (e.g. the city of Rizhao). According to the industrial organization literature, 
lower wages in emerging countries may lower the cost of entry for emerging countries to take 
advantage of new industries which can lead upstart metropolitan areas to rapidly overtake major 
cities (Brezis & Krugman, 1997). At the same time, developed countries can be comparatively 
slow to adopt new market developments, since they are typically market leaders in extant 
markets (with the corresponding economies of scale in production) and at the same time 
typically have much higher wages, making rapid entry into new markets somewhat cost 
prohibitive. 
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Finally, a related motive for some developing markets to enter new and contested markets is 
that of survival (e.g. the economic crisis in Venezuela which has led to a liquidity problem).  
Meanwhile, in developed countries, cryptocurrency trading is clearly not motivated by either 
leapfrogging or survival. US and UK citizens typically have higher incomes and are therefore 
likely to engage in cryptocurrency trading on the side, with mainstream investments going into 
classical stock and bond markets. Inhabitants of developed countries are much less likely to 
depend on such new markets for survival – this type of activity (e.g. speculative risks using 
disposable income) can therefore for all intents and purposes be considered a luxury in such 
settings. We therefore posit that: 
H2: The country’s emerging market status will be positively related with Bitcoin trading 
volume over time.  
5.3.5 Corruption and Bitcoin Trading 
Transparency International defines corruption as "the misuse of public power for private 
benefit" (Transparency International, 2010a). Consider a startling statistic: 96% of bitcoins are 
owned by only 4% of investors (formally: addresses)81 – a large portion of the wealth is 
concentrated in few hands. Power concentrates more easily if there is little or no 
controlling/regulatory entity (e.g. Lukes, 2004), as is currently the case with bitcoins.  
According Kaufmann et al. (2009: 4) corruption can be defined as “the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain” and includes such activities as bribery, cronyism, nepotism, 
patronage, graft and embezzlement. The theoretical foundation for the relationship between 
corruption and conducting business in a country focuses on the increase in costs associated with 
corrupt practices—that is, whether or not an entrepreneur gets involved in corrupt activities 
(e.g., Becker 1968). In this context, conducting a criminal act depends on the expected value of 
                                               
81 https://news.bitcoin.com/bitcoin-numbers-21-statistics-reveal-growing-demand-cryptocurrency/ 
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negative outcomes (costs) as well as on the probability of getting caught and prosecuted. Thus, 
if entrepreneurs assume that the legal framework is strong and the restrictions are high, they 
will be less likely to be involved in corrupt activities. Since Bitcoins developed anonymously 
and are often classified as non-legal currency they have been accused of supporting illegal 
transactions82.  
Prior research has reported several areas for illicit activities in the context of Bitcoin trading 
(see for example, Böhme et al. 2015). For example, the early adopters of Bitcoin were 
marketplaces in the internet that valued greater anonymity and the absence of rules concerning 
what could be bought or sold (for example the online sale of drugs). Prior research found that 
the transaction volume grew sharply when these marketplaces introduced Bitcoin. Christin 
(2013) reports that the turnover on the Silk Road anonymous online marketplace, the first 
to support Bitcoin transactions exclusively, reached $15 million per year just one year after it 
began operations. In addition, gambling sites also find Bitcoin attractive, in order to protect 
customer privacy and to receive money from customers unable to use other payment methods. 
Finally, Bitcoin has been used to evade international capital controls such as in China or 
Argentina.  
In addition, in April 2018 Interpol opened a first Working Group on the Cryptocurrencies and 
the Darknet83. Of course, we expect cultural norms to play a large role here; if corruption in a 
country is perceived as commonplace and lighter types of corruption such as tax evasion or 
small bribes to facilitate business transactions are perceived as typical or as only a minor 
transgression with few or no social sanctions, we would expect this to impact the respective 
level of bitcoin trading. Thus, we assume: 
                                               
82 This could indeed be the case if the parties remain anonymous throughout the transaction process or if there is a mafia-like 
structure underlying an account where it is hard to trace back ownership or control to an individual; since many bitcoin trading 
platforms require the use of real names, anonymity is partial at best. Certainly, the speed of both legal and illegal transactions 
can be greatly accelerated with blockchain technology. Speed is often a factor in success of a crime; burglars do not want to 
stick around for the authorities. Criminals may also use cryptocurrencies for money laundering of proceeds from drug trade or 
illegal gambling. 
83 https://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2018/N2018-022 
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H3: The level of perceived corruption in a country is positively related to the country’s Bitcoin 
trading volume over time. 
5.3.6 Corruption and strong regulative institutions 
Work in institutional theory mainly investigates the impact of institutions on organizational 
behaviour. Recent research recognizes not only the central role that institutions play in shaping 
economic actions but also their absence. In particular, research in institutional theory has 
increasingly focused on institutional voids and how firms in emerging markets handle and 
overcome a lack of institutions (Gao et al. 2017) or respond to different levels of institutional 
voids (Narooz & Child, 2017). Institutional voids are often manifested as “gaps between formal 
rules and norms, and their enforcement in daily practice” (Rodrigues 2013: 14). Khanna and 
Palepu (1997: 42) explain that there are three main sources that describe institutional voids  
(1) information problems (2) missing or misguided regulations and (3) inefficient judicial 
systems. The lack of institutions results in high uncertainty: It is easier to engage in corruption 
or theft to conduct business in such an environment that lacks effective political governance, 
and regulatory institutions (e.g. enforcement).  
We assume that the level of institutional voids moderates the link between corruption and 
bitcoin trading. In countries with a high level of perceived corruption, institutional voids create 
opportunities for entrepreneurship (e.g. Puffer, McCarthy and Boisot, 2010). As previously 
mentioned, we expect two mechanisms to play a central role in bitcoin adoption – (1) social 
norms and the legal framework and (2) enforcement.  
Thus, we assume: 
H4: Strong legal regulation of bitcoin trading will positively moderate the relationship 
between corruption and the level of Bitcoin trading over time. 
 212 
5.3.7 Corruption and emerging markets 
Since we expect the direct effects of both corruption and emerging market status on trading 
volume to be significantly positive, for mathematical reasons, we would expect the interaction 
of these independent variables with our dependent variable (Bitcoin trading volume) to be 
positive as well, i.e. that corruption will positively moderate the relationship between emerging 
market status and trading volume. 
If we are in a developing country and –on top of this– one with a high (perceived) level of 
corruption, we would be intuitively more likely to trade even more with Bitcoins to circumvent 
the respective corrupt government. In some developing countries it is relatively normal to pay 
bribes to government officials for simple bureaucratic tasks (e.g. in certain parts of India, see 
Bertrand et al, 200784).  
At the same time, many emerging countries have a large income gap between the rich and the 
poor (and corresponding effects on access to health and education, e.g.  Mohanty and Pathak, 
2009, Seven and Coskun, 2016). Cryptocurrency trading can give people in such countries hope 
of escaping the low income trap. 
If, on the other hand, we are located in an ‘advanced’ country (with comparatively high 
education levels and average income and a reasonable inflation level allowing significant 
accumulation of disposable income), we would expect another regime to take precedence 
underlying the motivation to engage in Bitcoin trading, e.g. that investors seek to earn income 
beyond their normal salary by engaging in high-risk speculative bets, a luxury permitted by 
their stable economic situation. 
In advanced countries, citizens can more easily invest parts of their disposable incomes (e.g. 
into the stock market) without risking not being able to pay their monthly rents. At the same 
time, corruption is likely to be significantly lower overall and is therefore less likely to have an 
                                               
84 For more recent studies in other regions see Blundo et al (2013), Kwong (2015) and Obydenkova & Libman (2015). 
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effect on a given individual. Further, in advanced countries, institutions are often further 
developed (see for example, Wright et al, 2005) which we would expect to dampen the effect 
of corruption on individual traders. We therefore posit: 
H5: The country’s emerging market status will positively moderate the relationships between 
corruption and the level of Bitcoin trading over time.  
5.4 Sample Description 
We utilize a full sample of data on Bitcoin trading volume spanning 46 countries with individual 
currencies, covering the years 2013-2017 from the bitcoin trading platform 
www.localbitcoin.com. This platform, founded in 2012 by two brothers – both technology 
entrepreneurs - is based in Helsinki, Finland. 
We selected Localbitcoins for as our primary data source for several reasons: first, it is the 
platform which is most well-known to be used to trade digital currencies (particularly Bitcoin) 
in developing countries and not just developed countries, allowing us to observe regions and 
countries that would otherwise not be observable. Second, the data was publicly available at 
the time of writing, allowing the replication of results. In addition, we were able to interview 
the founder to clarify the intricacies of the dataset and the history of and users of the platform. 
Further, Localbitcoins’ decentralized model, particularly the reliance on cash transactions in 
local cities, gives us confidence that the majority of trades were conducted in a particular 
country.  
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5.5 Description of Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
5.5.1 Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable is the natural log of the weekly trading volume in US-Dollars per 
country per week. Since our dependent variable is highly skewed (the skewness is 35.895), we 
used the natural logarithm to account for the distribution of the variable.  
5.5.2 Independent Variables 
Corruption. Is measured based on the Corruption perceptions index (CPI) annually provided 
by Transparency International since 199585. It relies on the informed views of analysts, business 
people and experts worldwide, e.g. expert assessment and opinion surveys and is currently 
reported for 176 countries.86 A higher score means the country has less corruption. We used the 
reverse coding of this variable so that a higher score means more corruption to facilitate 
interpretation. The data is only available until 2016. We followed earlier cross-cultural studies 
(e.g., Roulet and Touboul, 2015) and predicted the value for 2017 based on a linear prediction 
of the previous years. Again, for Europe we used the average score from the countries cited 
above.87  
Institutional voids (emerging market). In order to categorize the markets into emerging 
markets and non-emerging while creating a dummy variable where 1 equals emerging markets, 
we used the category provided by the UNDP88 provided by Development Policy and Analysis 
                                               
85 www.transparency.org; Data is available from  
(http://files.transparency.org/content/download/2155/13635/file/CPI2016_FullDataSetWithRegionalTables.xlsx) 
86 https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi  
87 For corruption, the CPI is considered a robust measure and a stronger indicator than that of the World Bank (the 
CPIA), which strikes us as strongly underreporting corruption (e.g. the World Bank assigns a CPIA value of 2 for 
“relatively low” corruption to Afghanistan, known to be a country with historically high public sector corruption). 
88 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf  
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Division (DPAD) of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat (UN/DESA).89 We grouped the three transition countries Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Ukraine into the developed markets categories. However, grouping them into the emerging 
category does not change our results.  
Institutional voids (level of institutional regulation). The level of institutional regulation was 
coded according to the level of regulation in a specific country in four categories (neutral; 
restricted; legal and illegal). The authors coded the categories independent of each other and 
obtained consistent results (over 97% of the cases were clear). For the remaining cases, mostly 
based on the timing of legal changes, the authors discussed the situation and came up with an 
agreement: if a country assigned a legal status, either illegal or legal, to bitcoin trading vs having 
no regulations in place (1=presence of a legal status). The coding was based on the coin Dance 
Website and press releases and was updated by each week. Figure 3 below provides an 
overview over the legal status of Bitcoins in each country in 2018. 
                                               
89 We used this categorization because it is based on various sources and information obtained from the Statistics 
Division and the Population Division of UN/DESA, as well as from the five United Nations regional 
commissions, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations World 
Tourism Organization (UNWTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and national and other private sources provided by the 
countries under investigation. 
 
 216 
Figure 3: Bitcoin legality by country in 2018 
 
Source: https://coin.dance/poli (as accessed on July 6th, 2018) 
5.5.3 Control Variables 
GDP per capita (current USS). We used the GDP per capita defined as the gross domestic 
product divided by midyear population provided by the World Bank as an indicator for 
economic prospects and growth. Data are in current U.S. dollars. We used a linear prediction 
for GDP per capita (current US$) for Venezuela based on the last five years (2010-2014) 
because data were only available until 2014. 
Internet access (percent of population). We control for internet access because people can 
only participate in bitcoin trading if they have access to the internet. Internet users are 
individuals who have used the Internet via a computer, mobile phone, personal digital assistant, 
games machine, digital TV or others (from any location) in the last 3 months measured in 
percent of the population of a particular country. Again, we used the Data provided by the 
World Bank to measure this variable. The data is only available until 2016. Therefore, we used 
a linear prediction from the last available five years to predict the respective values for 2017.  
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Electricity access (percent of population). We again used the data from the World Bank as 
an indicator for access to electricity. We controlled for this variable because of small transaction 
costs and the marginal costs of mining. Again, this data is only available until 2016. Therefore, 
we used a linear prediction from the last available years to predict the values for 2017. 
Population (ln). We further control for the number of people living in a country in a given 
year. Again, we used the data from the World Bank as indicator for population size. To 
normalize the distribution of this variable we used the natural log. 
Number alternative cryptocurrencies. This is a count variable, where we counted the number 
of alternative cryptocurrencies available and active in a particular week. To measure this 
variable, we also studied several press releases and a list provided by Wikipedia90  
Wallet users (ln). Wallets are data files that include Bitcoin accounts, recorded transactions, 
and private keys which are important to spend or transfer the stored value. Since many users 
rely on a digital wallet service that keeps the required files on a shared server with access via 
the web or via phone-based apps (Böhme et al. 2015: 221) we control for the number of wallet 
users in a particular country. We obtained data from the number of wallet users from the 
Blockchain platform. Blockchain is the world's leading (self-declared) software platform for 
digital assets91 The software has powered over 100M transactions and empowered users in 140 
countries across the globe to transact quickly and without costly intermediaries. 
Inflation. We also control for the level of inflation (in percent) in a particular country in a 
particular year which impacts consumer prices.92 We again used the data from the World Bank 
as indicator for inflation.  
Financial stability. Financial Development Index. We used the data provided by the 
International Monetary Fund. The dataset contains nine indices that summarize how developed 
                                               
90 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cryptocurrencies , as accessed on June 1st, 2018 
91 https://blockchain.info/charts/my-wallet-n-users 
92 Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the 
average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, 
such as yearly. 
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financial institutions and financial markets are in terms of their depth, access and efficiency. 
These indices are aggregated into an overall index of financial development.  
Year dummies. We included the year dummies to account for the general trends in the data 
over time. 
Google bitcoin attention (ln). Search requests for the term „bitcoin“ via Google trends93. Note 
that this data is relative. Google trends states “Numbers represent search interest relative to the 
highest point on the chart for the given region and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity 
for the term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. Likewise, a score of zero 
means the term was less than 1% as popular as the peak.” To normalize the distribution of this 
variable we used the natural log. 
Entry week on platform. The respective entry week for Bitcoin trading in a given country on 
our global trading platform (there are 208 weeks in our dataset, but some countries began 
trading later).  
Homicides rate94. Intentional homicides rate (per 100,000 people) based the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crimes International Homicide Statistics database available via the World Bank95. 
Intentional homicides are estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a result of 
domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang 
violence over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups. Intentional 
homicide does not include all intentional killing; the difference is usually in the organization of 
the killing. Individuals or small groups usually commit homicide, whereas killing in armed 
conflict is usually committed by fairly cohesive groups of up to several hundred members and 
is thus usually excluded. For this variable, data were only available until 2015. We predicted 
the values for 2016 and 2017 based on the values available from 2011 until 2015. The average 
                                               
93 https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?q=bitcoin 
94 As corruption is a perceptive measure, we include the homicide rate as a hard indicator of corruption and 
criminality. 
95 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5 
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mean of the standard deviation in this time span was .643 as the number is relatively stable over 
time for a particular country. 
5.6 Model Specification 
Since our data is in panel format, to decide whether the random or fixed effects model is the 
more appropriate regression model, we first ran the regression with random effects and then the 
alternative model with fixed effects, storing the respective estimates. We then ran the Hausman 
specification test to check the appropriateness of the random effects estimator. Hausman's test 
is based on estimating the variance var(b-B) of the difference of the estimators by the difference 
var(b)-var(B) of the respective variances. The test requires a sufficient sample size, a criterion 
which we clearly meet with our dataset of over 8000 observations per country (at the 
aggregated, weekly resolution). It also requires minimal asymptotic variance, which we believe 
is given since our observations are not weighted96. The Hausman test was insignificant 
(Chi^2=17, p>.05) thus supporting the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the 
unique errors and the regressions in the model and that the random effects model is more 
efficient. In addition, as Allison (2009: 3) notes “If predictor variables vary greatly across 
individuals but have little variation over time for each individual, then fixed effects estimates 
will be very imprecise”. While random effects (panel) models allow us to adjust for unobserved 
time-invariant confounders, as a robustness test, we nonetheless additionally report the 
alternative model with fixed effects (see the robustness check and the Appendix).  
                                               
96 For further details, please see the Stata Manual for the hausman command or any good econometrics textbook. 
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5.7 Results 
Table 1 shows our correlation table and the descriptive results. The figure below depicts the 
bitcoin trading volume over time in each nation in our dataset. First, we find that as expected, 
bitcoin trading has experienced phenomenal growth over the last five years in all countries 
observed: The platform clearly launched later in some countries than others. Simultaneously, 
growth patterns differ both in terms of scale and variance (distribution of trades). The countries 
with the overall highest trading volume are the US, UK, Russia, Australia, China and South 
Africa; countries with the lowest overall trading volume include Tanzania, Kazakhstan, 
Indonesia, Hungary, Japan, Vietnam, Denmark and the Dominican Republic. 
 
Figure 4: Weekly Bitcoin Trading over Time by Country 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Table 
# Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Weekly bitcoin trading volume (ln) 13.054 3.069 
                   
2 GDP per capita 24,143.320 23,502.040 -0.3884 
                  
3 Internet access (percent) 64.689 22.172 -0.3280 0.7754 
                 
4 Electricity access (percent) 95.595 13.315 -0.1768 0.3423 0.5461 
                
5 Population (ln) 17.464 1.409 0.3707 -0.5351 -0.6637 -0.3279 
               
6 Number alternative cryptocurrencies 27.751 13.643 0.4765 -0.1226 0.0461 -0.0146 0.0356 
              
7 Wallet users (ln) 15.255 1.115 0.5102 -0.1277 0.0478 -0.0159 0.0237 0.9290 
             
8 Inflation  5.088 10.353 0.2389 -0.2400 -0.2046 -0.0598 0.0857 0.0069 0.0426 
            
9 Financial stability 0.535 0.215 -0.2943 0.8003 0.6010 0.3293 -0.1994 -0.0992 -0.1125 -0.3976 
           
10 Year 2015.322 1.313 0.4944 -0.1240 0.0466 -0.0217 0.0289 0.9857 0.9621 0.0311 -0.1074 
          
11 Region 4.553 2.933 0.1644 -0.3801 -0.5298 -0.3427 0.1780 0.0721 0.0697 0.1061 -0.4552 0.0746 
         
12 Google bitcoin attention (ln) 1.213 0.826 0.2848 0.0982 0.0834 -0.1099 -0.0851 0.4355 0.3958 -0.031 0.0173 0.4249 -0.0603 
        
13 Entry week on platform 15.632 19.593 0.1592 -0.3610 -0.1632 -0.0670 0.0284 0.1834 0.1957 0.2973 -0.4322 0.191 0.0622 0.0134 
       
14 Homicides rate 7.000 11.475 0.3308 -0.4014 -0.3401 -0.1609 0.1805 0.0002 0.0274 0.6694 -0.4051 0.0137 0.0395 -0.1003 0.1861 
      
15 Corruption  46.360 22.299 0.4651 -0.8934 -0.7782 -0.3002 0.5640 0.0964 0.1086 0.4372 -0.7932 0.1036 0.3937 -0.1282 0.4227 0.5583 
     
16 Legal status neutral 0.354 0.478 0.2589 -0.3565 -0.3327 -0.2334 0.1197 -0.1013 -0.0837 0.329 -0.5573 -0.0961 0.284 -0.0470 0.2512 0.2809 0.4357 
    
17 Legal status restricted 0.045 0.207 0.2222 -0.1387 -0.1479 0.0434 0.1269 0.2009 0.1752 0.023 -0.1506 0.1959 0.0764 0.1411 0.1262 -0.0943 0.1354 -0.1137 
   
18 Legal status legal 0.556 0.497 -0.3599 0.4841 0.4224 0.1626 -0.3005 0.0577 0.0527 -0.3163 0.6147 0.0588 -0.2684 0.0534 -0.3101 -0.2094 -0.5833 -0.8029 -0.2358 
  
19 Legal status illegal 0.045 0.208 0.0771 -0.2044 -0.1191 0.0748 0.2838 -0.0737 -0.0776 0.0063 -0.086 -0.082 -0.0448 -0.1218 0.0621 -0.0324 0.2580 -0.1624 -0.0477 -0.3369 
 
20 Emerging market (=1) 0.578 0.494 0.1294 -0.3984 -0.6565 -0.3060 0.2698 0.0532 0.0638 0.2403 -0.326 0.06 0.3895 -0.0428 0.0649 0.4013 0.5165 0.1736 0.0674 -0.1798 -0.0112 
 
(obs=8,062) 
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We test the hypothesized effects based on Table 2 Model 6. Several robustness checks showed 
a highly consistent picture for the main effects in models without interaction terms (see also the 
fixed effects models in the Appendix). In the additional analysis we investigate in greater detail 
how the level of institutional regulation impacts bitcoin trading. First, in H1 we stated that a 
strong legal regulation will be negatively related with Bitcoin trading volume over time. We 
find (Table 2, Model 6) that the coefficient of the level of regulation in a country has a negative 
and significant impact on the trading volume in a particular country (ß=-0.135, p<.05).  
Second, in our second hypothesis (H2), we assumed that emerging markets have a higher 
bitcoin trading than non-emerging markets. We find that in Model 5 (Table 2) the country’s 
emerging market status is significantly positively related with Bitcoin trading volume over time 
(ß=1.806, p<.05). Thus, we can support H2. However, in Model 6 (Table 2) with the interaction 
terms, this positive main relationship turns negative and is slightly significant (ß=-2.519, 
p<.05).  
In H3 we hypothesized that the level of perceived corruption would be significantly positively 
related with Bitcoin trading volume over time. However, contrary to H3, we find (Table 2, 
Model 6) that the coefficient of the level of perceived corruption in a country has a negative 
and significant impact on the trading volume in a particular country (ß=-0.081, p<.001). 
Next, in H4, we stated that a strong legal regulation of bitcoin trading will negatively moderate 
the relationship between corruption and the level of Bitcoin trading over time: The coefficient 
for the interaction term between corruption and a strong legal status is indeed negatively 
significant (ß=-0.005, p<.001), supporting our H4. 
Finally, we assumed in H5 that a country’s emerging market status positively moderates the 
relationship between corruption and the level of Bitcoin trading over time. In Model 6 (Table 
2) the coefficient for the interaction term is significant and positive (ß= 0.107, p<.001), 
supporting our hypothesis H5.   
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Table 2: Random-effects GLS Panel regression (DV: Bitcoin Trading by Country) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Emerging market (=1) 
  
1.789* 
 
1.806* -2.519* 
   
(0.808) 
 
(0.750) (1.069) 
Legal status regulation 
   
-0.368*** -0.361*** -0.135** 
    
(0.023) (0.023) (0.051) 
Corruption  
 
-0.049*** 
  
-0.041*** -0.081*** 
  
(0.010) 
  
(0.010) (0.014) 
Corruption x Legal status regulation  
    
-0.005*** 
      
(0.001) 
Corruption x emerging market 
    
0.107*** 
      
(0.018) 
GDP per capita -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet access (percent) 0.017* 0.021** 0.020* 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.051*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Electricity access (percent) 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.127*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 0.115*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Population (ln) 1.023*** 1.383*** 0.862*** 1.083*** 1.224*** 1.125*** 
 
(0.247) (0.261) (0.260) (0.227) (0.248) (0.251) 
Number alternative cryptocurrencies -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.043*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Wallet users (ln) 1.499*** 1.489*** 1.500*** 1.511*** 1.504*** 1.507*** 
 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) 
Inflation  -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.042*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Financial stability -5.139*** -6.783*** -4.964*** -7.052*** -8.280*** -7.283*** 
 
(0.977) (1.034) (0.983) (0.956) (1.014) (1.020) 
Year dummies included included included included included included 
 
      
Google bitcoin attention (ln) 0.673*** 0.678*** 0.672*** 0.659*** 0.663*** 0.668*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Entry week on platform 0.024 0.036* 0.017 0.004 0.007 0.013 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Homicides rate -0.148*** -0.152*** -0.156*** -0.139*** -0.149*** -0.151*** 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Constant -36.293*** -39.190*** -34.764*** -35.042*** -35.939*** -35.074*** 
Chi2 14681.456 14759.327 14701.297 15333.982 15405.27 15587.211 
N 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 
Legend: † p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
    
 
  
 224 
Next, we report the results of our control variables again based on Table 2, Model 6. First, we 
see that GPD per capita is negative and significant but the overall effect is very small (ß=-0.000, 
p<.001). Second, we find that the percent of population with internet access in a given country 
is positively significant (ß=0.051, p<.001). The same is the case for access to electricity 
(ß=0.115, p<.001) and the natural log of population (ß=0.125, p<.001). The number of 
alternative cryptocurrencies in the market at a given point in time is negatively significantly 
related to trading volume (ß=-0.043, p<.001). The natural log of the number of wallet users is 
significantly positively related to the level of bitcoin trading over time (ß=1.507, p<001). 
Further, we find that inflation (ß=-0.042, p<.001) and financial stability (ß=-7.283, p<.001) in 
a given country is significantly negatively related to bitcoin trading volume over time. Next, 
we find that Google attention to Bitcoin (the natural log of the quantity of Google searches for 
“Bitcoin” in each country) is significantly positively related to trading volume (ß=0.668, 
p<.001). While entry week (the week a country began trading on our platform) is positive but 
not significantly related to trading (ß=0.013, n.s.). The homicides rate in a given country is 
significantly negatively related to Bitcoin trading volume (ß=-0.151, p<.001). 
5.8 Additional Analysis 
To investigate our hypothesis in greater detail we conducted two additional analysis. First, we 
investigated H5 in greater detail and in this sense the question how the level of institutional 
regulation impacts bitcoin trading over time, we split the level of institutional regulation in the 
different categories (i.e., neutral, regulated, legal and illegal). Table 3 Model 10 shows the 
coefficients for the interaction between corruption and legal status. We find that the interaction 
between corruption and legal status restricted is significant and positive (ß=0.03, p<.05), the 
interaction term between corruption and legal status legal is indeed negatively significant (ß=-
0.218, p<.001) and the interaction term between corruption and legal status illegal is in the 
 225 
model with only one interaction (Model 8) highly significant negative but in the full model 
(Model 10) only slightly significant negative (ß=-0.289†, p<.1). These results strengthen our 
hypotheses that a greater institutional regulation (i.e., declaring bitcoin trading as either legal 
or illegal) has a negative impact on bitcoin trading. A graphical illustration of these results is 
displayed below (Figure 5). Figure 5 illustrates the strong moderation effect of corruption on 
the relationship between legal status illegal and bitcoin trading. The higher the level of 
perceived corruption the lower the bitcoin trading volume if trading is declared as illegal.  
 
Figure 5: Interaction between level of institutional regulation and corruption 
 
Note: Figure is based on Model 10 in Table 3. 
Figure 6 displays the interaction between emerging market and corruption. Figure 6 shows how 
corruption impacts emerging and non-emerging markets differently. 
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Figure 6: Interaction between Emerging Market Status and Corruption 
 
Note: Figure is based on Model 10 in Table 3. 
 
Second, we investigated in greater detail the regions in which bitcoin trading has the strongest 
impact beyond the dichotomous categorization of emerging market and non-emerging market 
(Table 4, Model 6). We study nine different geo-cultural regions with the Anglo-America 
region serving as a base category. We used the region categories from the GLOBE study (House 
et al, 2004) and the regions are Confucian Asia region, Eastern Europe region, Latin Europe 
region, Middle East, Nordic Europe, Southern Asia Sub-Sahara Africa region. We find that, 
compared to Anglo-America, the Confucian Asia as well as Middle east region (ß=-0.063, n.s.) 
is negatively but not significant related to trading volume. The coefficients for Eastern Europe 
(ß=-1.234, p<.001), Latin Europe (ß=-2.397, p<.001) and Latin America (ß=-1.939, p<.001) are 
significant and negative. However, Southern Asia (ß=1.286, p<.001) and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(ß=2.045, p<.001) are significantly positively related to Bitcoin trading volume. 
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Table 3: Random-effects GLS Panel regression (DV: Bitcoin Trading by Country) with interaction categories 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Emerging market (=1) 
  
1.789* 
 
1.693* 1.536* 1.484†  1.904* -2.093†  -2.189* 
   
(0.808) 
 
(0.777) (0.730) (0.782) (0.759) (1.102) (1.073) 
Legal status restricted (Base: Status neutral) 
   
0.466*** 0.445*** -1.493* 0.697*** 0.432*** 0.370*** -1.218* 
    
(0.103) (0.103) (0.595) (0.106) (0.103) (0.104) (0.592) 
Legal status Illegal (Base: Status neutral) 
   
-0.801*** -0.796*** -0.802*** 13.486*** -0.870*** -0.841*** 13.448*** 
    
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (1.584) (0.111) (0.111) (1.578) 
Legal status legal (Base: Status neutral) 
   
-1.103*** -1.081*** -1.090*** -1.021*** -0.268†  -1.119*** -0.289†  
    
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.156) (0.074) (0.156) 
Corruption  
 
-0.049*** 
  
-0.037*** -0.042*** -0.029** -0.024* -0.087*** -0.070*** 
  
(0.010) 
  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) 
Corruption x Legal status restricted  
     
0.032*** 
   
0.030** 
      
(0.010) 
   
(0.010) 
Corruption x Legal status Illegal 
      
-0.216*** 
  
-0.218*** 
       
(0.024) 
  
(0.024) 
Corruption x Legal status legal 
       
-0.020*** 
 
-0.019*** 
        
(0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
Corruption x emerging market 
        
0.090*** 0.091*** 
         
(0.018) (0.018) 
GDP per capita -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet access (percent) 0.017* 0.021** 0.020* 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.052*** 0.035*** 0.044*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Electricity access (percent) 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.127*** 0.115*** 0.114*** 0.111*** 0.118*** 0.110*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Population (ln) 1.023*** 1.383*** 0.862*** 1.051*** 1.174*** 1.184*** 1.128*** 1.289*** 1.015*** 1.081*** 
 
(0.247) (0.261) (0.260) (0.233) (0.256) (0.241) (0.258) (0.251) (0.261) (0.252) 
Number alternative cryptocurrencies -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.043*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Wallet users (ln) 1.499*** 1.489*** 1.500*** 1.510*** 1.503*** 1.501*** 1.486*** 1.507*** 1.504*** 1.489*** 
 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Inflation  -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.044*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Financial stability -5.139*** -6.783*** -4.964*** -6.753*** -7.871*** -7.950*** -7.933*** -7.290*** -7.370*** -6.996*** 
 
(0.977) (1.034) (0.983) (0.961) (1.020) (1.011) (1.017) (1.019) (1.026) (1.019) 
Year dummies included included included included included included included Included Included included 
 
          
Google bitcoin attention (ln) 0.673*** 0.678*** 0.672*** 0.668*** 0.671*** 0.674*** 0.696*** 0.676*** 0.671*** 0.704*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Entry week on platform 0.024 0.036* 0.017 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.010 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Homicides rate -0.148*** -0.152*** -0.156*** -0.138*** -0.148*** -0.135*** -0.149*** -0.139*** -0.154*** -0.140*** 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Constant -36.293*** -39.190*** -34.764*** -35.038*** -35.810*** -35.150*** -35.355*** -39.766*** -32.210*** -34.907*** 
Chi2 14681.456 14759.327 14701.297 15562.855 15626.767 15616.353 15872.5 15712.733 15705.096 16054.244 
N 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 
Legend: † p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 4: Random-effects GLS Panel regression (DV: Bitcoin Trading by Country) with 
regions 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Emerging market (=1) 
  
2.950** 
 
3.103*** -1.449*** 
   
(0.975) 
 
(0.878) (0.274) 
Legal status restricted (Base: Status neutral) 
  
0.451*** 0.434*** -5.748*** 
    
(0.119) (0.119) (0.789) 
Legal status Illegal  (Base: Status neutral) 
  
-0.865*** -0.863*** 0.653 
    
(0.118) (0.118) (1.895) 
Legal status legal  (Base: Status neutral) 
  
-1.063*** -1.081*** 1.452*** 
    
(0.083) (0.082) (0.183) 
Corruption  
 
-0.066*** 
  
-0.035** 0.182*** 
  
(0.013) 
  
(0.012) (0.006) 
Corruption x Legal status restricted  
    
0.112*** 
      
(0.013) 
Corruption x Legal status Illegal 
    
-0.043 
      
(0.029) 
Corruption x Legal status legal 
    
-0.075*** 
      
(0.003) 
Corruption x emerging market 
    
-0.016* 
      
(0.006) 
GDP per capita -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet access (percent) 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.016†  0.021* -0.001 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) 
Electricity access (percent) 0.289*** 0.281*** 0.277*** 0.232*** 0.229*** 0.053*** 
 
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.011) 
Population (ln) 0.601* 0.964** 0.706*** 0.586* 0.848*** -0.112** 
 
(0.299) (0.328) (0.209) (0.237) (0.198) (0.040) 
Number alternative cryptocurrencies -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.031*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Wallet users (ln) 1.440*** 1.432*** 1.435*** 1.451*** 1.445*** 1.426*** 
 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) (0.084) 
Inflation  -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.066*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Financial stability -4.691** -7.711*** -4.467** -5.040*** -5.771*** 5.227*** 
 
(1.588) (1.713) (1.419) (1.489) (1.452) (0.343) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
      
Confucian Asia region (Base: Anglo America 
region) 
-4.026** -4.031** -5.322*** -3.470*** -4.943*** -0.146 
 
(1.287) (1.375) (1.086) (1.015) (0.966) (0.146) 
Eastern Europe region  (Base: Anglo America 
region) 
-4.131** -3.514* -3.142** -4.043*** -2.674** -1.234*** 
 
(1.525) (1.630) (1.079) (1.217) (0.970) (0.174) 
Latin Europe region  (Base: Anglo America region) -3.634* -3.196†  -4.094*** -3.542** -3.880*** -2.397*** 
 
(1.647) (1.763) (1.183) (1.297) (1.046) (0.143) 
Latin America region  (Base: Anglo America region) 1.886 3.630* -1.458 0.365 -1.850†  -1.939*** 
 
(1.347) (1.459) (1.238) (1.102) (1.115) (0.194) 
Middle East region  (Base: Anglo America region) -4.719** -3.835* -6.639*** -4.576*** -6.099*** -0.063 
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
(1.669) (1.788) (1.467) (1.332) (1.308) (0.201) 
Nordic Europe region  (Base: Anglo America region) -2.365 -3.070†  -1.366 -2.094 -1.542 0.175 
 
(1.659) (1.777) (1.150) (1.305) (1.015) (0.109) 
Southern Asia region  (Base: Anglo America region) -0.504 0.560 -2.933* -1.092 -2.769* 1.286*** 
 
(1.454) (1.557) (1.323) (1.180) (1.182) (0.166) 
Sub-Sahara Africa region  (Base: Anglo America 
region) 
10.152*** 10.732*** 7.191*** 7.099** 5.235** 2.045*** 
 
(2.652) (2.789) (2.113) (2.231) (1.928) (0.450) 
Google bitcoin attention (ln) 0.646*** 0.653*** 0.650*** 0.653*** 0.656*** 0.715*** 
 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) 
Entry week on platform 0.037 0.055* 0.030†  0.017 0.023 -0.040*** 
 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.003) 
Homicides rate -0.170*** -0.185*** -0.119*** -0.123*** -0.088*** 0.105*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.005) 
Constant -
41.322*** 
-
43.155*** 
-
42.961*** 
-
35.267*** 
-
39.073*** 
-
20.755*** 
Chi2 9895.3434 9984.1109 9763.3687 10479.386 10408.579 15632.25
1 
N 6,068 6,068 6,068 6,068 6,068 6,068 
Legend: † p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
    
 
The table below summarizes our hypothesized effects and findings (Table 5): 
 
Table 5: Summary of Hypothesized Effects and Findings 
# Hypothesis Type Finding 
H1 Strong legal regulation will be negatively related with Bitcoin trading volume over time. Direct effect (-) Supported (-) 
H2 
The country’s emerging market status will be 
positively related with Bitcoin trading volume 
over time. 
Direct effect (+) Supported (+) 
H3 
The level of perceived corruption in a country is 
positively related to the country’s Bitcoin trading 
volume over time. 
Direct effect (+) Contrary (-) 
H4 
Corruption will negatively moderate the 
relationship between strong legal regulation and 
the level of Bitcoin trading over time. 
Interaction (-) Supported (-) 
H5 
The country’s emerging market status will 
positively moderate the relationship between 
corruption and the level of Bitcoin trading over 
time. 
Interaction (+) Supported (+) 
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5.9 Robustness Checks 
To rule out spurious effects due to misspecification of our variables and model specifications, 
we re-run our model with a fixed effect regression and our results stay the same (Table 6,  
Appendix). However, in this regression we lose two variables (entry week and emerging market 
category) due to their time invariant nature.  
To further underscore the robustness of our data, we ran the same model again with an alternate 
operationalization of our dependent variable. First, we used a relative measure - the Trading 
Volume (per country over time) divided by the GDP per capita (per country over time) with 
similar results. Finally, to see how well our model explains Bitcoin awareness, we ran an 
additional model with Google Awareness (search results for “Bitcoin”) as the dependent 
variable. 
 
5.10 Discussion  
Our finding that strong legal regulation is negatively related with Bitcoin trading volume over 
time (H1) is in line with our theoretical expectations. First, clearly a ban in a given country 
would significantly hamper trading. This would also be a questionable tactic for governments 
as it would force certain traders into the criminal space or to use alternative services, if 
available, that are likely to be much less transparent than the publicly available general 
transaction ledger underlying Bitcoin trade. Consider for example, how banning the sale of 
Marihuana forces sellers into illegal territory with no possibility for the government to control 
quality or to benefit from potentially sizeable sales tax revenues, both driving forces behind the 
recent legalization movement in the US. Similarly, history has shown that the prohibition of 
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alcohol sales initially drives up the price but ultimately leads to the growth and legitimation of 
urban crime organizations (e.g. in the US in the 1920s). Strong legal regulation in place of a 
ban, would also extinguish innovation in this bustling new sector and would make trading less 
attractive. 
Second, our finding that country’s emerging market status is positively related with Bitcoin 
trading volume (H2) supports our contention that emerging markets are using Bitcoins to 
leapfrog over outdated technologies (e.g. Fudenberg, Stiglitz & Tirole, 1983) in order to catch 
up with advanced countries. In addition, in some countries such as Venezuela, Bitcoins seem 
to be used for survival motives, acting as a substitute (store of value) for hyperinflated local 
currencies. Our finding also supports our expectation that in advanced countries, Bitcoin trading 
is more of a luxury (speculative, high-risk investment activity). 
Our finding that the level of perceived corruption in a country is negatively related to the 
country’s Bitcoin trading volume over time (contradicting H3) is surprising as it is most 
commonly assumed that such trading is used to launder illicit economic activity and for tax 
evasion. One explanation for this could be that cryptocurrency transactions can play a role in 
closing perceived trust gaps (e.g. information asymmetry) between transaction partners, as such 
transactions are publicly recorded in a global digital ledger, requiring little or no intermediation.  
Next, we discuss our findings on the hypothesized interactions. First, our finding that the 
perceived level of corruption negatively moderates the relationship between strong legal 
regulation and the level of bitcoin trading over time as predicted (H4), makes intuitive sense: 
where strong legal legislation is in place (e.g. considerable trading restrictions or an outright 
ban), a high level of (perceived) corruption would imply that the legislation would have less 
effect on trading volume.  Where people are willing to bend the rules, they are more likely to 
ignore laws. Lastly, our finding that the country’s emerging market status positively moderates 
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the relationship between corruption and the level of bitcoin trading over time is in line with our 
theoretical expectations (H5): Our results here again support the leapfrogging hypothesis (e.g. 
Fudenberg, Stiglitz & Tirole, 1983) but also indicate the role of institutional voids as 
contingencies (e.g. Khanna and Palepu, 1997).  Corruption seems to play a stronger role in 
emerging than in developed countries, where strong institutions can act as a buffer to mitigate 
the effects of corruption. In emerging markets, Bitcoin trading may also serve as a method to 
circumvent unnecessary interaction with corrupt government officials. 
These results have both theoretical (e.g. for research streams that juxtapose innovation, 
institutional voids, corruption and trust) and practical implications (e.g. for cryptopreneurs97, 
institutional entrepreneurs and policy-makers. From a practical perspective, effective 
innovation policies for cryptocurrencies will require regulators to walk a fine line between 
sanction mechanisms and enforcement, on the one hand, and incentive structures on the other: 
while preventing largescale fraud and tax evasion is of course necessary, this should be 
implemented without choking a rapidly emerging and innovative market with the potential for 
job-creation and for revitalizing often volatile economies. Also, since cryptopreneurs are 
particularly active in emerging countries, this could be a sign that governments in such countries 
see the (decentralized) crypto-space as a potential mechanism to help them catch up with more 
highly developed countries by means of leapfrogging (e.g. Fudenberg, Stiglitz & Tirole, 1983) 
and mastering the digital transformation. If so, this would lead to a purposefully low degree of 
regulation in such markets, in line with the view of transaction cost economics (e.g. North & 
North, 1992; Williamson, 1979). North argues that lower transaction costs –the costs of trade– 
lead to economic growth and that institutions play a key role in either raising or lowering 
transaction costs (North, 1992). 
In an interview with a blogger Russ Roberts in September 2006, Nobel Laureate Milton 
Friedman suggests that the money supply should be controlled not by human beings with often 
                                               
97 We use the term cryptopreneurs to refer to entrepreneurs in the cryptocurrency space, who inspired this study. 
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misaligned incentive structures, but by a computer program: "Roberts: But the alternative, the 
elected system, has the problem that you mentioned earlier of the temptation to exploit the 
ability to create money to increase revenue. Friedman (replies): But that’s why what you want—
if possible—is a mechanical system." 98 In the discussion that follows, Friedman later remarks: 
“If you really carried out the logic concerning the quantity of money, you deprive the Federal 
Reserve of anything to do. Suppose the Federal Reserve said it was going to increase the 
quantity of money by 4 percent a year, year after year, week after week, month after month. 
That would be a purely mechanical project. You could program a computer to do that.” A mere 
three years later, a person with the alias Satoshi Nakamoto created the Bitcoin algorithm, the 
first truly decentralized currency. Recently we even witnessed the situation were Venezuelan 
President Maduro stated he would peg the local currency to the state-initiated and monitored 
cryptocurrency, “Petro” (named after the country’s considerable oil supply) – a desperate move 
to attempt to temper hyperinflation in the country. Our findings imply that, while without any 
regulation society could be harmed, regulation can be detrimental if those in charge of 
regulating are not highly competent. In early phases of a new market, public discourse is 
therefore highly important to the healthy growth of a new market and to balancing the needs of 
society with those of entrepreneurs and early adopters. 
If Bitcoins are not primarily traded for illicit but for legal reasons as our exploratory study 
implies (both the perception of high corruption in a country and the actual homicide rate are 
negatively related to overall trading volume), cryptocurrencies could pave the way for just such 
a system, earlier than most people –Nobel Laureates aside– anticipated. For entrepreneurs, our 
findings imply that in early phases of a new market, it can be a good strategy to stay under the 
radar, particularly in countries with high perceived levels of corruption. 
We also believe that the results have implications for other contested markets linked to digital 
innovation (e.g. peer-to-peer vs. classical lending or the emergence of crowdfunding vs. 
                                               
98 http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2006/Friedmantranscript.html  
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traditional venture capital). In conclusion, we want to emphasize that our paper examines 
surprising new market developments and finds interesting results worth further study that link 
to the conference theme. 
 
5.11 Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has a number of limitations. First, our measure of corruption (the CPI), is a perceptive 
measure. Hazards of governance indexes are well documented and some authors criticize 
governance assessment, mostly on methodological grounds (e.g. Arndt & Oman, 2006). Self-
reported measures rely on the accounts of others, which may have incentives for 
misrepresentation. However, as this is the case for all countries in which the respective indicator 
is compiled, cross-national differences should nonetheless remain highly informative. 
In addition, some authors have suggested that measurement bias can be a concern with 
government indexes (e.g. Olken, 2009). For instance, Olken (2009) suggest that countries added 
to the index very recently may be discriminated in the CPI due to perceptive biases spread by 
the media. Since our analysis observes only a subset of 43 countries available on the chosen 
trading platform which have all been part of the index for a considerable number of years, we 
believe that we can rule out this type of measurement bias for our analysis. Further, while it is 
arguably more direct to survey traders on the chosen online platform about their perceptions of 
corruption, this would be time and cost prohibitive (e.g. due to the number of countries and 
necessary translators involved). Also, fine-grained data on corruption are notoriously difficult 
to obtain and are often available only for few countries and a limited number of years (Fréchette, 
2006).  
Further research could include event history analysis or other multi-method approaches (e.g. 
combining qualitative findings with our or an alternative quantitative approach). In addition, 
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further cross-societal comparisons and survey measures could elucidate counter-intuitive 
findings such as in this study and would be informative in shaping future research and policy 
to support entrepreneurship in newly contested digital markets. 
Finally, while our model focuses on corruption and institutional voids, future studies could also 
study how the role of trust shapes the market for bitcoin trading. That is, how does the level of 
generalized societal trust impact trading volume overall and differently in emerging vs. 
developed countries? What about the role of institutions and trust in innovative new 
technologies? These are some of the questions we seek to explore with an ongoing global survey 
on the trust in and the perception of Bitcoins and cryptocurrencies worldwide. 
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5.13 Appendix – Table 6: Fixed Effect Regression 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Legal status regulation 
  
-0.346*** -0.340*** -0.140** 
   
(0.023) (0.023) (0.052) 
Corruption  
 
-0.048*** 
 
-0.037*** -0.025* 
  
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Corruption x Legal status regulation 
   
-0.005*** 
     
(0.001) 
GDP per capita -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet access (percent) 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.060*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Electricity access (percent) 0.197*** 0.187*** 0.180*** 0.172*** 0.169*** 
 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
Population (ln) -24.912*** -22.135*** -22.057*** -19.957*** -19.134*** 
 
(2.337) (2.415) (2.314) (2.389) (2.394) 
Number alternative cryptocurrencies -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.042*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Wallet users (ln) 1.524*** 1.515*** 1.533*** 1.526*** 1.527*** 
 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Inflation  -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.042*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Financial stability -2.570* -3.902*** -5.413*** -6.396*** -6.009*** 
 
(1.101) (1.139) (1.103) (1.138) (1.140) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
 
     
Google bitcoin attention (ln) 0.664*** 0.668*** 0.653*** 0.656*** 0.659*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Homicide rate -0.268*** -0.279*** -0.263*** -0.272*** -0.267*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant 407.078*** 362.668*** 360.397*** 326.823*** 311.243*** 
AIC 25717.691 25699.538 25502.654 25492.332 25475.328 
N 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 8,062 
Legend: † p<.1; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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